Transcript

Is BRICS primarily a challenge to Western-led institutions, or does it serve a broader purpose in global governance?
How effective has BRICS been at pursuing its objectives?
Does BRICS membership provide newer states with greater strategic influence through engagement with major economies like China, India, and Russia? 

In this episode, Flavia Zimmermann and Fitriani join David Andrews to explore the evolving role of BRICS, its effectiveness, and its potential influence on global governance and power dynamics.

(This transcript is partly AI-generated and may contain inaccuracies.)

Fitriani

BRICS offered an alternative from the world that is mainly dominated by the Western voices.

Flavia Bellieni Zimmermann

Some analysts would be concerned that this new layer that deals with military and strategic purposes could lead then to a new Cold War.

National Security Podcast

You're listening to the National Security Podcast, the show that brings you expert analysis, insights and opinion on the national security challenges facing Australia and the Indo-Pacific. Produced by the ANU National Security College.

David Andrews

Welcome to the National Security Podcast. I'm David Andrews, Senior Policy Advisor at the ANU National Security College. Today's podcast is being recorded on the lands of the Ngunawal and Ngambri people, and I pay my respects to their elders, past and present. Today I'm joined by Dr Flavia Bellieni Zimmermann and Dr Fitriani for a discussion on BRICS and its role and impact on international order. Flavia is a lecturer in public policy in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne and an international political analyst.

She is also an adjunct research fellow in the school of Social Sciences at the University of Western Australia, where she was previously a lecturer of politics, policy and international relations. Fitriani is a senior analyst with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's Cyber, Technology and Security Program specialising in hybrid threats in the Indo-Pacific, as well as foreign policy and non-traditional security issues. She has previously held appointments with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Dortmund University and the University of Indonesia.

Welcome to you both and thank you for joining us on the National Security Podcast.

Fitriani

Thank you, David.

Flavia Bellieni Zimmermann

Thank you for having us.

David Andrews

A large part of the international security discourse in recent years has been focused on or attention drawn to concepts like strategic competition and the rules based international order or the potential emergence of a multipolar system and the possibility of a so-called new Cold War. certainly while each of these could probably have its own episode of the podcast, when we're talking about international order, in simple terms, I'd say that we're talking about the laws, the frameworks, the regulations and institutions that govern and shape, albeit imperfectly, the interactions between states and other international organisations. And this includes bodies like the United Nations, International Criminal Court and the National Monetary Fund that were established following the Second World War and remain largely intact today. There's certainly a tendency towards free and open trading relations in that system and the equality of nations and democratic values. But I think the aspect of that where I find BRICS particularly interesting is that I feel like it's become to some extent more important for what it represents than what it is per se.

And so before we get too far along and for any listeners who aren't aware, I just thought I'd give a very brief overview and background of BRICS so they're up to speed with us all for the conversation. So BRICS is the name that's given to a multilateral, multinational, that is to say, grouping of states comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia. And it takes its name from the original members, that is Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, but was actually coined by the then chief economist at Goldman Sachs, Jim O'Neill, in a 2001 study that was entitled Building Better Global Economic BRICS, but with a small s in this case, and existed mostly as an analytical category in scholarship for several years before the foreign ministers of those core countries met on the sidelines of the 61st General Assembly of the United Nations back in 2006, then held their first official summit in and were joined in 2011 by South Africa. So it's still a quite young entity, all things considered. But over that time, it's evolved to become a more substantial international institution, and the past couple of years has expanded rather significantly with Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the UAE joining in 2024.

Indonesia only had been admitted about a month or two months ago from where we're talking now. so since 2023 as well, those four members have been joined by a wider network of 12 other BRICS Plus partner countries. So in this case, it's Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Argentina and Saudi Arabia were also invited to join as four members but have so far declined.

And so I think particularly because of that Russia, China, Iran connection, so the states that have been pointed out within a lot of US strategic doctrine, particularly as being a sort of core belligerence or opponents, and I suppose compounded then with Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing sort of competition between the United States and China, BRICS has come to be painted as a kind of anti-Western or anti-liberal order partnership in some respects. But, but Flavia,how true is that? Is that an accurate representation or is there a lot more that we need to be thinking about when it comes to BRICS?

Flavia Bellieni Zimmermann

Look, I think we need to look at what I like to say that is the first incarnation of BRICS. That is BRICS in the mid, late 2000s, when it starts with Brazil, Russia, India, China, even before South Africa joined, why BRICS? Yes, Jim O'Neill is the first person to talk about an economic cooperation of the emerging, the four and later on five emerging economies in the world. But what is bringing these countries together? think that's the first question we need to ask ourselves. So there are issues in the US post World War II international order which failed to address the needs of global self-countries. So these countries, come together as the five leading emerging economies in the world. But what is binding them together? And it's fascinating because there are differences.

