

Hard Power and National Security

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- In this lecture, I will examine the issue of the use of military force by states (or 'hard power'). I define 'hard power' for the purpose of this lecture in two dimensions. First, it is a *capacity*. By this I mean the capacity of states to effectively use military force. Secondly, its usage creates *effects*. By this I mean that when states *employ* military force, hard power is what is used to threaten, coerce or harm other actors, such that they are dissuaded, deterred or compelled to take a course of action which they otherwise would not have taken.
- As I wish to focus in this lecture on the use of *military force* as a key element of national security strategy, I have deliberately excluded other coercive capacities of the state, such as law enforcement, covert action, and economic sanctions, but I do recognise that any comprehensive treatment of national power would have to treat these and other capacities as components of a continuum.
- My thesis tonight is that we must resist the temptation to think that hard power has diminished in utility since the supposed decline of the era of wars between states, and the rise of what are termed 'non-traditional security issues'. These rarely lend themselves to solutions exclusively reliant on hard power. Here I mean issues such as weak and failed states, the security impacts of climate change, resource scarcity (concerning energy, food and water) and population pressures, the wide variety of transnational threats such as extremism, terrorism and international organised crime, as well as the risks and threats which are becoming more apparent in the 'dark side' of globalisation and the information revolution, such as cyber crime and terrorism, aviation, transport and border security risks, and maritime security risks.
- The faultlines and strategic pathologies of globalisation, and the risks and opportunities of the information revolution, will make for a wide range of possible futures, and as a practitioner I can tell you advisedly that this is already complicating national security planning. Since the end of the Cold War, we have rightly therefore changed how we think about national security – largely because the emergence of these new security issues has broadened the very concept of national security, so that it is now concerned with much more than the traditional relationships between states.
- In part, however, the change in our thinking has also been driven by the rise of 'soft power' strategies. Soft power is founded on the idea that an actor's values, and its ability to persuade others, rather than coercing them, are critical capacities of national power. Central to the 'rise of soft power' has been the converse idea that the utility of hard power has diminished. In the more complex strategic

environment which has emerged since the end of the Cold War, it has become clear that states need to work together on common problems which might otherwise overwhelm their individual capacity to respond. In doing so, they generally have to seek to persuade and influence one another, rather than making demands and dictating outcomes.

- This focus on soft power is to be welcomed. Soft power approaches should have increased weight in any integrated and comprehensive national security strategy. Hard power, however, still needs to retain a presence within any national security portfolio, beyond being used to wage war as a last resort in defence of the nation. Hard power is a necessary capacity if a state wishes to dissuade, deter or compel other actors, which will sometimes be required for the effective functioning of the global order.

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- What does the idea of 'the global order' mean in this context? After the Cold War ended, strategic optimists developed a particular view of the emerging global order. They argued that due to the virtuous circle of interdependency and integration within globalisation, and the collapse of the communist system, we had seen – or would see - the 'end of history'. Over time, new supranational models of sovereignty would reduce the incidence of war and conflict. Strategic pessimists, however, argued that with the ending of the Cold War, new forms of fragmentation, confrontation and conflict would emerge, driven by the fault-lines of the 'clash of civilisations', traditional power politics, the increased incidence of weak and failed states, and the sundry other global pathologies which had revealed themselves in the post-Cold War landscape.
- I am not going to try and resolve these arguments in this lecture. My contention is that we need to be very clear in our thinking about these deep strategic currents regarding the nature of the global order – especially when thinking about hard power. In this lecture, I will need therefore to chance my arm: if a coherent view of the global order is crucial to our understanding of hard power and national security, is there a construct which might make sense? In my view, a normative and empirical construct which helps us to think clearly about the global order is the idea of *modernity* - which is associated with the tendencies of global interdependency and integration noted above, and characterised by the maximization of opportunities for citizens and civil society. Modernity creates a transparent, rules-based order within societies, centred on the adherence to the rule of law, and the upholding of liberties and rights. These are in my view not 'Western values' but 'human values' - but that is another lecture!
- Modernity also creates, and relies upon, global interdependence, and adherence to rules-based behaviour at the international level – from the resolution of trade disputes and territorial boundaries, to the aversion of war and the making of peace. The Australian Government subscribes to the view that a functioning rules-based global order is a vital prerequisite for creating a secure and stable environment in which states, citizens and companies can interact, to mutual advantage.

