Transcript

Does the flare up in recent AUKUS debates represent the perspectives of the broader Australian public?

Does Australia have a credible Plan B if part of AUKUS falters?

Can Australia sustain the political will and strategic patience needed for a multi-decade defence project?

In this episode, Justin Burke speaks with Jennifer Parker and Peter Dean about what the latest developments mean for AUKUS, the US alliance and Australia’s long-term maritime strategy.

Transcript

(This transcript is AI-generated and may contain inaccuracies.) 

Jennifer Parker

Yes, of course, there should always be contingent planning. But with AUKUS, because it is a multi-stage, multi-decade program, it depends on which element goes wrong or which element is faltering as to what your plan B would be.

Peter Dean

And the majority of Australians and the Defence and national security community believe it's in Australia's strategic interest and will help to maintain peace in our region and to affect deterrence.

National Security Podcast

You're listening to the National Security Podcast, the show that brings you expert analysis, insights and opinion on the national security challenges facing Australia and the Indo-Pacific. Produced by the ANU National Security College.

Justin Burke

Welcome to the National Security Podcast. My name is Justin Burke, and as is customary at the college, we begin by acknowledging the traditional custodians of the land on which we meet, the Ngunnawal and Ngambri people. We are rapidly approaching the fifth anniversary of AUKUS, and just this month has seen a flurry of announcements from a reduced Life-of-Type-Extension for the existing Collins class boats, to at long last a signature Pillar 2 project. Centred on the extra large uncrewed undersea vehicles. And of course, the announcement that the three Virginia class submarines due to be transferred from the US to Australia in the early 2030s would be in service rather than one brand new one as previously indicated. And as if that weren't a lot, we have a people's inquiry underway. We have a new UK Prime Minister incoming, and also to discuss today the annual Lowy poll. Today we are going to weigh these developments with defence experts Jen Parker, an Expert Associate here at the College and an adjunct professor at the University of Western Australia, and Peter Dean, professor here at the ANU. Welcome both. Jen, if I can start with you, thinking over those recent AUKUS announcements. I'd like to know what elements of those that you found to be encouraging, perhaps elements of those announcements you found to be discouraging, and indeed if there are any elements of those recent announcements that you felt were misunderstood or blown out of proportion.

Jennifer Parker

Blown out of proportion consistently. Hey Justin, thanks for having me on and good to be here with Pete. Look, I think there's been a lot of change but also a lot of continuity. And the stuff that doesn't make the news I think is the you know, what is it, three, equivalent of three Collins class crews now training on Virginia class boats across the Indo-Pacific, members of Australian defence industry training up in shipyards in the UK and Hawaii, the maintenance periods on nuclear powered boats out of Stirling in the last couple of years. I highlight that because if you just watch the news cycle and what it says about AUKUS, it can be quite depressing. I think in terms of you know things that were that were misrepresented, look I guess I was surprised at the response to the change in terms of the types of boats that we're getting. So in 2023, when the Optimal Pathway was announced, a couple of months after that it came out that we'd be getting two in-service or second hand, either title is fine, a block for boats, and then the third one would be a block seven. The design for the block seven is not actually clear, it's not really publicly available, but it wasn't going to include the extra missiles of Virginia Payload Module. So when the announcement was made that this would now be three in-service block fours, I thought, great, we don't need to go through the significant amount of certification and the issues that occur when a vessel comes straight off the production line. So I was quite surprised that it dominated the news cycle for a week. I think there was a lot of facts that were probably misrepresented. But I think a lot of that showed an upswell about other concerns with respect to AUKUS, I don't think it was about the capability change. I think you'd be hard pressed to really argue that that capability change is actually a downside. Many did, but I think, you know, realistically you'd be hard pressed. But I think we saw the push about anti-nuclear or anti-submarines or how you think about the defence of Australia or anti-alliance come through in that conversation, as opposed to really a concern about the change in terms of which boats we're getting.

Justin Burke

Indeed, yeah. Oftentimes people talking past each other, I find. Pete, same question. we've had a month to reflect on all of this news. The good, the bad, the ugly.