 Of course, there are differences in foreign policy. There are cultural differences, immense cultural differences. But these are global self-countries who which look at the international order and the World Bank and institutions which were created within the international liberal order led by the US and Western countries which don't fully represent their needs.

So since the first incarnation of BRICS to what we are seeing now, there is a big difference and a shift in this narrative not only since 2022, the BRICS summit changed the narrative and the objectives of BRICS. Why are they together, right? It has been expanded not only for an economic cooperation for global self-countries, but also strategic and military. And it has a lot to do with the invasion of Ukraine. But the main point that I want to make, and you are asking about, if BRICS want to counter the liberal world order, the main thing we know about BRICS, particularly if you look at the political discourses at the beginning of BRICS, and particularly the role played by the Brazilian president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, that the irony of history, he was one of the key leaders during the BRICS' first incarnation to be pushing for this greater political leverage of global South countries and now he's back in his third term in Brazil and also presiding the BRICS. can talk about it a bit later on. But BRICS, and particularly the BRICS expansion is a manifestation of a historical lack of representation of those countries. Now with BRICS plus these countries represent approximately between 36, 40 % of the global GDP. They have incredible economic weight globally. But they don't feel like they are represented, for instance, at the United Nations Security Council. So this is one of the points that maybe we can expand a little bit more when we reflect upon the points raised in the Kazan summit. So there is a structural, historical problem in the way the liberal international order was designed that is not really fully representing the voices and the needs of the global self in my perspective.

The way the world order and the international institutions are structured, it's predominantly gives more representation and leverages the interests of the US and Western countries.

So that's the main point that they are not satisfied with the world order if there are possibilities to engage between inverted commas these grievances. And there is compelling evidence, for instance, when you think about the role played by the World Bank in furthering inequalities in global south countries, which were needing money to borrow money from the World Bank to develop their economies to address issues that they have not only of development in itself, of structural inequalities in the global self. Actually, the fact that they went to the World Bank, the irony of it all is that the conditions given by the World Bank actually exacerbated those existing challenges that the global self countries were facing.

So I think this is the context there is a desperate need to engage with the global South and BRICS offers this alternative. These countries, have immense weight, particularly together now with BRICS Plus, and they want their political agendas heard, they want the international community to understand better the challenges they face. They don't feel they have not only their voices, but their needs met by the international institutions developed under the umbrella of the international liberal world order.

David Andrews

Fitriani, if I could bring you in at this point, you may have some reflections on what Fabio's just said as well, but...

But how effective do you think BRICS has been at pursuing these objectives? think there's a, as Flavia said, there's this sense of perhaps states coming together to represent their interests, to try and be better heard, better represented on the international stage when these institutions of international order weren't necessarily established with them at the forefront of mind. In some ways I'm...

I'm reminded a little bit of the non-aligned movement in the Cold War and the Bundleung Conference and such. But given particularly how young it is, it's only sort of a, it feels like the issues are long standing, but the institution is only relatively new, is it of 10 or 15 years. How effectively do you think it's been, how effective do you think it has been at pursuing those objectives in that short space of time so far?

Fitriani

Thank you, David. I think your point is correct. Although first I would like to acknowledge Flavia's comment about how BRIC is actually proposing a new and fresh perspective of the global power positioning. That BRIC's offered an alternative from the world that is mainly dominated by the Western voices. As you mentioned, David, earlier on in the 1955, we have a non-aligned movement. going on in year of 2020, 2000, we don't have that anymore. However, in the P5, in the United Nations, China and Russia, member of BRICS, have been part of the P5 and have the FIDO power. But to what extent do this two countries able to shape where the global power dynamics goes? So, Flavia, comment regarding how the economic dynamics point to. For example, the dominance of the World Bank and the IMF, International Monetary Fund, is actually not in favour of developing and least developed countries, for example. The BRICS actually provided an alternative in 2014 with New Development Bank and its contingent reserve arrangement the year after that I think ideally would like to be an alternative to the World Bank and IMF world order. But to your question, to what extent does the BRICS affective? It remains to be seen because it's still in the early years. Babies need to learn how to walk before it runs. that to say the same with BRICS.

But as you mentioned earlier, there's a laden kind of interest in the polarity minds of the global power dynamics to put the Western world with its quad and its AUKUS vis-a-vis the BRICS. And how we see it with countries a member of BRICS with Iran.