- Such a global order does not, however, spring into existence as a natural phenomena, and nor is its continued existence pre-ordained and immutable. Such an order has to be formed and sustained through human agency and practice. It requires the establishment of a set of rules and norms for managing human affairs across borders, and widespread adherence to those rules and norms. It also requires mechanisms for ensuring compliance and, where necessary, rules enforcement. Absent means of compliance and enforcement, any order prescribed by rules and norms would become problematic.
- Unsanctioned violence within the global order - whether in the state-centric international system or within states – needs therefore to be treated as a strategic pathology. In order to enforce the global order’s rules of stability, and ensure compliance with these rules, the pathology of violence has to be dealt with, *in extremis*, through a grand strategy of ‘counterwar’, where other responses are likely to be ineffective, or have proved to be so. Counterwar means the employment of ‘violence to stop violence’ (or the application of ‘counterviolence’). This means the sanctioned and calibrated use of hard power by like-minded states which recognise that each state’s national security now depends on the collective enforcement of the rules and the countering of pathological strategic violence.
- I am not suggesting that modernity as an order is a universal state of affairs, that there will ever be a universal consensus about it, or that resistant or ungoverned spaces which are outside of the order will magically cease to exist. It is, however, a sound empirical way of thinking, insofar as such a rules-based global order is emerging, even if not universally, with these features. It is also a useful normative policy basis for determining policy aims and strategic objectives - insofar as such an order is worth protecting - and for judging the legitimacy and the legal frameworks which should surround the use of hard power.

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- Some actors, including states, do not accept the values, legitimacy or structure of the global order and will continue to pursue aims and objectives which are detrimental to the functioning of that order. Such actors will generally look to operate in or from places where the rules and norms of the global order are weak or non-existent, or are yet to be formulated. Some will seek to exploit parts of the global commons (for instance, pirates in ungoverned maritime spaces and criminal or terrorist actors in cyberspace), or the ‘non-integrating periphery’ of the global order (for instance, terrorists, warlords and insurgents operating in and from weak or failed states). The internal freedoms and liberties of states of modernity also provide opportunities for such actors (for instance, for mounting terror attacks). In these and other cases, soft power will be relevant (for instance, in countering and containing the spread of the extremist ideology of al-Qa’ida), but sometimes we will need to be prepared to fight, exhibiting all the necessary intent to do so, and maintaining the capacity to follow through.
- States need to be prepared to support their policy aims with hard power on occasion, seeking wherever possible to avoid the use of force because of its human cost. Of determinative importance will be the extent to which the state has

a strategic interest in achieving, or being able to achieve, the dissuasion, deterrence and compellence of other actors, some of whom will be states. If these are imperative requirements, hard power has to be present, to some extent, in the state's portfolio of capacities. An expansive view of hard power is, however, contrarian thinking. The use of force is typically collapsed into the idea of waging war, and is seen in turn as a last resort, concerned either with the physical defence of the nation or the necessary means to defeat a tyranny such as Nazism. We need to take a much more subtle view of hard power.

- If we develop hard power and demonstrate a capacity to use it effectively and legitimately, in a manner consistent with our international obligations, it can help to ensure that the rules are enforced, aggression is deterred, and pathological strategic behaviour is discouraged, and perhaps even altered. Hard power, without necessarily used in anger, can bolster our diplomacy, deter a potential adversary, reassure a vulnerable ally or partner which is at risk of being coerced, dissuade an aggressor from committing acts of war, or unleashing mass atrocities against a vulnerable population, protect the global sea lanes and other global commons, or put steel into sanctions against a state which is flouting the rules.
- Hard power is the essential instrument of the 'optimistic realist' – which I define as somebody who believes in a global order of norms and rules, promotes its emergence and has a basis for thinking that it has taken root (the optimistic tendency) - but who recognises that the order's protection, and the enforcement of its rules, requires an capacity to do more than rely on the ability to persuade and influence (the realist tendency).
- None of this means that force has to be actually used by the state to achieve strategic effects. To the contrary, perceptions about the potential use of hard power (whether those perceptions are generated by threat or implication) are often a more effective enabler of such outcomes, without there being necessary any actual violent acts by the state. This requires the state to effectively judge what an actual or potential adversary values, and apply hard power effects through statecraft - such that the adversary is either constrained from undertaking a course of action, or compelled to take a course of action, without the need for violence to be employed. There is, in other words, a 'diplomacy of force' involved in the art of employing hard power.
- We can see this most evidently when hard power is deployed in a pre-conflict crisis or confrontation, for instance as part of proactive diplomatic efforts to persuade an aggressor state not to conduct acts of violence, either against another state or its own population, or to cease such acts of violence – on pain of being subjected to harm through counterviolence. Hard power, in the form of deployed carrier battle groups, amphibious assault groups, and air combat fighter and bomber wings, can be positioned so as to make real in the mind of an adversary the threat of counterviolence. Strategic forces based in the home territory of the state conducting a counterwar strategy, such as long-range strategic bomber and missile forces and airborne forces, can be placed on alert, in ways that can be 'read' by the aggressor state. Threats of force, as well as the use of force itself, have communicative elements, and we need to understand the vital importance of hard power signals, symbols and messaging, whether they are explicit or tacit.