Peter Dean

Look, I think the progress at Surf West is a really big positive. And the fact that that's going to be up and running soon and all doing smoothly. US has already done their first bit of maintenance at Sterling. That's all very positive and all the stuff Jen said about the training of the Australian naval personnel and the industry personnel is great. I actually took away the three in-service block four SSNs as a positive. I'm one of those people who believes that having three boats of the same block, you know, yes, we'll lose a little bit off the end in terms of life cycle, but what we gain in supply chain management, in maintenance, in operating the same capability, I think is a big advantage. And Jen hit the nail on the head. The block sevens are still in development, the design and we're seeing a lot of countries have problems with ship design and submarine design at the moment. Taking something that is real, that exists and is in service, that is still an absolutely world class capability, the best of its type in the world. I think, I actually think that's a big advantage. And I do think, as Admiral Mead and others said at Senate estimates, this will over the long run save us money. It'll be a more cost-efficient thing. Negative, well, what's happening with the UK politics is not reassuring at the moment. And of course, you know, that's about, part of that is about the debate about investment and workforce. They're an ongoing concern. But I think to get to Jen's point about the, if you just read the news, this is a big thing. I think the reason this is happening, every issue with AUKUS, every slight change, and it will change, it's a big complex project, is sort of blown out of proportion. And I really think that what it is because AUKUS is a bit of a totem for other things. It's a proxy for a broader conversation about our changing strategic environment, the changing nature of US domestic politics. Those and the big strategic shifts in our region. And so I mean I'm sure we'll get into it, but you know, the AUKUS inquiry that's happening, it's being run by groups, if you look at on their website of the list of people who are supporting that, the people who and groups that are long been opposed to the US alliance, for instance. So it's a full agenda. There's a lot of noise, as Jen said. There's a lot of people talking past each other. As I said, I don't think that'll change any time soon. Nor do I think government policy about its commitment to AUKUS, nor the commitment of our two AUKUS partners will change either. So but it's an important and necessary conversation we have to have because this is a big Australian investment and as I outlined there's big things happening in the world that our country has to adjust to.

Jennifer Parker

Look, I agree, I’ll just add one point. You know, if I was to take away anything from kind of the week of what I would define as AUKUS fear-all [IJ1] in respect to the change from the block seven to the in-service block four boat. You know, I think and I've said this publicly a number of times about the Chinese Naval Task Group circumnavigation of Australia as well. What do I think the lesson from that? Look, I think the lesson from that is clear communications and this is where I would be, you know, slightly critical of some of the conversation from government Defence around AUKUS. I think there could be a little bit more clarity on these issues and I think a lot of the week was eaten up by misinformation about facts and figures which actually took over what could have been a genuine conversation around capability and that stuff can be dispelled by a press conference with a person who stands up in uniform who explains what is a block four, what is a block seven, what does a submarine do. Just some of those basics could dispel some of that noise. And I think that that would be a beneficial way to look at big Defence announcements, including AUKUS moving forward, but also when we see changes like circumnavigations in the region. Clearer communications and a Defence spokesperson.

Justin Burke

Great ideas there, Jen. if I may answer my own question there. I would say that something that discouraged me in all of that news was the Collins Life-of-Type-Extension. Not that it doesn't make sense to trim our sails at this point. I am not of the opinion that AUKUS can never change or that any change represents a crisis. I think it's actually encouraging in some senses that we are trimming our sails with the Life-of-Type-Extension and clarifying the Virginia boats. That's that speaks to some confidence. However, one must look at that National Audit Office report into the Life-of-Type-Extension and wonder whether Defence has gripped up this new era and is treating the Australian taxpayer with the utmost respect and moving at best possible speed and making decisions in a timely fashion that were, there were a lot of things that caused anxiety there. And I do confess to having listened to our competitor podcast ‘The Grumpy Strategists’ and found myself weeping with frustration by the end of it. But I do think that gave me some pause and I'm interested in your reflections on that.

Peter Dean

Look, I think to add in here, I think one thing that we always have to remember in this debate is AUKUS was something that the Australian government asked for and the Australian Department of Defence asked for. And a lot of focus on AUKUS is falling on the sale of these Virginia class submarines in the US. That is the overriding focus of every hink at the moment. Why is that happening? Well, we have a looming submarine capability gap coming up. That is entirely of our own making as a country. Both sides of politics were involved in this, so it's not pointing fingers at one government or another. But we delayed too long in making a decision about the replacement submarines. We had an amazing opportunity with AUKUS come along, but the sale of those three Virginias is about filling that gap until the SSN AUKUS boats can come online. So I think this is a context that's often forgotten. It's often pursued by those who don't like AUKUS that, you know, this is something the US is doing to drag us into something or impose upon us. I think it's always good to remember this is an Australian initiative. We want this capability for good strategic reasons. The US has done a review of AUKUS, including under the Trump administration, and agrees it's fit for purpose. It will change. it's a political path, but I think it it's beholden on all of us to remember. We got ourselves into this problem. AUKUS is an attempted solution. It's not the only pathway we could have chosen, but it's a pathway that we've chosen to ensure that we have a submarine capability, because I think, largely speaking for a lot of people in this debate, we're debating about, you know, the ways and means, the ends of having a submarine capability is not really lost. If you, my dear friend and colleague, Hugh White, doesn't agree with AUKUS, but he agrees on a submarine capability. Sam Roggeveen, our good friend of the Lowy Institute's in the same position.

Jennifer Parker

Although I think he's changing his mind. I don't know. We're gonna have a debate on this at the Press Club coming up in a couple of months, but -

Peter Dean

Yeah, so I think it's just beholden on all of us to remember this was an Australian choice. It's a sovereign choice we make every day to be involved. And you know, one of the reasons we're doing the sale of three in-service Virginia class boats is an attempt to get us through a problem that is of our own making.

