Transcript

How much strategic bandwidth does the United States have as it manages the Iran war, Ukraine and its wider global commitments?

How are conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East changing the nature and cost of modern warfare?

What does China’s growing military power and activity in the Indo-Pacific mean for Australian security?

In this episode, Sharryn Parker is joined by Charles Edel, Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva and Euan Graham to discuss the wars in Iran and Ukraine – and what they are revealing about the United States’ capacity, weapons stockpiles, and the changing character of warfare.

Transcript

(This transcript is AI-generated and may contain inaccuracies.) 

Rory Medcalf

Before we begin this episode I wanted to share with you what a milestone this is for the ANU National Security College. This is our 300th episode of the National Security Podcast, an initiative that we began in 2018 with the very straightforward intention of bringing some clarity to the complexity of the security issues and the geopolitical challenges facing Australia, Australians, our region, the Indo-Pacific, and indeed the world. We've had more than a million downloads of our podcasts over those eight years. And now as we reach our milestone 300th episode, it's time to take stock and reflect a little bit.

We've brought scholarly rigor to many of our conversations. But at the same time, we've tried to always drill back to the core issues. So what? Why does this matter? What can we do?

Community consultations in Australia this year have demonstrated that there are rising levels of concern At the same time, there's a growing appetite for clear and effective communication from government.

And from experts I take all of this as a vote of confidence in what the team have been doing here at the National Security College in bringing this program to you. I want to take this opportunity to thank today's team, but also the ever-changing team of contributors to the podcast over the years.

A former colleague, Chris Farnham, the originator of the National Security Podcast, put it very well when he launched that very first episode with me – “ From the largest strategic issues down to the nitty-gritty of tactics and of policy responses and of how ordinary people think about the challenges in the world today, this podcast has been bringing clarity to the complexity.” I hope we continue on this journey. Thanks for staying with us and now on with the episode.

Charles Edel

A war that President Trump started in Iran that we can't quite seem to figure out how to wind down before we even get to the region that is on paper at least the number one priority for the United States.

Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva

With the development of AI and the development of drone warfare, we do see issues with regards to ethical elements of that. Civilians should not be targeted or civilians being differentiated from combatants in the field.

Euan Graham

It's pointless to talk about deterrence as an abstract noun. You have to know who you're deterring, where you're deterring, and what you're deterring.

National Security Podcast

You're listening to the National Security Podcast, the show that brings you expert analysis, insights and opinion on the national security challenges facing Australia and the Indo-Pacific, produced by the ANU National Security College.

Sharryn Parker

Alright, buckle up team, this is our three hundredth episode. I'm your host, Sharryn Parker, and we're recording in Canberra on Ngunnawal and Ngambri Country. Amid the storm that is current geopolitics, we hold out hope.

That peace will one day dominate war and negotiation will deliver calm, all the while, the pace of world events set by our world leaders feels compressed and volatile. The current geopolitical landscape feels more like a connected test rather than a series of separate crises. Does the United States have enough bandwidth to span these themes, while China continues to make its strategic advances?

It recently fired a submarine launched ballistic missile into the Pacific, and later this month Xi Jinping will head to Washington with both rare Earths and Taiwan both on the discussion table. There is a lot to unpack in this conversation, so we're planning on bringing it to you in two parts. To bring clarity from complexity, Dr. Charles Edel joins us, our expert on statecraft and great power Competition is from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Dr. Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva is a Lecturer here at ANU National Security College. She is an expert on Central Asian dealings with a post-Soviet Russia and the positioning of the Global South in world power. Finally, Dr. Euan Graham is a commentator and expert advisor to the National Security College, formerly of the British Foreign Office. Whose publications and research span military strategy and deterrence in the Indo Pacific. There are many questions here, team. First of all, welcome to the National Security College in what is, I think, our biggest subject to date. Can I start with a lead question for you, Charles? The view from Washington is Iran stockpiles, and perhaps a distracted superpower. How does that land with you and what do you think of it all?