- These are subtle, but not abstract, effects. They require the development and, where necessary, employment of tangible capabilities which send a *message*. States can send hard power signals in a number of ways, short of using force. Even outside of a crisis or a looming conflict, they adopt a ‘posture of hard power’, the bedrock of which is the force structure of a state's military forces. This is the sum of its military capabilities in the fullest sense of the term, involving systems, platforms, trained people to operate them and enabling support elements. Also relevant are a state's alliances and security partnerships; its ability to generate strategic capability advantage (through technology and the innovative skills of its people); its ability to project force, in terms of power projection and strategic mobility (for example, amphibious sealift capabilities and long-range airlift); the levels of military preparedness and readiness maintained by the state; and the disposition of a state's military bases (especially its naval and air bases), and foreign basing rights.
- Beyond these material factors, the hard power posture of a state consists of its military's reputation for professional mastery and competence, which is grounded in its operational history; demonstrated effectiveness on operations and in exercises; and ability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, including by way of the provision of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the wake of natural disasters. Short of war, if a military force is seen as being flexible and agile, able to move quickly, and deliver effects rapidly, not only is its professional standing and reputation enhanced, but the state's perceived hard power is given substance and credence. This is because such activities demonstrate and signal, short of war, the training and quality of the defence personnel involved, the capabilities of deployed systems and platforms, the levels of preparedness and readiness maintained by the state, as well as the other capacities and attributes required to succeed in such missions.
- Beyond these factors again, a state's hard power posture is grounded in its strategic culture, its declared and demonstrated willingness to use hard power, which can be seen in the record of operations undertaken by the state, and in its principal statements of national security and defence strategy. The 2009 Defence White Paper is such a declaratory statement, and represents the Australian Government's hard power posture set within a broader approach to national security. It is, in this sense, more than an expression of how Australia would defend itself in circumstances of national peril caused by armed attack upon our population, cities and infrastructure. It also set out a policy framework for how Australia would employ hard power, in concert with others, to protect and preserve the rules-based global order.
- The White Paper set out (in Chapter Five) an interlocking regime of geographically defined strategic interests to guide defence planning. It said that we have an interlocking regime of strategic interests in a rules-based global order, which increases the likelihood of strategic stability in the Asia Pacific region, which in turn makes more likely the maintenance of a secure immediate neighbourhood and ultimately a secure Australia. The White Paper therefore made clear that hard power should be used, where the circumstances warrant and consistent with our international obligations, to secure broad strategic interests in

relation to the maintenance of a 'stable, rules-based global security order'. To be clear, while the White Paper placed *highest* priority on the requirements of national self-defence for force structure purposes - and I will return to this point later in the lecture - in keeping with an expansive view of hard power, it argued that the use of hard power should not be limited solely to the physical defence of the nation.