Jennifer Parker

Yeah, look I I agree and I would add our shipbuilding woes as part of that conversation. It's over a decade of delayed decision making, inadequate decision making and inadequate funding. Look, Justin, in terms of the Collins class Life-of-Type-Extension, look I agree. I mean the ANAO report is harrowing reading at some points and it certainly requires review and probably some accountability. But I do tend to separate that from the AUKUS conversation. I worry when AUKUS becomes a catch all for everything, the need, as Peter said, to extend the Collins class submarines originated well before AUKUS was announced. In fact, under the current plan, if it goes to plan, we actually get a submarine before we would have gotten the French submarine, two years earlier. So 2032 we're expecting our first Virginia. If that goes to plan, 2034 was when the French submarine was due. And that was admittedly when it was cancelled, not expected to be on track. So I do tend to separate that out. Are there lessons from that? Yes, absolutely. I think the ANAO audit is very clear. Does that have implications for AUKUS? Certainly in terms of project management. But I do think they are two separate things and the Life-of-Type-Extension has a very long lineage. I think the D-scoping was prudent by the government. I do think it probably could have happened a couple of years earlier. I think most people agree with that position.

Justin Burke

Indeed. So Pete, just picking up on your mention of the UK element of AUKUS, to those with a submarine lens, you know, it's clear that there are stepping stones to get to the point where we are building our future submarines, the SSN AUKUS here in Adelaide. That is the destination, that' the point. And as Jen points out, this Life-of-Type-Extension does give people reason to think about our ability to do that, to build them here. Of course there's legacy of the Collins build in Adelaide and difficulties overcome in time, but nonetheless some scar tissue there. But just turning our mind to the British part of the of the AUKUS agreement because I think that a lot of people have focused on the Virginias excessively. To the point where perhaps we haven't asked some of the tough questions of the of the ultimate you know British co-designed build of SSN AUKUS. And indeed to look at the news of this week, we've seen a UK Prime Minister resign, proximate to his Defence Minister, resigning because Defence funding was insufficient, you know, a fragile, barely growing economy. Lots of reasons to be concerned, lots of pol political turmoil and so on and so forth. So, you know, a as you've both pointed out, there is good news in some cases that isn't making the front pages. What can you tell us about the British part of the AUKUS plan?

Peter Dean

Yeah, look, I think you've hit the nail on the head. All the sort of oxygen in AUKUS goes on Pillar One. We often figure about Pillar Two. And within the Pillar One debate it is largely about the US. And I think a lot of that is fuelled by the Trump administration and by their view and approach of the world. You know, this is a political agreement. Like all political agreements it could be subject to change by any one of the parties. And I mean it was very positive that the, you know, the Trump administration, a very transactional, very zero-sum game administration, reviewed AUKUS came back and went, actually, this is in not just your interest, Australia, but still in our interest as well. So that's positive. I think that's taken a lot of focus away from the UK relationship. I think there's some exceptionally good signs in that from the industrial point of view, like the work with Rolls-Royce and who's gonna build our reactor under license, you know, the fact that the design of the submarine is continuing. But what's happening in the UK, irrespective of who becomes, you know, the leadership of the UK, they're facing some pretty dire economic problems over there. But at the same time, they're facing some pretty dire strategic problems and successive reviews of UK governments on both sides of politics have put AUKUS at the centre of that, both the advanced capabilities and the submarine capability. So I think irrespective of which government is in power, they see the advantage of doing things trilaterally and sharing this technology. They see that as a cheaper and easier in the long-term pathway than the UK going it alone. The question for Australia and the other AUKUS partners, and the long term for SSN AUKUS is, will the money continue to flow and will the reform continue to be? If you look at some of the raw numbers and I was speaking at, you know, IODS in Perth, where Jen and I were at a few weeks ago to some of the UK companies, I mean the uplift in their workforce in some of those key corporations has been amazing over the last couple of years. Can that momentum keep going? And can the funding line keep being invested there? Because that is the bigger longer-term partnership. Once these Virginians are sold, US is largely in a position of providing div design specialty advice and expertise and of course reactor technology and combat system technology. But I mean this is the great irony of those who talk about sovereignty in AUKUS. Our Collins class submarine operates a, you know, a US combat system and US weapons and US systems as the AUKUS boats will. As the new AUKUS boats will do. So it's a longer-term relationship with the UK. There's both positives and negatives to that at the moment. I think the underlying nature of the strategic need will help drive this. But I think the workforce issues and development and industrial side of the fence is probably the most acute in the UK of all three countries at the moment. And that's something that we've got to watch carefully. That's something that we've gonna have to monitor our own part of SSN AUKUS in. because ideally, you know, they will deliver the first boat for the UK Navy, which, Jen will know this far better than me, first boats in class have the bigger problems of all the boats. How this part of the relationship will change over time will be really interesting. But the strategic commitments there, I think we just got to wait and see what happens with the investment from the Defence Department. But it's mirroring some of our own investment issues and the US investment issues. I actually think it draws us back. One of the reasons we're doing this trilaterally is to help solve the problems we're all having individually, which are better if you have partners to share technology workforce and costs with. So I think the underlying need for it will remain.

