Australia’s Chief of the Defence Force: reflections on half a century of service
Transcript
How is the Australian Defence Force preparing for the challenges of a changing world?
Does the appointment of a naval officer as the Chief of the Defence Force signal a shift in focus to the maritime domain?
What does a career in the Australian Defence Force mean in the 21st century?
In this episode, Admiral David Johnston joins Rory Medcalf to discuss the insights he has gained through his career in the Royal Australian Navy, and how he sees the future of Australia’s defence.
(This transcript is AI-generated and may contain inaccuracies.)
Admiral David Johnston AC RAN
All like-minded nations are seeing change in their strategic environment, challenges to the rules-based order that have been essential to their economic prosperity and safety for many decades. all of them are answering that series of challenges in ways that are unique to their nation's requirement, but I think commonly reaching out to strengthen partnerships.
National Security Podcast
You're listening to the National Security Podcast, the show that brings you expert analysis, insights and opinion on the national security challenges facing Australia and the Indo-Pacific produced by the ANU National Security College.
Professor Rory Medcalf
Welcome to the National Security Podcast. I'm Rory Medcalf, head of the National Security College at the Australian National University. We're recording this podcast from the traditional lands of the Ngunnawal and Namburi peoples and I pay respects to their elders, past, present and emerging. It's a great privilege today to welcome a very special guest to the studio, the Chief of the Australian Defence Force, Admiral David Johnston AC RAN. Admiral, welcome and thank you for giving us your time and your thoughts on the National Security Podcast.
Admiral David Johnston AC RAN
Rory, thank you. It's a pleasure to be here.
Professor Rory Medcalf
So we're recording today at a time where not only is there momentous challenge and change in the international strategic environment, but most specifically time stamping today's conversation. We've just seen the Australian Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese in the United States in the White House having a very important meeting with the president and the leadership of the United States and some very clear messages emerging from that on AUKUS. on the shared strategic challenges and opportunities we have. So I'd like to come to that a little later in the conversation. But before I do, I'd welcome it if you could share with our listeners a little bit more about yourself. You were appointed Chief of Defence Force, I think, last year, July 2024.
Admiral David Johnston AC RAN
Yes.
Professor Rory Medcalf
We're now recording in October 2025. And of course, this is a culminating point in quite an extensive and distinguished career in the Royal Australian Navy and Australian Defence Force. Going back to, I think, the 1970s, the dim and distant 1970s, there have been some very impactful events and decisions that have shaped Navy, the Defence Force, Australia's strategic environment in that time. But I'm interested in a little bit more about yourself first. So how did your career come to be an apprenticeship for this job?
Admiral David Johnston AC RAN
Yeah, Rory, thank you. You right, my career di start, I was described a little bit back as a Cold War warrior, which I took slightly offensively until I gave it some thought and of course that's where my career did start in, I joined in 1978, that's we would say the latter part of the Cold War where state on state conflict was a very real feature of the environment that we were in. Shortly after I joined the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and that has consequences that might return to that start point of being in an environment with a state based conflict and competition of course is very much where we find ourselves having to address now and it's a long circle to arrive back at a similar geostrategic environment. In my own career I'd say some key events would include the first Gulf War, I’d been in the Navy at that stage for 12 years. It was something of a shot across the bow in Navy terms of the reality of missile age conflicts. It returned us from, I'd spent much of my sea going time in the South Pacific and in Southeast Asia, for ships to be redeploying into the Gulf War environment. Really, shook Navy to lift its preparedness and ability to operate in a genuine combat environment with genuine risks associated with it. Then like many, found ourselves dealing with consequences of counterterrorism, particularly in Afghanistan, the rise of counterterrorism in Iraq and then subsequently with Daesh. Changing nature of how military contribution was expected of Defence and all the way through that again equally important to where we find ourselves now through that period in the 90s and early 2000s. Bougainville as an issue, East Timor rose, Solomon Islands, so a reminder of our own region and particularly the proximate part of the region is where there's a high expectation of what Australia and its defence force can do, that all merged together to bring me to the experiences that I've brought both as the Chief of Joint Operations, really at the end of our Afghanistan campaign and our reorient back into the Indo-Pacific region as we call it now. Through my time as the Vice Chief relearning, I'd done a capability job when I was a lieutenant commander, major equivalent of what it is to try to do forced design for the future or helping for the type of responsibilities that I perform now.