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- This was most evident in its treatment of *intrastate conflict*. Since the end of the Cold War we have seen a reduction in the perceived prospect of state-on-state conflict. We have also seen an increased incidence of weak or failing states, and the complex interplay of social, religious and ethnic conflicts within such states which, together with mass poverty, poor governance and institutional incapacity, have created the conditions for civil wars and other forms of intrastate conflict. Taken together, these factors have given rise to the idea of 'war amongst the people'. These wars are less a trial of military strength between opposed conventional military forces, than a clash of political wills principally concerned with winning the support of the people who live in the theatre of operations. The people, or at least their consent, are the key to victory, and the ultimate strategic objective. In winning the minds, if not the hearts, of the population, what I would term 'socio-anthropological' capacities and human interaction are generally more important factors in such conflicts than weapons.
- Indeed, the White Paper judged that intrastate conflict will be a persistent occurrence, and the most common form of conflict, in the period to 2030. Deployments into such conflicts could be in the form of humanitarian, stabilisation, counter-insurgency and/or peacekeeping interventions, such as the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has undertaken over recent decades. In such operations, conventional forces such as the ADF will have a particular focus on establishing a secure environment, separating warring groups, and disrupting insurgents or terrorists who are intimidating the population. These operations are challenging, especially as irregular combatants may not be easily distinguishable from the general population, and might well be 'accidental guerrillas'. The ability of conventional forces such as the ADF to create a significant physical presence on the ground in order to provide reassurance to the population will often be essential - but in nearly all cases will not be a sufficient response in itself.
- Some writers have suggested that we should think about the employment of hard power in such operational settings as involving the application of 'counterwar strategy' and 'counterviolence methods'. As with the earlier uses of these terms, but at a different scale and level of focus, here the objective of operational military strategy is to 'master violence' through the disciplined and modulated control of violent actors. The aim is to dissuade, deter and compel those actors, to stop them engaging in violent behaviours – and eliminate their will and their means to do so, as required. Under this approach, conventional military forces, working alongside police forces and other civilian partner agencies, seek to create as a matter of highest priority the environmental conditions of 'counterviolence' and societal human security - which are required for stabilisation and reconstruction efforts to be able to commence and proceed. This is a fundamental

imperative in situations of extreme state failure, where law and order frameworks have been compromised to the point of being virtually non-existent.

- Advanced warfighting capabilities will, nonetheless, continue to be relevant in the ground wars which are fought amongst the people. In fact, war amongst the people cannot be effectively undertaken in the absence of a heavy foundational base of advanced conventional capabilities, which is why the leaders of military coalitions in such operations (such as the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, Australia in East Timor in 1999 and 2006) invariably find themselves having to provide not only the core ground forces, but also the associated enablers and support capabilities.
- *Complex irregular warfare* in intrastate conflict will become increasingly evident as irregular non-state adversaries gain greater access to weapons and technologies which were once the preserve of states, with a view to employing them asymmetrically, in order to exploit the perceived vulnerabilities of advanced militaries. We will have to increasingly focus on the complex challenge of combining the ‘socio-anthropological’ approaches required to win the minds if not the hearts of the population, with the ‘counterwar’ approach required to precisely target and, as required, strike dispersed but networked adversaries.
- In the latter case, the aim of hard power employment is not the annihilation or mass attrition of the adversary, as occurs in total war, but rather the calibrated elimination of the adversary’s means to avoid and resist the modulated and disciplined use of ‘counterviolence’. The skills and capabilities required to span these multiple lines of activity suggest that we need a wider rather than narrower set of integrated power instruments, with an emphasis both on ‘socio-anthropological’ capabilities *and* advanced long-range precision intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike capabilities. The latter will often be employed in ‘counterwar’ operations which resemble ‘large-scale ambushes’ of irregular non-state adversaries executed over long distances, to paraphrase one Australian writer’s gripping conception.
- That said, military interventions in wars amongst the people might not always be the right policy response, and other tools might be more appropriate. We need to be especially careful to not militarise all of our policy responses in such circumstances. It also means that we need to refine our policy framework for establishing the basis for when should we intervene with hard power, and whether to do so on a preventative or pre-emptive basis.
- Intervention certainly needs to be seriously considered where an unfolding humanitarian crisis is associated with serious human rights violations, such as the risk of genocide and war crimes (for instance, violent ethnic cleansing), and where the protection of vulnerable populations at risk becomes necessary. In this context, the evolving and profoundly important international norm of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is likely to have a bearing. In the White Paper, the Government recognised that this norm is at an important stage of development, and supported the principle that on occasion it may be necessary for other states to intervene under the auspices of a United Nations Security Council resolution if a state cannot or will not protect its population. Under the norm, military

intervention is best seen as a last resort in a spectrum of responses, which includes aggressive preventative and peacemaking diplomacy, the application of international pressure, robust legal approaches, and the imposition of coercive political and economic sanctions.