Jennifer Parker

Yeah, look, I agree with Pete. I guess when you think about, you know, the AUKUS conversation, often it feels like, well, if you can't demonstrate that everything will go to perfectly to plan, why do we do things? And if you think about that from any large, whether it's defence acquisition or broader industrial project, you can never guarantee that everything will go to plan. It's about how do you assess, how do you manage risk and how is that managed against the reward. Are there problems in the UK industrial base? Absolutely. Should we be concerned about them? Absolutely. There are, of course, as Pete mentioned, strategic incentives for the UK to make this work. I mean, when I step back and think about, you know, why is the UK invested in this? It's not because of an Indo-Pacific tilt, is not because of any colonial relationship with Australia. It's about it makes it easier and cheaper for the UK to operate SSNs, attack submarines. Why do they need to operate them? Well, the UK is one of the P5 members, they are a nuclear weapon state. The only arm of nuclear weapons they have now is on their ballistic missile submarines. To operate ballistic missile submarines, you need attack submarines. Do I think the UK will have to have a conversation in the next hundred years about whether it maintains a nuclear power, a nuclear armed power? Potentially. Is it having that conversation now? No. So I think managing the risk, of course, being prepared in terms of if things don't go to plan or on time, which things invariably don't when it comes to ship and submarine building, then what are the contingencies and what we do? What do we do? And you know, there's often this obsession with what is the plan B? and it's a really hard question to address because yes, of course, there should always be contingent planning. But with AUKUS, because it is a multi-stage, multi-decade program, it depends on which element goes wrong or which element is faltering as to what your plan B would be. When it comes to phase three and SSN AUKUS, of course we have there, in the 2024 US NDAA, this clause of you could potentially acquire an extra two Virginia class submarines if that is delayed. And that is partially the plan B in terms of phase three. So look am I concerned about the UK? Yes. Do they need to address their investment issues both in terms of their infrastructure but also their workforce? Yes. Are we seeing positive signs on that? Look, there are some, but I think we can't talk about this conversation without mentioning the Parliamentary Inquiry Report that came out of the UK in April. That was quite critical, but what was his biggest criticism? His biggest criticism was actually that the politicians weren't leaning into the AUKUS conversation and communicating its importance. And I think there's some lessons for Australia in that as well. So is the UK a concern? Yes. Is that a risk that would force us to cancel the current multi-decade programme? No, not at this stage.

Peter Dean

Can I add one quick thing? People talk about a plan B. I haven't a plan B I'd like to see, which I actually talked about when AUKUS was announced in 2021. I think an ideal position, which I still think we could get to at some point, is that we all decide to build the same SSN between all three countries. You know, the US are struggling with their design of their SSN replacement for Virginia. I mean, we've already seen the US House decide, well, and Congress to fund the building of more Virginias because that's a more cost-efficient way to go and it's still an amazing world-class capability. I mean, if we all got to an agreement where the three countries could agree on one design and we could build it in all the same yards and have a common supply chain, that's a great plan B. It's more efficient, it makes better use of supply chains, better use of the shipbuilding yards that we have. The same way that we're building the same Megami class frigates with the Japanese now, because then we'll have an entire fleet across two countries with a shared supply chain. I think that I'd love to see that. And I still think there's time in the agreement and space in the in the years that we have to come to come to that agreement. And can you imagine how much better it would be where all three of us are collaborating on the design of a single submarine? If it's built off an evolution of an existing submarine like the Virginia, then you create a huge degree of efficiencies there. And this comes back to, you know, better off the submarine that's easily built and designed now than the than the next step of advanced stage submarine that doesn't yet exist. You know, the minimum viable capability in the shortest possible time. The current Block four Virginia class submarines are the best attack submarines in the world. The Americans have already decided they're going to keep building them longer. I think there's an option here for a plan B of AUKUS that actually makes even better use of the trilateral agreement.

Justin Burke

I think it's a beautiful dream, Pete. I'm happy to confirm that I said the same thing in an issue of the Canadian Naval Review, which I assume you read. But in the interests of, you know, kind of deferring to the collective wisdom of those that put the optimal pathway together, I have I have kept my alternate plan to myself and rooting for the success of the of the plan that's been designed. Though talking about other nations, I think it does raise this question of South Korea, which is really interesting to me. Certainly at the time when the optimal pathway was announced and AUKUS was announced, critics would say, why is Australia thinking of nuclear propulsion if others in our region are perfectly happy with conventional propulsion? And it is interesting to see that in fact we're not alone in that. There is a movement towards this in our very region. I wonder if either of you have been tracking this, but it does appear that South Korea is making these decisions and making these steps in a fairly ordered way and without a great deal of controversy. Would that be fair? Is there anything that we could potentially learn from them?