Rory Medcalf
Of course, whole of government as well, I mean border protection command and really engaging with all the other agencies of the national security community. I guess throughout this career, whether it's individual role models or whether it's qualities of leadership, what's inspired you?
Admiral David Johnston AC RAN
the nature of the people that I have worked through and I'd tell a story I remember quite vividly when I first saw a Federation Star presented to an officer, of course Federation Stars 40 years of service, I was much younger than that. I wondered at the time, why on earth would anyone stay that long in a career of this nature? Course I've found myself in a similar position since then and the answer equivocally is the quality of the people that I have worked alongside, all services, public service, international people throughout that career. It is a genuine inspiration to see people dedicated to doing the best they can and serving the interests of their nation. I've worked with good leaders and some leaders that I'd prefer not to have worked with, but like all of us, we learn from each of them and every one of them has contributed to what I find to be important and what I try to do as a defence leader.
Professor Rory Medcalf
So you are also the first CDF from the Royal Australian Navy in many years, I think since 2002. Is that, in your view, any indication that the maritime domain is taking on greater precedence?
Admiral David Johnston AC RAN
I'd agree that maritime domain is taking on greater precedence, whether that’s a reflection of my own appointment and plenty of others could comment on that. But if you look at our circumstances at the moment, we're a country that (as we have for decades) relies on trade for our economic health and wellbeing, we increasingly rely on those sea lines of communication, 99 % of our exports by volume 99 % of our internet traffic all flows through seabed cables So the maritime environment is essential to our national wellbeing. In defence terms, course, to move into those locations, you're either by ship or sea, if you are offshore, so it is critical to us and you see that reflected in our strategy in our investment program, 38 % of the integrated investment program, our capability plan. is into the maritime environment, but that doesn't mean Navy. is, of course, Navy through the Nuclear Propelled Submarine Program, acceleration of the Megami frigates is a beneficiary of that, but the uplift in Army capabilities that are relevant to maritime, the amphibious capability that Army will introduce the introduction of long range fires that has a maritime component to it and therefore similarly getting the profile around maritime surveillance. We had a new P8 arrive to join the fleet, stand up of a new P8 squadron, just within the last week to Triton our first really significant uncrewed air system entering our inventory. So you can see the strategy has a heavy maritime influence to it, the capability plan that underpins the performance of that strategy are all reasons why that environment is important to us.
Professor Rory Medcalf
And that really leads us into the broader National Defence Strategy. So as Chief of Defence Force, now you have a focus on delivering the priorities laid out in that strategy. We had a national defence strategy last year. We understand there'll be a new one or an update sometime in the first half of 2026. It's sort of a two year tempo that we've been promised, but of course strategy on paper is one thing, strategy in reality is what we need to talk about here. How do you see Australia's defence priorities evolving over the next decade?
Admiral David Johnston AC RAN
So you're right in the National Defence Strategy of 2024 and the Defence Strategic Review that preceded it. Really important changes to the way we conceive of the national security requirements for Australia. In my view, there were three foundational elements to it, which will in all likelihood be preserved through the biennial updates that we do. When I talk about why NDS 24 is so important, it emphasises three things that I draw on. The focused nature of it. We had come, and my early comments to you, from a Defence Force that was required in part to be a Jack of all trades. Everything from supporting counter-terrorism operations in Iraq or Syria or in Afghanistan through to our region to a very clear focus on the geographic region that was of most importance to our country and the type of missions that we might perform in it. So the focus was key, the integrated component I saw as highly valuable. and I'll take just a moment to explain it, it was an expression not just of the three services coming together, which we had customarily called the joint force. But with the rise of two really important warfighting domains. space and cyber, you're talking about more than just the three traditional services.
