Transcript

What are some of the key mechanisms for avoiding conflict?

Why is ASEAN a key player in preventive diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific region?

What challenges are faced in trying to prevent conflict in the region? And what role does Australia play?

In this episode, Bec Strating, Huong Le Thu and Collin Koh join Rory Medcalf to delve into the complexities of conflict prevention in the Indo-Pacific region, emphasising the role of ASEAN, Australia and other partners.

(This transcript is AI-generated and may contain inaccuracies)
 

Bec Strating

Ultimately, conflict prevention will only be successful if countries believe in the mechanisms and believe in the purpose of conflict prevention.

Collin Koh

How do we incorporate media management? How do we incorporate the role of media in terms of conflict prevention?

Huong Le Thu

ASEAN recognized that it can't do conflict prevention on its own as well, and we recognize that global and regional conflicts are not separated from each other.

National Security Podcast

You're listening to the National Security Podcast, the show that brings you expert analysis, insights and opinion on the national security challenges facing Australia and the Indo-Pacific produced by the ANU National Security College.

Rory Medcalf

Welcome to the National Security Podcast. I'm Rory Medcalf, head of the ANU National Security College. We're recording this episode from the traditional lands of the Ngunnawal and Ngambri people and pay respects to their elders past, present and emerging. This week on the podcast, we have three expert guests who are going to help me unpack the challenge of conflict prevention in our region. In the Indo-Pacific region, in Australia's region, but in particular the region centred on maritime Southeast Asia, where so many of the strategic challenges facing the Indo-Pacific are concentrated. This podcast really springs from a report that a few of our speakers were co-authors in - released recently in Malaysia - in tandem with the speech by the Australian Foreign Minister. But we want this conversation to go wider than that report and to really look at the challenges of conflict prevention in our region and the role that institutions centred on ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, can play, but also the limits of that role.

So let me go to introduce our speakers now. And I'm really pleased to be joined firstly by two of the authors of the report. And I should confess I'm the third author. So I'll offer a bit of commentary as well - but Dr. Huong Le Thu, who's the Deputy Director for Asia at Crisis Group at the International Crisis Group, also an expert associate here at the National Security College and Professor Bec Strating, the Director of Latrobe Asia, also an expert associate here at the college. And I should note that Huong and Bec are members of what's called the eminent and expert persons group of the ASEAN Regional Forum - Australian delegates to that group, along with me. And it's also great to welcome Dr. Collin Koh, Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, RSIS, at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. And Collin is a long time analyst and watcher of all things maritime security in the region.

So let's get right into it. This report, Preventing Conflict in Our Region: Options for Australian Statecraft, was an effort by my colleagues, Huong and Bec and myself, to offer some practical ideas for how some of these institutions - institutions with pretty complex acronyms that not a lot of strategic analysts pay enough attention to in my view - how these institutions might contribute to the core strategic challenge of our region. That is risks of conflict and risks of crisis escalating to conflict, and particularly risks involving great power relations, the rise of China and the way that China is asserting itself in the region. It was a big agenda. It was a report that grew out of work that these three authors did for what's called the ARF or ASEAN Regional Forum Eminent and Expert Persons Group.

And it's a report that's really meant to help the Australian government with some independent thinking on policy initiatives it might take. I'll begin by perhaps going to you, Bec, if you don't mind, just to frame some of your own input to this report. You led the work on the conceptual foundations, conflict prevention, and how do we approach this in a global and historical context? What are some key messages that you would have for our listeners about conflict prevention in our region?

Bec Strating

Yeah, thanks Rory. It's great to be here talking about conflict prevention, which is a really broad and contested concept particularly when we're thinking about the academic literature. And so one of the tasks that we had to sort of go through or grapple with was how do we try to define conflict prevention? Because, you know, there's various life cycles or stages of conflict life cycles. We can think about conflict prevention, which is about preventing armed conflict, or we can think about conflict prevention during armed conflict, or we could even think about the stages after conflict - peacemaking, peacebuilding. All of these sorts of concepts can get wrapped up in the discussion around conflict prevention. So the first thing that we needed to do was to be really clear about what we were talking about when we're talking about conflict prevention, and that is why we developed a conceptual framework and are really thinking about the stage before armed conflict. So talking about preventative diplomacy that's trying to prevent violence from breaking out in the first place. So that was the first sort of decision that we had to make in this report.