Jennifer Parker

Look, I mean, I'm not sure there is a great deal of controversy around AUKUS in Australia and we may get to this, but I think that you know the Lowy polling on whether your average Australian supports nuclear powered submarines has been fairly consistent for years now. And I think we need to be careful of assuming that the loudest voice actually carries what most Australians view. I think when it comes to the South Korean nuclear powered submarine programme, to be honest, I think they're still finding their way about what they exactly intend to do. It is very much in the embryonic stages, and I think that they have a lack of clarity about what the process will be. You know, where is their reactor coming from? Where is the fuel for that reactor coming from? What is the design? Now we know that South Korea has had some indigenous designs for some time, but for it to be world-leading or even a re regionally leading nuclear-powered submarine, they'll need some assistance in that design from the US, I would suspect. So I think they are very much in the embryonic stages. In terms of the why look if I, you know, if I was in South Korea, if I was a South Korean planner, would I think that South Korea needs a nuclear-powered submarine? Look, I probably wouldn't, to be honest. I think the why comes down to how do you intend to operate your submarine and the way South Korea would need to operate their submarine compared to Australia is completely different. I think having spoken to, you know, a few academics, a few government officials within South Korea, I think they see it as a concern of, well what technology is Russia really providing to North Korea and how is a North Korean submarine program really developing, which is a bit of a grey area and what does that mean for their capability? Are there lessons that Australia could learn at this stage? No, I don't think so. Potentially down the track once they progress. But I think that they are much more in the embryonic stages than we are, and we're nearly five years down the track.

Peter Dean

Yeah, look, I think first thing is South Korea is in a very different geostrategic position than Australia. It has an existential threat, a really clear and very vivid existential threat right on its border. If you look at polling data from places like the Asan Institute and others inside South Korea, not only are they in favour of this move, they're in favour of you know, the US bringing back tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula or the South Korean government getting their own nuclear deterrent. And we're not talking slight majorities here. We're talking very high poll numbers, you know, up in the eighty plus percentile range. So I think it's driven partly by that. I think it's very much, as Jen said, driven by the concern over what Russia is providing, the DPRK, and how the nuclear weapons program in North Korea will develop and particularly will they go to a submarine capability and what will that look like? And I think the South Koreans are looking at a nuclear powered submarine as a counter to that particular risk that they're looking at. And I think it does come back, I'm like Jen, if you look at the geography and the operating requirement, you know, they don't have the range requirements, they don't have the others. However, the other side of that coin is the detectability. You know, diesel-electric submarines are becoming much harder to be stealthy, which is their number one advantage that submarines have. So I think there's also a layer of concern about that. But then if you come to the deal, I don't think this is going to look anything like AUKUS. First of all, as close as the Korea-US alliance is, they're not a Five Eyes partner and member. They don't have the same level of interoperability and intelligence security exchanges that the three AUKUS countries have. And I think what you would find, as Jen said, is some US support to a Korean indigenously designed and built reactor. Not a transfer of technology. And one of the great things about the AUKUS program if you're the UK or Australia is this is a technology transfer pact in the end. The number of $368 billion, and you know, it may not be that, there's a big $168 billion contingency. That sounds like a big number and it's over a long period of time. But if you actually look at the amount of money that the US has invested in their nuclear submarine program since the 1950s, if you added that up in totality, and we're going get the IP for that at a fraction of the cost if we had to do this ourselves. And from the US UK point of view, like they're getting they're going build SSN AUKUS reactors, which are US reactors under license being built in the UK, which means there's been a wholesale transfer of that US reactor technology, the most advanced reactor technology in the world, to the UK. That saved the UK tens, if not hundreds, of billions of dollars by that technology transfer. I don't think it's gonna look anything like that. That's a particularly unique sort of deal that's been done. I think it'll be about as Jen said, the US supporting Korea, which has a, you know, its own nuclear power industry, to develop that capability, an indigenous capability. The question will be, will it be regional leading or world class and how long will that take and how much of an investment? I would have it a guess that would be a much bigger investment in time, effort, energy and cost from the South Korean government than AUKUS will be from the Australian government.

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Justin Burke

Excellent. Just picking up on your mention there, Jen, of the Lowy poll, long-standing poll, very trusted, fascinating as always. This year reporting that almost seven in ten Australians, sixty-eight percent say they are either strongly in favour or somewhat in favour of Australian nuclear-powered submarines. Only twenty-nine percent of Australians say they are either somewhat against or strongly against a three-point drop from last year. So it's interesting to reflect, isn't it, that this debate which, as you say, has you know, flared up in recent weeks to such an extent. Is it the case that there's countervailing forces keeping the needle precisely where it is? Or indeed is this debate happening in a way that most Australians are not paying attention to?