I've always valued the N part of an NDS, which is the national component. The integrated also means bringing together our other partners across government, not just the security partners, but realising those linkages into the economy and trade and health sectors all of which are vital for a defence force that may need to increase its capacity or deal with conflict. So the integrated is fundamental and the international partnerships that we might come to talk to are a core element of that.
But perhaps the final one, which equally it's taken in my view, some conceptualising of defence to be able to understand it well is the view of time. So NDS 24 introduced the three time epochs, first one to 27, second out to 2030 and then beyond 2030. What it did in our system was indicate that we need value time differently than we had in the past. And that in that very comfortable environment where waiting time was beyond 10 years, there’s a lot you can do in 10 years. But when the strategic challenge is what might you do in two or out to five you really have to think about what you are prioritising how ready you are today as well as the months and years ahead. And shift everything from our training regimes, our acquisition approaches, our relationships, to accommodate a very different sense of urgency. So your comment then, yes, we're in a two-year cycle. I would anticipate that there will be an evolution, but not the substantive step change that we saw in 2024. The wonderful part of a two yearly cycle is we look at what’s changed in the environment, we can update our view of technology, what's relevant, what's become less relevant and blend those two together with a new strategy and that's what the 2026 outcome will lead us to.
Professor Rory Medcalf
Can I take that a little bit further because I think it's really valuable that you've illuminated the challenge of effectively a lack of warning time, for the benefit of listeners who may not have followed the theology of Australian strategic policy over the last few decades. Of course, the concept of 10 years or more of strategic warning time, I think, came into the thinking in the 1980s when it was pretty clear that for a potential adversary to prepare to be a major threat to Australia, we would have significant warning time. We would have time to really change our strategic settings to invest and so forth and that is not the case anymore. There's a very clear admission from government that is not the case. In specific terms, rather than in those sort of general terms about acquisition and training and so forth, in specific terms, what can you say about what we have and how prepared we would be for the kinds of contingencies that could arise in the next few years?
Admiral David Johnston AC RAN
So I am upfront I’d say very confident in the type of defence force that we have. But it is true that set of demands around time introduce a different set of priorities. And you can interpret that well through the actions that we are taking the approach to increasing our guided weapons capacity, both through sovereign production and through offshore acquisition. One of the luxuries you have when your warning time is something like 10 years, you can manage the risks in your inventory, recognising that weapons have a shelf life, they can get superseded technology. So you can draw down on your holdings with the comfort that you have time to increase them. We're in a time where we need to increase them. So, our approach to guided weapons is an example. We have to lift our logistics capacity, the tempo of the force is very quickly determined by, how much fuel do you have? What are your spare parts inventory like, can you get those key items to the locations where you wish to operate from? The northern base infrastructure enhancements are a complementary component of that. We know to that to get the reach that we would need into our region operating out of the North. Has both great abilities to project force. It's also good for dispersal and our ability to move the force around to present challenges for anyone who might target that force. But that means we have to, in the short term, uplift that northern infrastructure, so it offers us the flexibility that we would be seeking. People are another component. If you've got a force that you have to worry about in 10 years, you can carry risks in the number of people that you have. You've seen a lot of effort by the government supported by defence, on how do we change our retention of people in service? How do we improve the recruiting into service, in order to bring that front loading of people to meet that increasing target of workforce that we have?
Professor Rory Medcalf
Of course, the strategic environment we're in is one where Australia is not alone. We are facing, I think, threats and risks to the regional and global order that we've become accustomed to. Some of that, a lot of that really is from, I think, big uncertainties about how great powers are going to behave. It's unilateralism, it's nationalism, it's rivalry. I think the visit we had to our part of the world by the Chinese Navy earlier this year was quite a bracing wake up call, I think, to a lot of the population to realize that China, for instance, can reach our region, I think, with substantial military force, if I'm not mistaken. But of course, at the same time, we're not the only country facing these challenges. And it's been, I think, a truth about our regional environment for a long time that Australia's interests are vast, our capabilities are more limited, than our interests, we've relied on partners and allies throughout Australia's modern history. How does that approach hold now? And I'm not talking only about the alliance with the United States, which we might come to in a bit more detail perhaps at some point, but how does Australia balance that alliance with its volatility that we've seen in the media in recent times, with other relationships, with regional powers? I think Japan stands out. For me, India of course is a rising force, there are powers in South East Asia. How do we balance all of those relationships and what do we extract from those for our defence?