Charles Edel

Well, thanks very much for having me on. You've done a terrific job of spanning the world, although we just got to Iran because that wasn't even in your preface, and we haven't even discussed the fact that AI might be ending the world tomorrow, or I guess 10 years hence, if you believe the words of the pioneers of it. So right now, how does Iran sit? How does everything sit as it's emanating out of Washington? Let me just say that the mood in Washington is febrile and getting a little wackier. And that's always true as you head into election season. And of course America's always in election season. But we have the midterm US elections coming up in November in the midst of not only a trade war, in the midst of attempting to broker or strong-arm apparently Ukraine or Russia, on top of a war that President Trump started in Iran that we can't quite seem to figure out how to wind down before we even get to the region that is, on paper at least, the number one priority for the United States. So let me just note that, one, foreign policy and national security are always contested, but they're going to become more contested over the period. The two different parties, no less those within the parties who are jockeying for ascendancy and to become their political leaders post-Trump and then within the Democratic Party, will be staking out a variety of positions now. So do not expect commonness or kind of straight-through lines from the US. I would say, too, though, when we take a step back about what this actually means and where the US is bandwidth-wise, you mentioned two speeches, right? One by John Howard, one by Kevin Rudd. In the US, we have formal documentation of national security strategy. But that's what's on paper as opposed to what happens in the real world, right? And what we've seen over the past year or two is that what was put down on paper is not what is actually US foreign policy. And that's partially always true. But that's always going to be true under Donald Trump, who probably didn't take much of a read of his own national security documents and likes to have as much latitude and leverage so he can zig and so he can zag as possible. But when we heard words like the United States, both during the campaign and in the national security strategy, is winding down and turning a page on forever wars and turning away from the Middle East, that is obviously not what has played out over the past year. Occasionally we'll hear comments that the United States is now either a reduced or a retrenched power. That's not, I don't think, what's played out over the last year or so. We've actually seen a very hyper-unilateral United States, for good or for ill on this front. But what we have seen too, and maybe we'll leave it here at the outset, is when the United States talks about the Asia-Pacific or the Indo-Pacific as its priority theatre, that's certainly true rhetorically, maybe a little bit less true in practice. And this Iran war and the implications and the tail of it, both for the effort but also, of course, for deterrence and for munitions, have had great impact in this region as well.

Sharryn Parker

Absolutely. You know, I think if we actually have a look at the munitions piece just very quickly, I've got numbers here that talk this week about the European theatre and the fact that there are 1,700 Patriot missiles that have been fired in 16 days against drones. Now they're 35 grand a pop. Ukrainian intercept rate against comparable targets is at 90 per cent. But they're using $1,000 drones. So what does this actually say about modern warfare and how the West particularly deals with those costs?

Charles Edel

Yeah, well, this is a great conversation to have amongst some really good experts here too. But I'll say that, look, the face and the practice of modern warfare is evolving and evolving quite rapidly. I mean, the short answer to that is expendable, attributable and asymmetric is what we've learned. That is, you need a lot of stuff. You need a lot of stuff that you can produce at mass scale and that you're willing to lose, and that maybe is not what your opponents, what your enemies, had calculated their strategy off of. That's the asymmetric part. The other thing that I think we've learned from this is that mass and national capacity to produce, the defence industrial base, matters enormously, as does innovation. If you look at the scale and the speed with which Ukraine has kind of leapt to the front globally on how they've put things together really quickly. You know, from an area where, if we all famously remember when President Zelensky was in the Oval Office and got a dressing down from JD Vance, "you have no cards". Well, fast forward a year and a half and Ukraine actually has plenty of cards, as we've seen. They're at the forefront of not only innovating in drone technology, but they're actually now sending and selling that technology to others who are trying to figure out how to innovate as rapidly as they have been forced to do.