Jennifer Parker

I look, I think it's hard to say, and as much as I think the Lowy pole is very encouraging and consistent support there for years and realistically since AUKUS wasn't ours. I think it takes only one geostrategic shock or one massive capability blunder to perhaps change perceptives, perceptions on that. But I do think, you know, most Australians reflect on the fact that the world is changing. I think there is a large communication story to be had on that. I think that we need to lean into that more in terms of educating the Australian public, both government and the Department of Defence leaning into that conversation. I think most Australians can see that the world is changing and would probably agree that a strong Australian Defence Force, and we are of course an island nation, something I feel like I say too much, but a strong Australian Defence Force that has significant capability in the maritime domain is an important response to that. And I think the average Australian gets that. In terms of the broader conversation around AUKUS, so I'm not sure that the average Australian is necessarily across the details, across the risks and challenges, but equally not necessarily across the successes to date.

Peter Dean

Yeah, look, it it's really interesting for all the public debate we have, and AUKUS gets a lot of public debate in this country. A lot. I mean, every single announcement is poured over, every single change is seen by some as a proxy that this is, you know, has to be abandoned or whatever it is. But for all of that debate, and you know, democracy a debate is great and I love to have it, and those in supporting of it have to come out in support and those opposed to it can put their view, the needle hasn't moved one bit. And I think, I did a project with some colleagues a couple of years ago that kind of well went let's look at this polling data that Lowy does, the United States Studies Centre does, that you know, the Australian Electoral Survey does, and we ran some focus groups on what, to try and understand what sits behind that and the numbers we found are basically the same. You get about an eight percent group who are rusted on in its opposition to the Alliance and opposition to AUKUS. They're a very loud and very vocal group. There's a lot of people who've written books on this, which called things like Allied and Addicted and Australia Australia's Fatal Alliance and this type of stuff. But that's a group that's existed in the Australian community all the way back to the 1950s and 60s. You know, this is the same group. And Peter Garrett's a good example of this. You know, in the 1970s and 80s, he was a very strong advocate for the anti-nuclear program. He protested against Pine Gap. This is in his DNA. I mean, I would be surprised not to see Peter Garrett sort of there. But they do represent, as the polling data shows, only about eight percent. Cause in the end, when you look behind it, whether it's the polling data or my focus group data, Australians are pragmatists. Australians look at the relationship in terms of interests, not values. I mean, what I was fascinated with against is how Australians in my focus groups did not see themselves aligned to so many things with the US and that we're a very different country. And they looked at the alliance and sort of said, well, what's in it for us? And if they see a pragmatic outcome, then Australians are likely to support it. But they also balance that against the balance of risk and threat. And Australians, the Lowy polls are also highly conscious about that changing strategic environment. China's expanding role in the region. And I think when they weigh all of this type of stuff up, they still see that the alliance is a return on investment. The relationship with the US brings us advanced military technology, whether it's in submarines, surface warships, aircraft or land combat systems. And on the balance of these things, the Australian public is still supportive of it. And the bipartisan political position. So if you're the Prime Minister or if you're the Defence Minister, Richard Marles, or the Foreign Minister, and there's a lot of heat and light coming on them about AUKUS, I think they would, you know, open up the Lowy poll today and go, well, we think it's in the best strategic interest of the country. And hey, if you're a politician and you're looking at it from the raw politics and you have something that has sixty eight percent support, you're feeling pretty comfortable about where you position you know, where you sit vis-a-vis the voters and the Australian community. And then you reflect community views and attitudes. I think it's beholden on those, for instance, you know, in this AUKUS inquiry or others who are very opposed to this and good on them for having a debate. But I think sometimes they need to remember that they are a vast, vast minority view in the country. And if they do want to change that view, they've got a lot of work to do. But the positions that they've had and the way the program's rolling out is the evidence is not supporting the position that they're taking with the Australian people or its representatives in the Australian Parliament. And for all that the angst that you know happens, say in the Labour Party a bit, it was taken to the National Conference of the Labour Party. It was passed resoundingly. And, you know, friends and colleagues of mine were there when it happened, it got a standing ovation. And there's nothing to see that that is changing. So I think, you know, when you sit back and look at the broader aspect of this, it's critical we have a debate on anything this big in terms of cost and public expenditure. It's essential that we look at how it's being delivered and can it be delivered better? But it's also, you know, important to deal with the fact that it's overwhelmingly popular amongst the Australian people, it's a bipartisan political position. And the majority of Australians and the Defence and national security community believe it's in Australia's strategic interest and will help to maintain peace in our region and to affect deterrence. And I think that's the core of it that sits back and that's what the Lowy numbers and Lowy poll is really representing to us.