It's actually bringing this concern of whether this discussion of BRICS would be actually providing an alternative that is workable for developing countries or whether it's actually just increased the polarity of the world we're living at the moment. It is interesting to know because Indonesia last year was quite hesitant to join, but this year it's formalized its membership under Brazil chair. And it's quite interesting perhaps to know that Indonesia opt to have its formal membership under Brazil because it is less politically contentious compared to when Russia is chairing BRICS.

Now, it is actually in my interest to actually learn where Brazil will lead BRICS this year. Because for Indonesia, the perspective of joining BRICS is actually opening crucial non-traditional market, accessing support for its development goals and of course reducing its dependency on traditional Western finances as Flavia mentioned comes with certain requirements that perhaps is not very friendly with the developing country. But it also brings about a concern to what extent that the Indonesia membership to BRICS is not just a facade to actually saying, now Indonesia is joining China and Russia, a team of this new world order of polarity. I guess that's my point for now. And maybe we can continue in the discussion if you have any more of like question of where this world that we're living at the moment is actually, you know, driven by BRICS in one side and perhaps Quad or AUKUS in the other side. Although we know with the, you know, the new, the second term of Trump presidency in the U.S. it's still, you know, a puzzle for us.

David Andrews

Absolutely. I think the the interesting example within in that comparison say between groups like the Quad and with BRICS is obviously India, right? In that when we talk about BRICS it's actually not in itself sort of a monolith and you have states whether it's like Indonesia or India or even the UAE and Egypt who are big military and financial partners of the UAE. Egypt receives a large amount of military aid from the US every year, billions of dollars, the UAE as well, of course, a very deep partner of the US and other Western states. And even the point you raised Fitriani in terms of Indonesia's interests, and we'll get into that a little bit more subsequently, but I do wonder, Flavia, how much states are, when they are looking to join BRICS, how much they are still focused on those economic markets, on development goals – as opposed to these strategic objectives.

Flavia Bellieni Zimmermann

That's exactly right.

David Andrews

If we think back to the origins of BRICS, when it was designed around, the concept was framed around these emerging economic powerhouses back in the early 2000s, that was a very clear purpose, you might say. And it feels a little bit like that purpose has become somewhat lost over time. But I do wonder whether all these new states who are either full members or observers, whether they're more interested in that economic market growth and an opportunity to meet with Xi Jinping and have that direct line to China and I guess to Russia and India as well. Indeed, Brazil and South Africa too. But it gives them maybe outsized contact or influence with this largest or second largest economy in the world and where they wouldn't otherwise get. Is that part of the rationale, do you think?

Flavia Bellieni Zimmermann

That's a fascinating point, David, and I'm also building up in some further developments made by Fitriani. I started the conversation talking about the first incarnation of BRICS for a reason. So in my analysis, some of the countries joining BRICS now, such as Indonesia, they have a strong history within the non-aligned movement. In my analysis, countries such as Indonesia, Cuba, and other players, which for a very long time...have attempted to have a greater say in the international arena, they feel that BRICS Plus is a platform that will benefit their own strategic goals, development targets. And we have countries supporting and being part of the Quad and we start to wonder how the Quad and even AUKUS, where this is going to lead in the current context of BRICS Plus and what type of strategy do they really have.

In my perspective, at the moment, BRICS may be divided into main objectives. One core objective, which is connected with the first incarnation has to do with development. The global South has been – I will use a strong language – punished by the international liberal order and by the IMF, by the World Bank. That's my analysis. It has not...

The way it is structured, didn't promote development in those countries and they understand it very well. So there is a part of BRICS that is very much consolidated around the narrative of development, of economic development. However, we need to consider that since 2022 with the invasion of Ukraine, there is this new layer of complexity that in a very fascinating way led to the BRICS expansion as well, that is the military and strategic component. So some analysts would be concerned that this new layer that deals with military and strategy military strategic purposes could lead then to a new Cold War could then led by China, Russia possibly a coalition between China, Russia and Iran – morph into maybe a new hegemon.

So these are real concerns. If BRICS represents it, there is this component. It is still evolving. But as part of BRICS, we do have China and Russia. They are countries with very clear ambitions to counter the US as a global power, I would argue.

We don't know to which extent they will engage more substantively, encountering American power in the world. But this component of a possible coalition of China, Russia, and Iran is not something to be discarded.

So in my perspective, yes, there are these two main layers. And some countries, they don't want another hegemony. They are coming together with BRICS because US hegemony and Western hegemony did not help their own development. They feel that the economy is suffered under...