- If intervention becomes necessary, it would always be important to employ force with precision, and in a manner consistent with our international obligations and which minimises civilian casualties. Clear policy aims and strategic objectives need to be articulated when it is employed, and these must be communicated so that all (not least the population for whom we fight) are clear about the purpose of the use of force. In planning such use of force, we must clearly appreciate the long-term consequences of its use (including whether our international standing would be enhanced or diminished by our actions, and whether the local population is likely to see our presence in a positive light). Assessing the consequences of the use of force, and undertaking sound planning to secure the peace and the post-conflict phase, are often more important in the long run than the planning and conduct of such military operations.

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- As difficult as these challenges are, the more difficult hard power calculation remains that of the prospect of major wars between states. In the White Paper, the Government specifically considered the issue of major war and whether it has had its day. This is a crucial question for defence planning, as the answer has the potential to reshape the way in which we think about hard power. War involving highly advanced militaries is the most complex, and dangerous, strategic challenge faced by nations. Preparing for it requires the investment of very significant materiel, technological and human resources. Being able to fight and win such wars requires difficult judgements to be made about defence planning, because being able to prevail on your terms in such wars depends ultimately on having the right set of military capabilities, which cannot be generated overnight.
- The White Paper judged that it would be premature to assume that war among states, including the major powers, has been eliminated as a feature of the global order. Globalisation will create growing economic and other interdependencies between states and these will act as a brake on the resort to force between them. Wars between the major powers are not likely over the period to 2030 - but they cannot be ruled out. Growing interdependence will not preclude conflicts or tensions short of war, especially where there are pre-existing strategic faultlines or disputes. Moreover, there is a risk that the constraints on war imposed by the global order might break down unexpectedly and relatively quickly if major power interests were fundamentally at stake in a crisis, and if one or more of those powers were to miscalculate the reaction of others at such a time. The tragedy of the history of war is that it very rarely occurs by design. More often than not strategic adversaries stumble into war, through a combination of misjudging their hard power potency, their odds of victory, the reaction of other parties, the prospects of escalation, and the chance of events and misfortune in war.
- Calculations regarding major war will become particularly difficult as the global distribution of power changes over the next two decades. Hard power will

become more decentralised, as emerging economies and rising powers are increasingly able to set aside more national wealth for military purposes. In particular, we will need to be alert to the fact that economic growth in the Asia Pacific region, the changing global and regional distribution of power, changing strategic perceptions and military priorities, the development over time of increased defence industrial, logistical and management capacity, and readier access to advanced weapons and technology, will complicate our long-term defence planning challenge.

- In particular, we will see over the next two decades the creation of more advanced navies and air forces, and space and cyber forces, especially in our region. More states will gain access to advanced precision weaponry, improved ISR and targeting capabilities, and enhanced command and control systems (which will give them better battlespace situational awareness and control over their forces). Over time, more states will be able to network these advanced capabilities and achieve greater levels of military proficiency. Through this *decentralisation of hard power*, more states will have access to high-end technologies such as advanced anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, fourth and eventually fifth generation air combat aircraft, counter-space weapons (including kinetic and directed energy weapons and jamming capabilities), cyber warfare weapons (able to be employed for the purposes of network attack and information warfare), stealth technology and advanced submarines. In particular, we will see a proliferation of long-range precision strike weaponry, which will allow more states to threaten the rapid destruction of an adversary's critical economic, energy, military and political infrastructure in the opening stages of a conflict.
- I am not suggesting that these strategic developments will inevitably evolve into confrontation, conflict and war. I would reject such technological determinism. As I said earlier, global interdependencies, diplomacy and confidence building measures will mean that on the whole mean we will avoid major wars between states, and so none of this should be the cause for *immediate* concern. Indeed, the more capable our regional partners, the less they will feel compelled to rely upon the strategic assistance of major powers, some of whose interests may be inimical to ours. Also, more capable partners make for more effective coalitions when we come together and work towards common objectives.
- However, we need to remain alert to relevant developments so that we get as much warning as possible of the emergence of strategic risks, as well as developments that might pose a significant challenge to ADF capabilities in particular areas. We have to especially look for signs that some states might take the opportunity afforded by the decentralisation of hard power to develop the capabilities necessary to coerce us, our allies and partners at some future time. Rather than thinking that recent conflicts represent a new paradigm of warfare, which has replaced the old paradigm of state-on-state war, we need to take a broad view of defence planning requirements across the spectrum of hard power.