Admiral David Johnston AC RAN
It's a really important issue and your right, our country is one where throughout our long history we've never sought to be alone. We've much better, because of our population size, the size of our continent, the nature of our interests when we are working with others. So those partnerships are critical to us all. I think all like-minded nations are seeing a change in their strategic environment, challenges to the rules based order. That have been essential to the economic prosperity and safety for many decades. All of them are answering that series of challenges in ways which are unique for their nation's requirement, but I think commonly by reaching out to strengthen partnerships. And I see it particularly acutely in the last few years now but if you look at the Papua New Guinea Treaty that was very recently signed by our two governments. The work in the South Pacific, I was in Jakarta last week where we are working together to implement the Defence Cooperation Agreement that was agreed last year by the Australian and Indonesian governments. The relationship with Japan, which is accelerating at a pace that is quite remarkable of shared interests between our two nations from economic structures through to the defence relationships between the Japanese Self-Defence Force and the ADF. Singapore being key to us with recent visit of the Prime Minister, reinforcing some of the defence and security outcomes. So when you look across each of these and India, I should have included as an increasingly important partner to us. All of the nations are looking both bilaterally and multilaterally at where our interests coincide and increasingly we are seeing very fertile grounds where those interests are raised around how do we make sure we have a common understanding of the environment, our information sharing, the linkages of our industrial bases together to be able to enhance general capacity. I’m really delighted to see the way other nations are embracing the opportunity to work with Australia and genuinely looking forward to how can we make these partnerships of mutual benefit to our countries.
Professor Rory Medcalf
The benefits do vary though. I mean, the way I look at it, the partnership with Japan brings, frankly brings strategic weight. Whereas I see a lot of the partnerships closer to home, including a formal treaty alliance with Papua New Guinea, but a lot of the engagement in Southeast Asia more as about bringing strategic depth and strategic weight. If I can be a bit sort of theoretical about that. How do you differentiate the value of different partnerships? And I would like to focus on Japan there, what does Japan bring?
Admiral David Johnston AC RAN
Very early in my career, I worked with the Japanese Naval Task Group and admired their precision for weaponry firing and the discipline that they brought to their naval operations. Where Japan's interest in our relationship has evolved since then are a recognition that some of the risks that we see acutely emerging in our environment are shared. They present themselves differently to the two countries, but they do present to both countries together. So our strategic interests are more aligned than I have seen in the last few decades and that is water falling down through to the nature of activities that we are doing. The Megami announcement, course made on capability grounds, but a very healthy strategic relationship benefit to it as well.
Professor Rory Medcalf
And they’ll be coming at relative speed…
Admiral David Johnston AC RAN
2029 is the planned delivery of the first of the frigates, so a rapid introduction into force for a major capability like a frigate. But if you look very recently, to excise Talisman Saber here. the largest Japanese contribution that we've had. They fired their surface-to- air missile, first time in Australia, second firing of a surface-to-surface missile off the south coast, amphibious elements participating in it, so their looking to do significantly more with us in Australia and Australian forces in Japan. We’ve had F-35s operating there, the destroyer HMAS Brisbane has just completed a substantial maintenance period alongside in Yokosuka, so you can see from strategy alignment right through to tactical force cooperation and the way we conceive when certain scenarios may arise in our region how our two nations may contribute or complement each other in addressing these risks.
Professor Rory Medcalf
And in another category, I mean, you've mentioned the Puk Puk Treaty, the alliance with PNG, but it's also interesting to see Australia really stepping up its engagement with the Philippines, close to those international waters of the South China Sea. How do you see our advantages and I guess also obligations in relation to those two partnerships?