US hegemony and Western hegemony. I don't think the smaller or middle players, including Brazil, I don't think they want another hegemon. They want a more plural, maybe cosmopolitan world order.

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David Andrews

And that was, I think, a very fascinating analysis, Flavia. So thank you very much for that. And I want to build on that, but also return to a point that Fitriani raised earlier about Indonesia's accession and joining this group. And I think I get the impression there's degree of that, the multi-layer game, if you will at play there as well, but I found that your point Fitriani to that sort of the timing of Indonesia's joining is sort of leaving it to the Brazilian era, very intriguing one, because I get the sense that Indonesia has to play a quite delicate game in some ways in given obviously playing its significant role in ASEAN and being sort of the largest in sort of population economic terms in that environment. And when there's certain challenges with China, let's say, with lot of Southeast Asian countries, particularly around the South China Sea and elsewhere that going from one more perhaps like regional vision to taking on a more global presence within this emerging framework, what's the motivation there for Indonesia? it these drivers like we've been talking about? Is it better market access and economic development? Or is it that and more? So what was the push for Indonesia to join BRICS? Or guess why now as well?

Fitriani

Thanks, David. I want to echo Flavia's point on economic development and the, I would suspect that the reason that most countries join BRICS and BRICS Plus is to support with their economic goals. Globally, we know that the UN have the sustainable development goals, but to achieve those goals without an economic support, I think would be impossible.

And we know BRICS, especially with China, would be able to actually support the development of this certain economic innovation or activities. for Indonesia, particularly, joining BRICS means its ability to engage with non-traditional market, opening a wider access, and as well as facilitating investment sources, gaining new sources for developing its infrastructure, technology, public health, as well as because Indonesia has new president Prabowo inaugurated last year, it's a way to show how he is different with the previous president that is engaging in two different sides. So under President Jokowi before, Indonesia is engaging with the Western security, but with China more in the economic perspective. Meanwhile, currently with Prabowo,

The engagement seems to be more open. He has the ambition to have more friends and no enemy. And therefore, he embraces to be in a grouping that have countries that perhaps problematic as Iran and to an extent Russia, because its invasion to Ukraine in 2022.

However, I think because Indonesia is pretty much inter-Paris or the first among equal in Southeast Asia at least, its movement, its formally joining BRICS would actually signal to the countries in the region how it's actually embracing the raising power of China and the grouping it joins. So I think having Brazil and India in BRICS is a safer buffer to say that, oh BRICS is not a political and security grouping, but it's more aligned to reach economic goal together. And togetherness is something that China is able to together and rally. And it is especially potent because how China actually shared the narrative of able to bring its country from a certain level of poverty to a more developed and technological advance country, which other country in the world would want to have access to that technology. So when China actually proposed BRICS Technology Transfer Center Network in 2018, it's something that making BRICS more lucrative because other grouping does not have that kind of advanced country that offered technology transfer. That's, think, the reason why BRICS is lucrative for Indonesia.

Flavia Bellieni Zimmermann

And I would like just to add a point to what Fitriani mentioned now about the main objectives of Indonesia with BRICS and BRICS Plus. It is really interesting, like if we think through security, like BRICS Plus, is it looking for…What are their priorities? Let's put it this way. Is it economic development? Is it security? Well, I agree with Fitriani, predominantly the Global South development. However, we need to think through non-traditional security threats when you think about climate change. So Brazil, It's very, very, very strong on an international agenda to fight climate change, particularly under the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

And as we know, Brazil will be hosting the United Nations FCCC in Belém, Pará – it is in the north of Brazil, that is the most significant United Nations climate change conference. And Brazil, it's interesting because it's like the stars are aligned at the moment for BRICS Plus. As I was mentioning at the beginning of our conversation, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has always been very passionate politically for a counterpoint to US hegemony. Don't forget that Latin America is still seen as the US' backyard. And some of Trump's policies such as his willingness to claim the Panama Canal – in my perspective is all about Latin American baby is all about consolidating US power in Latin America. He doesn't even need to say it. If he controls the Panama Canal, he is going to know the main targets that China has in Latin America market-wise and could start a trade war against China.

So it is really interesting to see that now with Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, someone who understands the history of Latin America, who understands how the most vulnerable communities have suffered the lack of political representation that those countries have in the international arena. He's very personally invested on BRICS. And of course, Brazil has the Amazon. So strategies to counter climate change are at the forefront at Brazil's international political agenda under Luis Inácio Lula da Silva.

And this year Brazil is going to be hosting the BRICS Summit in my hometown of Rio de Janeiro. I hope I can be there. I'm not sure with my teaching commitments. But it is, mean, in my perspective, Pacific countries would be very, would have a strong appeal to Brazil's commitment to non-traditional security threats, particularly when you think on countering the challenges towards climate change.