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- In terms of making judgements about how much, and what type of, hard power we need, both in the context of the slim prospect of major war between states and the

persistence of intrastate conflict, the White Paper said that our best defence lies in the maintenance of a positive international environment, where sources of potential conflict are dealt with before they evolve to the point where force is required. As a matter of policy, the Government would seek in a crisis to avoid wherever possible having to use force or threaten its use, preferring in the first instance to rely on proactive preventative diplomacy, and as required the application of international pressure, robust legal approaches, and coercive political and economic sanctions.

- However, the White Paper also recognised the need to be prepared to use force as a means to give effect to policy aims, both in defence of the nation and in support of a rules-based global order. It said that we would only do so having regard to our international standing, including our active membership of the United Nations. If employed, force should be used with precision, in a manner consistent with our international obligations, with clear policy aims and strategic objectives in mind, and on the basis of an appreciation of the long-term consequences of its use and how the peace would be secured.
- The Government decided in the White Paper that the focus of defence policy would be the principle of self-reliance in the defence of the nation and in relation to our unique strategic interests, but with a capacity to do more when required, consistent with those strategic interests that we might share with others, and within the limits of our resources and capabilities. This means a building a force structure which would be able to independently defend Australia against armed attack by credible adversaries, to the extent required to protect our maritime approaches, critical sea lanes, territory, infrastructure and, of course, population. Of particular importance in this context would be the ADF's ability to undertake sea control, air superiority and strategic strike tasks. The White Paper recognised that in relation to the risk of armed attack by a major power, especially one armed with nuclear weapons, we would continue to rely on the protection afforded by our alliance with the United States, including the protection against nuclear attack afforded by US extended deterrence.
- Even though the focus of the White Paper was on advanced conventional capabilities required for self-reliant defence, what should not be overlooked was the significant investment made in the White Paper in relation to wars amongst the people, especially in terms of leading contributions to the stability and security of the South Pacific and East Timor. In saying that we need expeditionary forces able to operate effectively in such contingencies, the White Paper represented a significant evolution of the long-standing basis of Australian strategic planning. While the defence of Australia remains the central organising principle of Australian defence policy, never before were the requirements of expeditionary force projection explicitly set out as an ADF force structure determinant, albeit of second order importance.
- While the geostrategy of the White Paper was very focussed on what it termed the ADF's *primary operational environment*, this does not preclude the commitment of the ADF further afield. The White Paper explicitly said that the concept of a primary operational environment is meant to serve as a guide, so that appropriate defence planning can take place, and should not be considered as imposing an

operating boundary on ADF operations. For instance, depending on developments in the Asia-Pacific region over the next two decades, we might need to selectively project force *beyond* our primary operational environment, in the Western Pacific or the Indian Ocean. The White Paper also said that more generally, Australia cannot be secure in an insecure world, and we have a strategic interest in protecting the rules-based global order. This means that the ADF will need to be prepared to contribute to the enforcement of sanctions imposed by the United Nations, including actions by the international community to deal with ethnic and other forms of internal strife; coalition operations, including in the Middle East, to counter terrorism; and the evacuation of our nationals from trouble spots.

- In terms of force structure, the White Paper recognised that we have to be able to conduct both high-end conventional combat operations (probably seldomly) and war amongst the people (probably much more frequently). This implies a broad spectrum of hard power capabilities. The outcome of the White Paper process of reasoning was *Force 2030*, which is designed to produce a more robust, potent, hard-hitting and mobile ADF, which is on or near the cutting edge of technology. This will be especially so in terms of undersea and anti-submarine warfare, surface maritime warfare (including air defence at sea), air superiority, strategic strike, ISR, and cyber warfare. In addition, significant investments will be made in the areas of force projection and the expeditionary capabilities required for undertaking complex irregular wars amongst the people.