Sharryn Parker

Yeah. Look, that's probably a great segue, I think, to you, Dilnoza. While the Ukraine war is one of a European context, it's not just one-sided. There is a Russia involved here and Russia has got more fingers in pies than many others. Can you give us a bit of an explanation of where Russia sits in 2026 and talk to us about Central Asia and how they interrelate?

Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva

Thank you, Sharryn, for having me today. So for Russia, if you look at the discourse of the Russian president when Russia started invading Ukraine, the discourse was about viewing NATO expansion as a threat. Ukraine's decision, or in the words of the Russian discourse, NATO's expansion towards Ukraine, was viewed as an existential threat. And hence they explicitly stated their two goals. And so far in 2026 I don't observe any changes in implementation of those initial goals. And I know we have seen recently, with interactions starting again between the US and Russia, if you look at it today you see Russian discourse mostly playing that they are good actors, they still want to engage, they want to have diplomatic engagement. Given I speak Russian, I do observe Russian news and how they present everything we see in international events for their own domestic population and broadly for those who speak Russian. But they also produce that content in English as well through their own different media content like RT. So they want to show that they are good players in the international system, they respect engagement. But at the same time, I don't observe any change in the set goals that they initially set at the start of the war. But what I see different today is how war has started impacting more ordinary Russians than it did before. So we observe in the news, and I think it's widely circulated today, how there are lines and queues waiting for gas at the gas stations, or how more ordinary people are being impacted with the attacks on the Wildberries chains. It is impacting ordinary people's lives. And hence the war, which was kind of more foreign for ordinary people, probably has become closer. And that kind of puts more pressure, in my view, on Putin's administration to do something about it. And moreover, I would like to also note that with regards to the diplomatic engagement, I mean it's really early to say anything about that, but I really don't think that there will be a massive change in the Russian stance with regards to what they want. So, unless, you know, things can happen. But I also would like to refer to two quick points with regards to the national security strategy of the year that Charles has referred to. I believe we were using it in one of my courses I taught last semester and we observed, quite obviously, naturally, a big change from the previous national security strategy, in which obviously under the Biden administration Russia was viewed as a threat and there were lists of actions, what we should do with regards to China, with regards to Russia. But I found it really fascinating how in the current national security strategy, I'm not quoting, but I think I'm accurately paraphrasing, that they want to build strategic relations with Russia, which I found very interesting and I guess it could be an element of Trump's foreign policy in this regard. I'd like to hear your views maybe. Also, with regards to the points about the two former prime minister speeches you mentioned, I found it really fascinating as I was listening to former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd's speech in regards to three points he mentioned. I particularly find the deterrence element very interesting and relevant, particularly in reference to China. And today, what we observe, while there's an ongoing war in Europe with Russia's invasion of Ukraine, we also see quite a lot of reference and kind of communicating to the Global South that we now have a multipolar world order and this is the right world order to have because the previous world order was mostly giving advantages to the Western powers and now we have a more just and more transparent law-based world order. So I think in this case, coming back to the earlier point about Russia's war in Ukraine, the war on one side is happening. On the other side, the very war narrative is helping Russia and other actors in the Global South to come up with that narrative that we do have an alternative world order now. We do have alternative institutions and systems. And they use BRICS, for example, as an example. They use the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, SCO as an acronym. So yeah, quite a lot happening in the international system today. But I also largely agree with Charles's point about how the war in fact has changed to become more asymmetric warfare in relation to Ukraine's use of drones. We have always studied Russia as being one of the great powers. But we see what a smaller state, in this case in relation to Russia, Ukraine being a smaller state, could do given the changes in warfare. But I also would like to highlight one last point about ethical aspects of using drones. With the development of AI and the development of drone warfare, we do see issues with regards to ethical elements of that. Civilians should not be targeted, or civilians being differentiated from combatants in the field. I think these are other important points. Yeah.

Sharryn Parker

Amazing, you covered a fair amount in that. What I'm going to do is pull on one particular thread so that we can bring Euan into the conversation. Euan, President Xi has been active and everywhere in the last few weeks. China has been very active in the Pacific. And, you know, this then leads us to the question for Australia of the Indo-Pacific. What say you for the last quarter of 2026?