Admiral David Johnston AC RAN
If I start with Papua New Guinea relationship, and I had the great pleasure of being in Port Moresby for the 50th anniversary of independence celebrations, and it was genuinely a joyful event, but in that wonderful way of two countries celebrating, not a colonial power being removed and an independence movement standing up there, it was a genuine bilateral celebration of a key event, the treaty, which the defence Treaty, which is at the request of the Government of PNG, really does give us a means to elevate what is a long relationship, both between our countries and our defence forces, to look at interoperability in a different way. And by that I mean really starting to think around. On, how do we make sure training standards are common where it's appropriate, equipment is common, but an ability for the two forces to work very closely with each other for enhanced access, for Australian forces to train and have access to PNG course, the opportunity for png citizens to join the Australian Defence Force. So it really does elevate us to taking us from what has been a substantial partnership over 50 years, but giving it a turbo boost in a way that is beneficial to both countries. The Philippines is a really good choice. Rory for you to raise, and I was in the Philippines just over a month ago for exercise alone. This is a bilateral activity between the Australian Defence Force and the Philippine Armed Forces. It was our largest offshore activity we conducted this year. We had maritime units involved amphibious units. We deployed fast jet and support to it conducted in different parts of the Philippines, but including Palawan, so many of your listeners would know facing the Philippine Sea right up through Luzon in the north, where we did complex weapon firings to the Philippines, really reaching out, recognising both their own circumstances benefit by having partners and seeking to work with countries like Australia, but particularly in the Philippines, around their own security. I think that's a really positive outcome,
Professor Rory Medcalf
just to be clear, though, PNG there is an obligation that we've taken on effectively, and it's an interesting question as to what that means, a mutual defence obligation, which I think I can I could see Australia more actively being called on to defend png than perhaps the other way around. Philippines is not a treaty. In the same sense, Philippines as a partnership, but in a pretty turbulent part of the region at the moment. So just any thoughts on the obligation question, what are the obligations that we're getting ourselves.
Admiral David Johnston AC RAN
in for the Philippines? You're right. From a defence perspective, we have a status Forces Agreement which enables that two way movement of defence forces, but quite different to the circumstance of the PNG treaty or the book. Book treaty gives us where an armed attack on either country is now recognising as having security consequences to the other country, which does bring an obligation for consultation for it. So they there is differences between the two, and the proximity of PNG and its inherent nature to our own national security is a self describing example of why that is important to us, but all of them are important partnerships to us, so we will prioritise the ability to both work with these countries and others, but the nature of activities are tailored to both the relationship and the interests of the host country in which we're working. We'll be right back
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Professor Rory Medcalf
So as I mentioned, we're recording this literally on the day where the visit of Prime Minister Albanese to the White House has been reported. It's in late October 2025 it looks very good from an Australian national interest point of view. It looks like we've we've got precisely what we need for certainty on the AUKUS programme, in particular, also the critical minerals deal, which has a defence set of implications, of course, and since we're having this conversation now, but I know we won't release the podcast for a number of weeks. I'm certainly not asking you for running commentary. But what could you say about the meaning that you draw from the announcement in the White House today on the longer arc of cooperation in the Australia us Alliance, and the importance of that alliance for our interests,
Admiral David Johnston AC RAN
the meeting does look to have gone very well, and it was we were always confident that the strategic rationale for the AUKUS, particularly the both the submarine component and the pillar to the innovation element of it, had a very strong rationale that was in the interest of the. Three countries, including very much the United States, the US does remain our principal security partner, and the outcomes of the meeting are a reflection of just how close that relationship is and how important it is to Australia, but to the United States as well. Of course, that does reinforce to us that we as a country need to continue to take responsibility for our own security, to be a valued contributor to those areas of complementary interest that we have to the United States and the rules based order, the US presence in the Indo Pacific all important to us, but I think a very pleasing outcome from what we've been able to see from the media reporting and gives us that good foundation to continue, particularly the work in the submarine programme, and the efforts that enable us to have been on track for That transition to a nuclear submarine force in the increasingly near future. And
Professor Rory Medcalf
what does it say to you about the commitment of the United States, including under this administration, to the security of our region?
