Options for safeguarding undersea critical infrastructure: Australia and Indo-Pacific submarine cables

Natural, commercial and recreational hazards

Of the 150 to 200 average cable faults that occur each year,¹² natural, commercial and recreational (e.g. boating) hazards are the principal cause. According to the International Cable Protection Committee, fishing and anchoring accounts for approximately 70 per cent of damage to submarine cables.¹³ Damage can also be caused by earthquakes, landslides, volcanic activity and extreme weather. The persistence of these threats means that prompt access to submarine cable repair capabilities, operated by the private sector, is critical.

State and non-state risks

Acts of sabotage, interference and terrorism are persistent threats. Submarine cable locations (including landing sites) are publicly known, allowing interference by adversaries.

Several Indo-Pacific states operate submarines that are capable of interfering with submarine cables.¹⁴ It’s very difficult to tap into a cable undetected, but much easier to do in data points or landing stations. These stations represent key vulnerabilities to data transmission security as data can be ‘mirrored’ once intercepted.¹⁵

Access to maintenance and repair services

In the event of submarine cable disruption, prompt access for repair crews is critical. Often these scarce repair vessels, operated by the private sector, are delayed not only by lengthy travel times to fault locations, but by bureaucratic barriers, including immigration, customs and excise procedures, security checks and approvals. These impediments, which need to be negotiated between the cable repairers and governments, often create long delays to cable repairs.¹⁶

Regulatory inadequacies

A regulatory gap exists in submarine cable protection.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the primary (but not only) international legal regime for regulating submarine cables in international waters. However, many states don’t fulfil obligations under UNCLOS, including criminalising conduct which has the potential to damage cables. Furthermore, existing international legal frameworks are inadequate to regulate the complex ownership structure of submarine cable infrastructure, which often does not clearly fall under the jurisdiction of any one country.¹⁷ Further legal issues arise when submarine cables traverse contested and disputed maritime boundaries.

China as an emerging supplier

Globally, the four largest submarine cable contractors are SubCom (United States), NEC (Japan), Alcatel Submarine Networks (France, but now owned by Nokia), and HMN Tech (formerly Huawei Marine Networks).¹⁸ HMN Tech, majority owned by Shanghai-based Hengtong Optic-Electric Co Ltd, has a global market share of approximately ten per cent, and has laid or repaired almost 100 of the world’s 400 submarine cables. In 2021, the World Bank-sponsored East Micronesia Cable tender was cancelled due to fears HMN Tech would win. HMN Tech is listed in the US Department of Commerce ‘Entity List,’ which limits the supply of US material to the company.¹⁹

1. Fund Indo-Pacific submarine cables to avoid Chinese-backed alternatives

Australia should continue to monitor HMN Tech’s proposals and tenders with Pacific states, and encourage and facilitate alternative suppliers where possible. Australia should continue funding cable projects in the Indo-Pacific, together with like-minded partners, such as Quadrilateral Security Dialogue members,²⁰ France, the UK and the EU’s Global Gateway program to connect vulnerable nations and avoid Chinese-backed alternatives.

Australia should also back the commitment made by the Northern Territory government to connect Australia to the trans-Pacific cable, which will enhance digital connectivity between Australia and the United States and support critical infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific.²¹ This will be the only subsea cable that connects the US to Singapore with a national security rated capability which doesn't transit the South China Sea. It’s a secure, low-latency, high speed data link to the US and Asia.^†

2. Promote the Australian submarine cable protection regime as a regional “gold standard”

Australian legislation should serve as a template for both Indian Ocean and Pacific Island states, when legislating for the protection of submarine cables in their respective national jurisdictions.

Australia’s Telecommunications Act 1997 allows the Australian government to declare a “protection zone” around submarine cables within Australian territory, restricts certain potentially damaging activities within protection zones, sets out stringent criminal offenses for unlawful conduct and stipulates that telecommunication carriers must apply for government permits to install cables.²² Figure 2 illustrates the Northern Protection Zone located in Sydney’s northern beaches.²³ Similar zones are enforced off Sydney’s eastern beaches area and off Perth’s coast.

These provisions effectively mitigate the threats to submarine cables from commercial and recreational activity in Australia’s territorial waters. The regime is considered world-leading.

Key legislative measures which could be exported include publishing submarine cable zone maps for maritime users, banning certain types of activities within protection zones, creating criminal offenses for those endangering cables and effective surveillance and law enforcement.

Promoting the adoption of similar legislation throughout the Indo-Pacific will assist more nations to comply with UNCLOS obligations and better safeguard cables from accidental damage and breaks.

3. Undertake multilateral submarine cable vulnerability assessments and exercises

Australia, along with allies and partners, should sponsor multilateral exercises on attack scenarios that imply large scale cable breaks on several cables and repair infrastructure.

This initiative would bring together government officials and industry representatives to plan and develop protocols for quick repairs and responses to cable disruptions.

A focus should be on scenarios where many cables are severed in a short time period, assessing the available redundancies and any legislative and capability gaps that might exist across the region. Such exercises should assist in reducing bureaucratic barriers which hamper the prompt attendance by cable repair ships, including immigration, customs and excise procedures, security checks and approvals/permissions.

4. Encourage greater information sharing and regional maritime domain awareness

Using Indo-Pacific multilateral fora, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Indian Ocean Rim Association and Pacific Islands Forum, Australia should encourage information sharing concerning cable vulnerabilities and interference. These forums should promote best practice on integrating cable surveillance into national and regional maritime domain awareness systems and establish regional registers for government and industry points of emergency contact on cable resilience.