Euan Graham

Well, I think that you're right that this is an important sort of choreographed bit of stage work for President Xi, culminating in his trip to Washington, which we might talk a little about later on. For Australia, yes, I think the final quarter of this year will hopefully see some more developments in the Pacific, which has been the recipient of the bulk of the resources that Canberra devotes to its external policy, with a particular watch, I think, on the likelihood of a new bilateral treaty or treaty-like deal with the Solomon Islands, which has been trailed around the same time as the Pacific Islands Forum. I think that's probably the next big event to drop on the Australian radar. But just a general point I would make in relation to Australia and my colleagues' comments about the changing way of warfare. I think it's not just the nuts and bolts of military capability or even the defence industrial base. It's getting your entire economy and society ready for conflict. And on that, I'm not so sure that Australia has made the progress it needs to make. I think a constant learning point from having taken part in various scenarios and tabletop exercises is the importance of getting your economic preparation done well in advance of the crisis or conflict point because you can't sort it out on the hop. And we've had, if you like, two very big real-world rehearsals in the last few years with COVID and more recently with the energy supply shock resulting from the US-Israel-Iran war. Australia is, like many other countries in this region, particularly prone to energy shock. The government has responded by increasing the volume of fossil fuels and hydrocarbons that are available in Australia. I think the economic shock that would result from a conflict in the Indo-Pacific, not that there's one imminent in the next quarter or even perhaps the next year, now the odds are shortening, which was something else that Prime Minister Rudd has been in the news for saying he thought there was maybe a one-third possibility of China making a military move on Taiwan. If that's the case, then those are very substantial odds and Australia really needs to prepare its economy in advance to minimise the dependence on China in critical parts of its supply chain and also to think in advance about what it would be willing to give up in the form of sanctions in trade if that were to happen. That's not to say it is going to happen, but we're at a stage where it would be imprudent not to be planning on that basis.

Sharryn Parker

Some great observations there, Euan. I know there's going to be some people asking some fairly serious questions there. You know, China also did a test firing of ballistic missiles from a submarine into the Pacific in July. While we're thinking about Australia's economy and how warfare would actually affect it, what was China's message at that moment when it was undertaking those exercises?

Euan Graham

I think the tendency in these cases is usually to try and find a signal, to look for a political message. That may be misplaced in this case. I think the primary driver is likely to be the programmatic one of China testing the reliability of its sea-based nuclear deterrent. This was not the first time that China's fired an intercontinental ballistic missile into the open waters of the Pacific. It did so all the way back in 1980 and then again in 2024. This latest test, however, was the first time that they've tested a submarine ballistic missile over such range. I think that is, you know, it's what it says on the tin. It's about demonstrating to itself and to others the reliability of its nuclear deterrent. I think from the Australian viewpoint, the tendency to sort of assume that that is somehow a counter to the treaty with Fiji or some other diplomatic move is overinterpreting it, in my view. And for that reason, I'm slightly less worried about this test, not because I believe that China's nuclear arsenal is a force for international good, far from it. If they're going to have one, I would probably prefer them to have confidence in its reliability as a basis for strategic stability. But unfortunately, it is not a precursor to any kind of arms control negotiation. We are very likely facing a prolonged period in which China, Russia and the United States are all modernising their arsenals, but China in particular is racing to approach parity or maybe even surpass it, who knows, with the United States over the next five, 10 years. That's why I think they were testing their missile. That's not to say that there was no cause for concern amongst the Pacific Island countries. Those which were warned were warned right at the 11th hour. It was not best practice, shall we say, to put it mildly, in terms of pre-warning. But the actual act itself, I think, was not a signal so much as a demonstration of capability.