Admiral David Johnston AC RAN
I think the US has been very clear right from the start of the importance of the Indo Pacific to its primary security challenges. Now we'll see when they release their national defence strategy, how that is articulated, but the prevalence of our region and the United States focus in it, in my view, has been unambiguous. It's to Australia's benefit that the US has that strong strategic focus on the region, and it just enhances the nature of the relationship between the two countries.
Professor Rory Medcalf
Now your job, of course, is to preserve peace by having a defence force that is prepared for conflict, prepared for war. And there are wars raging in the world as we speak. The conflict continues in Europe, the Russia Ukraine conflict, the conflict really driven by Russia's brutal invasion, unjustified, illegal invasion of Ukraine, we've seen, in a horrific way, a laboratory for the future of war over the past three years on the battlefields of Ukraine. What lessons does that conflict hold for the Indo Pacific and for your thinking and planning about Australia's Defence
Admiral David Johnston AC RAN
needs the Russia, Ukraine conflict, and I would just reinforce your view of illegal, immoral, devastating for the Ukrainian community and clearly of concern both to the European community, but has consequences that are global in its nature. We have, as you would expect, and the next national defence strategy will be the beneficiary of some of the work that we have done at looking at the Ukraine conflict, everything from the strategic nature of that conflict through to its tactical execution. And there are a few really good examples, and some of them used a lot in public commentary, the use of uncrewed systems and asymmetry. And of course, drones, in drone warfare has great public profile to it. We're looking at all of the insights that we can gain, perhaps some of the less obvious insights, but no less importance to us that we draw the rapid innovation cycle that we have seen in a three year conflict in Ukraine, of how quickly capabilities are developed, and then counter strategies we watched in the early part of the Ukraine conflict, as the use of drones rose, then the countermeasures to drones quickly tried to match it. That meant that disrupting drones by electronic means became less prevalent or useful as drones controlled by optic fibre were introduced. So the think the cycle, and it's been described to me, cycle for innovation is measured in weeks. So that brings a mindset that we are seeking to absorb and adjust to. There's quite a remarkable relationship between the defence forces and Ukrainian industry. Ukrainian industry people going to the front line to see the employment of equipment, to understand how it might need to shift. And similarly, defence people working in factories alongside designers. There's a linkage there that I think is really important to us. The electronic spectrum has become really key again, both its ability to be used and disrupted. What that means to command and control your ability to deploy forces at range or disrupt an adversary is. Actions. So all of those are part of the melting pot that is entering into what we've observing. But we haven't limited our views to those the recent conflict between India and Pakistan involving near fifth Gen capabilities being used in a manner which gives insights to the employment of those capabilities, and of course,
Professor Rory Medcalf
including Chinese capabilities.
Admiral David Johnston AC RAN
And similarly, Israel, Iran with long range weapon exchanges, drones at scale. All of these provide insights to us that are important, that when we contextualise it, and it is important that we take in some cases, we're not a country that has a land border like Ukraine and Russia have we need to translate those insights into our own environment and make sure we're pulling the right lessons through.
Professor Rory Medcalf
And are we learning the lessons quickly enough? I know that one might always say we're never moving fast enough, but, I mean, how do you feel about the pace of our adaptation?
Admiral David Johnston AC RAN
We would always like to go faster where that's possible, but we are. We've reviewed our innovation approach, and the advanced strategic capability accelerator is a good example of a shift in order to be able to accommodate it. Of course, we don't have a greenfield military capability. So with the you deal both with the systems that are in service, and look to shift those, but space and cyber are two examples where they've come to the fore very much from these insights and ensuring that we have the capacity to address them. So it's a very good question. We put significant attention to being able to address it, and it's important we do it as well as we can.