Jennifer Parker

And I think that you know, that's a position of course that that shouldn't be taken for granted. And I think that there are, you know, genuine concerns about some of the communication, whether it's around cost, whether it's around capability, etc. And there is an opportunity, I think, for, you know, government and Defence to lean into that. But I think the other thing too, when we talk about, you know, whether there's an announcement about the Block or whether there is the latest report about UK submarine industrial base or US submarine industrial base, straight away we do whip ourselves up into a little bit of a crisis frenzy when it comes to AUKUS. And I you know I really thought, David Speirs on Insiders recently when he pressed Senator Shoebridge, he said, well, what is the alternate option? And I think that when we push forward these ideas of just cancel it. And don't get me wrong, I don't want to underestimate the risk to the Australian public. There is risk, but risk is there to be managed. The question is well what is the alternate option? And when you hear about what the alternate options are, you know, those that believe that actually we do need a strong maritime capability because we are dependent on maritime trade, third large Exclusive Economic Zone, etcetera, quickly go to well, the French option. Well France has one nuclear powered submarine shipyard and they take on average ten years to build their nuclear-powered submarines. So that's not happening anytime soon, even if they would agree to that. or they go, well, the South Korean option, like this is an option that you could pull off the shelf immediately. Now those boats aren't particularly suitable to our circumstances. Or it's the Japanese option. But these aren't realistic options in a realistic time frame. Now if AUKUS was to fall apart or phase two or phase three, you could look at what are your long lead options, but these are not overnight options. Or there's the case of, well actually we don't need that capability because you don't need power projection through the maritime domain, and this becomes a debate about defence of Australia as a continent, continental strategy versus maritime strategy. And the continental strategy conversation becomes, well all we need is missiles and drones. When you start to pull the thread on, okay, if we're going to cancel this multi-decade, multi-phase program right now in response to a minor change, what is the solution? The cupboard becomes pretty quickly fairly bare. And I think that, you know, when you step back and if you look at the conversations that occurred around the French nuclear-powered submarine, which now in some quarters is the ultimate option, but at the time it was also highly controversial. It was in the Australian media all the time talking about issues and in some ways overemphasising issues. I think there's a wider conversation here about what is the ability of us as a nation to continue and commit to long-term projects. And the point that I made in a in a recent piece, I think it was in the Australian Financial Review, it might have been in Lowy, it was it kind of made the point that if you just step back and say, okay, whether you agreed or didn't agree with AUKUS, and you know, and certainly when it was announced, I was working in force design and I had some surprise and bemusement to be fair. But when you kind of step back and go, okay, well actually a lot's been achieved in five years. Is there risk? Yes, but a lot's been achieved in five years. The idea that Australia would just suddenly cancel, which is what is often represented by those against AUKUS in our newspapers fairly regularly, that we should just cancel the project, the idea that you would cancel a project with your closest ally, right? Yes, there are some challenges in that relationship, but our closest ally, a project that is largely on track, on the back of cancelling a French submarine project, on the back of reducing a Hunter-class frigate project, on the back of reducing an Arafura project, and the other defence projects that we have reduced. And the thought that somebody would rapidly want to get into bed with you to do a long term, multi-decade defence project deal, is ludicrous. And there is this question here about what is our reputation as a country and would anyone want to work with us? And to be honest, the answer is probably no.

 Justin Burke

It's such a great point, Jen. I think this question of our strategic maturity, our patience, our ability to concentrate over long periods of time, is going to be key because this is a multi decade project. So I'm gonna ask the question first of you, Pete, to wrap up our podcast today. But assuming we're sitting here again in five years' time, for AUKUS's tenth birthday, what's the discussion gonna be like?

Peter Dean

Look, I’d hazard a guess that not a lot will change from where we're at. you know, there'll be those who are opposed to it, those who are supporting of it, and those that sit in the middle who, you know, the polls say they're somewhat supportive or somewhat against, but they're kind of, you know, middle mass, where they sit will largely depend on the ability to deliver, I think. In that debate, I think what it'd be nice to see is what Jen said. If you're gonna tear down or dislike or, you know, argue that we're not going to do AUKUS, then you need to put forward an alternative option. Now I also say this for those who are calling constantly for increased defence spending. If you're going to make a call for increased defence spending, you have to make, you put forward where is that money going to come from? Is it going to be a tax increase? Or which part of the public portfolio of spending that the government does that you want to take money away from? You can't just constantly call for one thing and not deal with the consequences in any way, shape, or form. And I think when you unpack some of those that you find problems. And Jen's made a really good point about some. The other option, as some commentators have pointed out, well, you double the number of conventional submarines that we've done. And again, if you look at that in detail, that will require a second submarine construction shipyard and all the costs. It will actually require more crew than the AUKUS submarine program, so more submariners and more sailors, it would actually involve a larger industrial uplift, and you're not going to come away any cheaper from that. So there are trade-offs and offsets. And of course, I never like the sunk cost fallacy, but you do when you get to projects like this, you have to make an assessment of how much have you already invested in will changing direction now lead to a better outcome? And for those who call with questions of sovereignty for a French submarine option, there is as many sovereignty concerns about that deal as they're in any other deal. And I honestly can't see how you know having an Australian-owned and operated and commanded sovereign capability is any less different from a Collins class submarine that we have at the moment. It's about technology transfer and this type of stuff. And I think I just want to throw in one thing. People say, you know, we haven't had a parliamentary inquiry into AUKUS we haven't had an independent review into AUKUS or it's never been looked at. Well, it's up to Parliament to make its decision if it wants to do that. But I was very lucky enough a few years ago to work on the Defence Strategic Review for Sir Angus Houston and Stephen Smith. Both the independent reviewers made it very clear that they started on the first principles of everything, and that included looking at the SSN capability. And Sir Angus Houston and Stephen Smith came out of that review with a focus on deterrence by denial and a military strategy of denial and asymmetric capability development, of which the SSN's that review firmly believes sits at the cornerstone of developing our strategic policy. So it has been independently looked at. That was commissioned by this Albanese Labour government. And that review was completely independent of the government and of defence. And the review is, you know, I was there through the whole thing were very protective of their independence. And they made that assessment as a part of a holistic measure around that strategy. That all said, as I said, where we started from, I think when we get to each anniversary, we'll probably be having the same debates with just slightly little bits of nuances in the side. Those who oppose AUKUS are the same groups who oppose the US Alliance, which are the people who, you know, protested, you know, Pine Gap and whatever in in the preceding decades. And I think the good thing the commonality here is both those people who are for and against AUKUS want us to be at the same place, which is a more secure and safer country. We just like that's what I take away from this so much. We're in agreement on that. We're just disagreeing on the ways and means to achieve that. But ultimately I think we've also got to remember that whether you're opposed to it or or for it, we're actually about making we're all working for the common goal of making Australia a safer, more secure place in what is as a world of great strategic change and uncertainty.