Charles Edel

Can I jump in for a second? Because Euan raised a really interesting point that's kind of ricocheting off my head because we're here recording at ANU and I'm thinking about the community consultations that ANU put together. And to me, the most interesting finding in some ways was the discrepancy between the threat level, the anxiety level that's felt in Canberra and the ACT and in the rest of the country. That is, that it was remarkably lower in the ACT than it was in the rest of the country, about the threat the country faced, the challenges that they were up against and what that engendered in terms of policy, the demand signal. And so when Euan raised the point about the production, the capacity of the nation, at least from my vantage point, the war in the Middle East, following on the heels of Ukraine's war with Russia, has clearly underscored just how important mass and munitions and a national effort to undergird that is. In Australia, I think there's clear acknowledgement of that. That is the entire logic behind something like GWEO, the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance program. That there should be more productive capabilities in Australia. There should be co-production. There should be production on Australia's own, not only for itself, but also maybe to supply into the region as well as backstopping the United States as its munitions run low. But the outstanding question is, if the orientation is correct, are the alarm levels high enough? Right? Kevin Rudd talked about Australia as potentially becoming a complacent nation in the face of all of this extraordinary geopolitical turn. And if the orientation is correct, but if the alarm levels are not high enough, then you're not where you need to be given the extraordinary circumstances unfolding that we've seen over the last year or two.

Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva

Can I add something? Thank you. So I really would like to refer to this speech again by Kevin Rudd that you mentioned about several points. Obviously the Middle East war is important. The war in Ukraine is still ongoing, but if you come back to the Indo-Pacific, and I would like to know your views as well, I think, and I largely agree with what Kevin Rudd said about deterrence, it is really important for the national interest of Australia. We talk a lot about Russia and the Middle East war, but I think, maybe it's my view and it's obviously my subjective view, I haven't seen that much strong reference to the potential threat from China as Kevin Rudd has explained in his speech. Obviously he tried to explain it around the theme of deterrence. And I understand, you know, it might be up for interpretation. But I think the way I read it is that it is really important for us to be aware of where we stand if that happens. Obviously his speech linked a lot to the potential situation about Taiwan. But if you make a general conclusion from this, China is the second strongest economy today in terms of military and economic capacity after the United States. And we know that China has done some grey-zone activities around Australia. This is something we don't see that is widely, I mean, analysed in communities, in my view, in Australia. We also understand that deterrence is a really important point here. And I think linking to the community consultations, I think it's really important for for us or for ordinary people who l who work actually in different communities. If you go out and talk to ordinary people, I wonder what they understand when they hear the concept of deterrence. Right. I think it's important maybe for us as well to try to help ordinary people to understand and maybe break it down what what what it would mean by deterrence, from whom from what, and what other things we can do about that. And that links to the national security elements in my view very neatly.

Euan Graham

I've got a substantial amount of faith in the judgement of ordinary people here in Australia. Having lived in the country as well as in the cities, I think those conversations, it's clear that people are not unaware, they're curious and they support national security, as is seen in the polling, for example, that consistently shows high levels of support for AUKUS despite the economic cost. And I think that is sometimes underplayed because the elite-level debate is conducted on rather different terms here in Canberra. And I think if there's a disjunction between the elite-level debate and popular understandings about Australia's role and potential vulnerability, it's the failure to give a clear strategic communication about threat levels. I think that's not unique to Australia. You see that across other governments in Europe where inside the tent, as it were, there's a lot more understanding that we're already in a pre-conflict or even a conflict that has hybrid elements but hasn't yet broken over into an open military threshold. And that, I think, is that tension between not wanting to call out the who of the deterrence. Because it's pointless to talk about deterrence as an abstract noun. You have to know who you're deterring, where you're deterring and what you're deterring.

Sharryn Parker

Look, that’s probably a great place for us to leave the discussion for now. I absolutely want to dig a bit deeper into some of those questions about the role of UK in AUKUS, probably the role of middle powers and unpack some of the developments at the BRICS summit. So tune into part 2 of this geopolitical update with Charles, Euan and Dilnoza. We’ll see you on the other side.