Professor Rory Medcalf
So before we wrap up, I'd like to turn the conversation back to Australia and really look at the intersection of defence and the Australian community. You've talked about the idea of National Defence strategy, and you've emphasised the national in that. And for me, that's that's whole of nation. It's not just whole of government. I agree. By the way, the National Security College has been conducting a community consultations process this year, and we've learned a lot of interesting things that we will reveal in due course. When we consolidate our research, absolutely, absolutely Admiral. We'll release our research in full early next year, but we will release some of our data towards the end of this year. The general observation I would make is that there is a public appetite to know a lot more about what government is doing in terms of their national security, and I take that as a very positive thing. And as we look around the world, colleagues here know that I'm a bit obsessed with the way, for example, a lot of the Nordic countries are looking at national security and engaging their populations, their business communities, their public in sort of a broader national security effort, including through education. Now Australia is in a different place on that journey of community engagement in national security, but it would be interesting to hear some views from you on that. I know you've commented previously, for example, that we have to think about plausible futures where Australia might need to be conducting operations, including combat operations from the Australian homeland, but that's a pretty bracing message. I know that recruitment is improving for the ADF, but there has been a pretty difficult story over recent years about those numbers. So just some observations from you about the relationship between the ADF and the community, and perhaps what more can be done to communicate the Defence Forces mission, our national interests to the community in these difficult times.
Admiral David Johnston AC RAN
I think it's a really important why the National Defence strategy is a public document. I'm sure I would like to think that each Australian has that on their bedside reading list alongside the work that you produce here, of course, Rory, but by making a public document, it does give the ability for our community to understand the way we see the environment and how we are responding to it. And then it is important that academia, think tanks, defence officials, support our ministers in helping communicate the understanding of what that means and why these approaches are taken. I'm quite confident the Australian community does have quite a sophisticated understanding of its environment, and a number of your polls kind of reflect at that maturity of approach. And while it may not feature heavily as around the pool side or at the barbecue discussion, there is a genuine appreciation, because we travel well, we force. Internet to have a well educated society, that that knowledge is there and we can then help explain it. Think the relationship between the Australian Defence Force and its people will always be based on our ability to protect the nation and our interest. Our history is pretty good at doing that, and I think there's a great pool of respect around people who choose to put on their country's uniform in order to preserve the safety and security of other members of the community. And of course, that's what every member of the Australian Defence Force subscribes to. So I think we're in a good position, reputationally. Of course, there is work that we continue to do to address observations that important work like the Royal Commission in defence and veteran suicide, some of our experiences out of Afghanistan that led to the Brereton report. So we are working still on that ensuring that that trust and confidence is there. But I think when the community has needed us in recent times, through floods and fires in our countries during the period of the covid pandemic, perhaps rare occasions where they get to see defence force operating inside their own community. I'm regularly reminded that when people find themselves in difficult circumstances, the appearance of people in uniform with the discipline and goodwill that the ADF brings when we come into a community, gives an enormous sense of relief, and that's exactly as we would wish it to be.
Professor Rory Medcalf
Again, without revealing too many confidences from our consultations, I've heard some very similar things, particularly in disaster zones I was in Lismore recently, and getting getting that view locally. Of course, there is a tension between that, though, and of course, the finite resources of the ADF and the question of who are the other entities that should be delivering disaster relief? But that's a that's a larger conversation, and we're getting a bit short on time today. You've been very generous with your with your thoughts and with with your insights. I just want to ask you one last question, which, which really builds on that thought about the ADF of the future, the Australian Defence Force of the Future. If there's one piece of advice you could give as your parting words today to young Australians considering a career in the Australian Defence Force. What would it be? So
Admiral David Johnston AC RAN
I'm really pleased, perhaps, as I answer that question, that the rate of applications to join the ADF is up almost 19% year on year. So there's people starting to listen to or seek an answer to the question that you've posed to me, I would say, if you want a meaningful role that is highly valued in our community, where you work shoulder to shoulder with the most extraordinary Australians who are similarly committed to their communities, if you want a world class training system and the opportunity to have the education component, if you want to work with equipment that, in many cases, is leading edge technology and all for the great purposes of defending the people you love and the communities that we come from. We've got work for you.
Professor Rory Medcalf
Admiral David Johnston AC RAN, chief of the Australian Defence Force. Thank you so much for being on the National Security Podcast.
Admiral David Johnston AC RAN
Wonderful to be here. Thank you.
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