Jennifer Parker

And I think if we can just pick up on that point, you know, a world of great strategic change and uncertainty. I think one of the things that we need to think about as a nation is preserving our capacity to deal with real crises. And I think that, you know, when it comes to calls for a parliamentary AUKUS inquiry, I think that if something significantly went wrong, I think that that would be prudent. I don't think that anything has gone significantly wrong so far. I can't promise that it that it won't. But when we think about the issue of capacity, this constant call for revisiting decisions or inquiries all reviews. What does that do? That actually eats up the capacity of the decision makers and the implementers who are trying to drive to significantly short time frames. And this is where, you know, I was quite critical of the idea that what we should do right now is lease a Japanese submarine, for example. Because when you think about, okay, what is the biggest risk from an Australian perspective to AUKUS? I think there are two. I think one, political will. I think that risk is treated at the moment, but that could change. I think the second risk is the ambitious time frames. Often people say, well, it's, you know, submarines in the 2040s. It's actually not. I mean, it's starting now. We've had the two US commands that will be established in HMAS Sterling already announced, the boats are getting here next year, sailors arriving by the end of the year. Every time you want to do something new, a new inquiry, a new review, the people who should be focused on implementing get caught up and their capacity gets eaten up. Equally, in terms of this crisis response and you know when we think about the change to the block four, three block four in service boats as opposed to two block four in service boats and a block seven, that entire week of crisis also ate up the Australian public's mental capacity to deal with a real crisis. And I made this point, you know, when the Chinese Naval Task Group circumnavigated Australia in February, March, the response by many, and many of the same people who responded to the AUKUS decision as as a crisis was this is an alarm, this is a crisis. But when you react in that way or overreact in that way as a nation and propel that, you actually undermine societal resilience and preparedness to do with a real crisis. And I worry that there is a real crisis heading down the track. So I think we should keep those things in mind when we're having this conversation.

Justin Burke

And so Jen, in five years' time, when we're having this conversation again, and it's, I'm issuing the invite now, I'm going to insist that we see you back here.

Jennifer Parker

In five years' time, absolutely. 'Cause I won't be bored about talking about nuclear powered submarines by then.

Justin Burke

And neither will I and neither will our listeners be tired of hearing about it. But what do you what do you hope or what do you expect? Do you expect that we're going to develop a little bit more resilience, a little bit more nuance in how we deal with changes to the plan, how we deal with changes in the environment? Do you think the media will start to treat this with a little bit more maturity rather than treating it as a clickable moment? What do you suspect? What do you hope?

Jennifer Parker

I'm not gonna I'm not gonna criticise the media there. Look, I think we'll probably be in the same place five years from now. I mean a lot of the focus on AUKUS as Pete highlighted before is often about phase two of Pillar One, which is the sale of three Virginia class submarines and the certification of that sale two 270 days before the sale, and that's gonna be twenty thirty one, which is which is five years from now. I think this discussion will continue along the same trajectory until we have a major crisis that perhaps shocks us out of that.

Justin Burke

Excellent. Well we have run out of time for today. an illuminating discussion, a wonderful chance to weigh these things soberly after a bit of a tumultuous month. But again I'd like to thank our guests, Jen Parker and Peter Dean.

Jennifer Parker

Thanks so much.

Peter Dean

Thank you very much. It's been a pleasure.