Another point that I wanted to make, I was starting to unpack the impact of the second Trump administration on BRICS Plus. I think we are going to see a lot of developments in the space of BRICS Plus with a second Trump administration. I was just mentioning one example of the Panama Canal and there are other policy platforms that Trump has, which are very provocative, I would dare to say – to global self-countries, increasing tax and tariffs, the treatment of migrants from global self-countries. Unfortunately, I think under a second Trump administration, the feeling that global south countries have, that they have been left out, that they don't have an equitable treatment in the international arena, according to my analysis, it's going to increase. If we also reflect upon the impact of a second Trump administration in the world order, and if BRICS, maybe, will benefit or gain momentum towards developing an alternative or a response to the existing flaws of the US-led international order. I think we still need to sit and watch, but it is a strong possibility.

We don't know to which extent the second Trump administration, how…In my perspective, the second Trump administration will increase to a degree an erosion of democracy in the United States will increase to a degree an erosion of the rules-based order as we are already seeing by his statements on Gaza as well, which – in my perspective and I think in the perspective most scholars – violate international law.

But still, the degree of erosion and the type of this response that BRICS Plus will offer, we still need to sit and watch. My perspective, if the second Trump administration will lead to further erosion of the US-led international order, it will lead to an increased degree of erosion, we just don't know how the full impact of Trump and I mean to each degree the US establishment, we will still maintain a level of normalcy and be having the capacity to bring a little bit more of stability and to advise Trump that a particular behaviour from the US leader can bring great disruption to the international order. So these we all need to sit and watch, but it's still early days from the second Trump administration. And according to my perspective, it's already a rocky start.

I would like to know what...Fitriani has to say.

Fitriani

I think I agree with Flavia. The second Trump administration again show us that he will pursue protectionist policy as he was before. this intensifying tariff will further challenge the existing financial architecture. for developing countries such as Indonesia and other countries as well in the Global South, such scenario will reinforce the rational to have a stronger multipolar strategy.

Whether we like it or not, Trump presidency would lend further credibility and momentum to BRICS initiatives. Flavia mentioned about whether Trump will bring about the doubt of US leadership in the world. And I would certainly...agree with that comment. I think BRICS is one alternative to balance and to provide another angle to actually fill the gap that the US left behind.

But I guess if I can say we need to be worried to what extent Russia and China will lead BRICS. I would agree if BRICS able to give more voices and role to the developing countries within it. Brazil, India, Indonesia to an extent to actually show what a different dynamic can be achieved by having an alternative from the Western dominance of geopolitical architecture that we have at the moment. I guess that's my take, David.

David Andrews

I think one point that you raised earlier, Fitriani, that I thought was quite...evocative of this is that comment around technology sharing and cooperation. And I guess as well as Flavius talking about environmental security, non-traditional security, mean, these all to me, as well as the comments we've been making about the sort of economic potential and sort of development assistance and such, these are all things that many, many states around the world are interested in and that have been trying to say to the United States and to Australia and others for a long time, this is sort of these are our primary interests that we need to help us develop economically, sort of support us with development and technology and things like that. But perhaps at least a number of them have found a vehicle that they believe might assist in giving them more of a voice in pursuing those objectives more prominently. I think that's probably the, maybe not the lesson, but it's least a very strong lesson that I think we should try and learn from

this expansion and this desire from countries around the world to join BRICS is that as much as there might be some significance or benefit in taking a more traditional security oriented sort of perspective in some of the US and as a partner foreign policies, we can't ignore the elements that complement that. And whether it's things like USAID or other forms of technology sharing, cooperation, environmental security, health security, these are all things which states around the world have a strong interest in understandably and that we need to find ways to bring countries into the tent and to contribute to that and to help build them up and rather than perhaps, if there are concerns that around the viability or effectiveness of bricks or what the sort of perhaps ulterior motives of some countries might be, but what's the alternative? Who's offering the alternative and what does it look like? So look, we could go on for for hours more about this. We've barely touched aspects around that fascinating Brazilian context that you gave us, Flavia, and so much more from Indonesia, Fitriani as well, and all the other countries in BRICS aside. But thank you both so much for the contributions you've made here today and for your perspectives. I think it was a really engaging and interesting conversation and hopefully sowing the seed for some future research and conversation down the line. So, Flavia Zimmermann and Fitriani, thank you so much for being on the National Security Podcast.

Fitriani

Thank you, David.

Flavia Bellieni Zimmermann

Thank you so much for having us.

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