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- In designing this force, we of course examined the future environment in which the ADF would be operating. Much of this work was and remains classified for legitimate reasons. What I can say about this analysis is that given the *decentralisation of hard power* and the *increasingly complex character of irregular warfare*, we broadly came to the conclusion that the ADF will be increasingly confronted by networked, dispersed adversaries, who will exploit advanced technologies and asymmetric approaches, and wherever possible not present massed easy-to-find and easy-to-hit targets. We should anticipate that they will develop and employ asymmetric capabilities which are designed to exploit the perceived vulnerabilities of the ADF, where maritime and air 'area denial' methods, disruption in the space, cyber and electronic domains, along with surprise kinetic strikes, could have significant asymmetric impacts. Irregular adversaries will become more lethal, dispersed and networked, exploiting greater access to advanced weapons and technologies, and asymmetric operational methods and tactics.
- Against this background, the White Paper said that in a conflict, whether in the defence of Australia, or further afield, we would aim to control the dynamics of the conflict by setting the pace, scale and intensity of operations, by dissuading an adversary from making attempts to escalate the conflict, and convincing them that such escalation would be met with significant retaliation. In declaring that violence would be used or threatened by Australia in order to *stop violence, or prevent more violence*, counterwar theory was built into the military strategy of the White Paper. Moreover, the ADF would as necessary tailor its operations such that it was not fighting in a manner that saw a high rate of attrition and mass

causalities among our forces. We would seek to avoid battle on unfavourable terms, and apply force in a precise and principled manner - in a way that our adversaries were not expecting, and which overmatched them at decisive points in battle, in order to offset the relatively small size of our forces.

- This meant that Force 2030 had to be designed around a number of crucial force attributes. The ADF will employ precise and discriminate targeting and force application over long distances, high levels of situational awareness, information superiority and networked capability (where sensors, weapon systems and personnel are very closely linked and integrated), and survivable and robust capabilities (including lower signatures and stealth wherever possible, as well as force protection techniques and countermeasures).
- The Government's clear policy direction in the force structure review process was that we were not to purpose-design the ADF for tasks beyond the defence of Australia and its maritime approaches, and expeditionary force projection in the context of regional stability and security in the immediate neighbourhood. What we found, however, as we went through the process of designing the force was that capabilities required for the mandatory tasks lent themselves to being considered for operations further afield in protection of the global order. The fact that Force 2030 will generate a range of hard power capabilities available for the broader tasks in protection of the global order was not the result of a strange and inexplicable alchemy. The demands of defending Australia and projecting expeditionary force across the 'focussed geostrategy' of the White Paper (which is in fact a very expansive military strategic operational environment) creates the requirement for highly capable forces which can leverage technology and information on a comprehensive scale, especially given the relatively small size of the ADF. The force attributes required for mandatory tasks set by the White Paper, such as sea control, air superiority, strategic strike and expeditionary power projection, will generate a high level of multifunctional capability in the ADF, which will be able to be employed flexibly by future governments, across a wide spectrum of operational settings.

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- The issues dealt with in this lecture are deeply political ones in the end, and cannot be left either to specialist academic discourse or to the generals - and that is not what the latter want in any event. They require high-level political and indeed societal discussion and deliberation. Some analysts have argued, however, that we are living in a 'post-military' or 'post-heroic' age where military affairs are seen as being analogous to emergency services work - professional soldiers deal with a 'hazard' that threatens civilian life, like their police, firefighter and ambulance colleagues. The collective memory of war in Europe in particular has pushed questions of the use of force to the margins of discourse and even created hostility to the very idea of using force.
- We are entering challenging times, where even an optimist needs to realise that we face a wide range of possible futures. In this environment, we will need to pursue comprehensive and integrated national security strategies, built around persuasion, influence and the other means of soft power wherever possible. Regrettably,

while we might be (as I am) optimistic about the general trajectory of modernity's global order, we will need to be realists about being prepared to do more than deploy soft power and tools of persuasion. We will need to be prepared sometimes to engage in the dissuasion, deterrence and compulsion business, and be prepared to wage war, if that becomes necessary.

- The White Paper was the most recent attempt in Australian public policy to fashion a portfolio of hard power instruments which are relevant to our strategic interests and our appetite for risk. Given our strategic circumstances and policy inclinations, it produced a relatively comprehensive and wide suite of hard power instruments, for a middle strategic power. Its primary focus was on defence self-reliance, but it had a clear eye on our broader strategic interests and constructed these on the basis of the benefits of living in a stable, rules-based global order - and a recognition that such an order needs supporters and protectors. It explicitly recognised that the capacity to persuade and the other instruments of soft power are generally to be preferred to the use of hard power, and the machines of war. We should certainly avoid armed conflict and war wherever possible – but not at all costs, and without shirking from these sombre tasks where we have to pursue the use of force in defence of our freedoms and liberties, or to protect the order within which we live and by which we prosper.

FINIS

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