And the second decision that we had to make was that we are primarily focused on interstate conflict. So this is conflict or armed violence breaking out between states rather than focusing on other forms of conflict, for example, between non-state actors. So when we were thinking about types of conflict, we also had to think about how conflict emerges. So in our region, in the Indo-Pacific region, in our conceptual framework, we outlined three sort of stages of conflict. The first is crisis. So how can countries come together to try to manage crisis so that it doesn't develop into armed conflict, particularly between militaries? The second is the issue of grey zone and the fact that a lot of these sort of assertive or even aggressive tactics that states might be using are designed not to provoke conflict, but they are nevertheless quite destabilizing and create an environment that increases uncertainty. And then there is of course that third stage of international armed conflict. The thing that we are definitely interested in trying to avoid, particularly given the role of great powers in our region, I think we can all agree that great power conflict would be disastrous for the great powers and for other countries in the region.

So we're really talking about a range of mechanisms that can be developed institutionally to try to prevent crisis, to try to mitigate grey zone activities and to try to prevent armed conflict, including confidence building mechanisms, early warning systems, fact finding missions, the use of mediation to really prevent that armed conflict from breaking out. And so one of the things that we had to do was look at the success of previous conflict prevention mechanisms, which is not quite easy. Because, you know sometimes it's not easy to identify when prevention was successful. We much more clearly recognize it when it is not successful, but you know, nevertheless, there are examples that we can draw on in crisis management, for example, the Cuban missile crisis and other case studies that we looked at to really think about what are the key things that matter.

And there's four key things. The first is the establishment of a shared normative framework. And one of the things that we can do much more of in the region is to have a shared understanding of what conflict prevention is, what it means, how we get there. And that is part of the recommendations that we ultimately make. The second key point is the development of clear operational mechanisms so that there are actually structures that are in place and resources that enable preventative diplomacy to take place and to be effective. The third is the institutionalization of those mechanisms. And finally, and probably most importantly, is political will, because ultimately conflict prevention will only be successful if countries believe in the mechanisms and believe in the purpose of conflict prevention. And there are lots of opportunities in the region, I think, for countries to collaborate on conflict prevention agendas. But there is also, I think, the real challenge of whether or not countries, all countries, are really on board with the agenda.

Rory Medcalf

It's great that you're so conscious of the limitations as well, Bec, and I know that as scholars who I think with very good intentions are looking at how to use institutions more effectively to manage crises or prevent conflict, we're also acutely conscious that the mechanisms themselves are not a magical solution. So you're referenced to political will. And I think also the way that we looked at the role of deterrence as part of conflict prevention comes into the conversation too. But look, let's go now to Huong for a bit more of the geographic and geopolitical context. A few listeners are probably already wondering what are all these acronyms? We've got the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting Plus Eight, et cetera, et cetera. Can you take us back a little bit and just provide some of the meaning as to what these institutions are? What's the ASEAN context here?

Huong Le Thu

Yes, thank you Rory. Yes, and the purpose of this paper and discussion about conflict prevention and Australia's role and Australia's partners’ role in it, is to set out a context, regional context that we operate in both in terms of the reality of geopolitics, but also the existing tools and institutions that we have in place. And so we are not necessarily suggesting in the paper to reinvent the wheels that are already in place. Quite contrary, we are suggesting to lean on existing mechanisms and institutions with some recognitions of existing limitations, but also some suggestions how to revitalize them. So in the context of existing institutions, we have, of course, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, the 10 or so - perhaps 11 countries - in our direct neighborhood. Australia is one of the oldest dialogue partners and a strong supporter of the regional architecture that is centred around ASEAN. So that includes all the acronyms you've mentioned, Rory, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus, and East Asia Summit, and so on and so forth.

So we find ourselves in this multilateral setting with multiple sometimes overlapping institutions, mechanisms, dialogue avenues for regular and constant communication which is essential for conflict prevention, for building trust, for preventive diplomacy, and for what Bec also mentioned, creating and socializing norms. And that's actually what ASEAN has been doing for decades now - norms building and norms socializing and hopefully those norms will also stand the test of time. But there is a certain already coded set of norms in the ASEAN way, how the ASEAN member states and dialogue partners work within this multilateral framework. And that includes that frequent consultations among the leaders and among the communities. So the ASEAN Way - oftentimes in the literature might be actually criticized for slow progress or being an acronym for slow moving processes - it's actually essential for building the norms and to keeping them alive and actually socializing ongoing different generations of leaders, who will come several times a year at least to those ASEAN meetings.

So ASEAN is really by its existence set to prevent conflicts because the common desire of all ASEAN member states and arguably also dialogue partners who sign up to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which is one of the core foundational documents with the set norms for ASEAN is to operate in an environment for peace, stability and prosperity. Those are the common desires, common objectives, common goals for the ASEAN member states as well as their partners. We saw that in the very foundational documents earlier on at the setting up stage, but also more recently in the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific, where it also reiterates that desire for promoting an environment for peace, stability and prosperity which by definition is avoidance or prevention of conflicts or crisis. Obviously, we'll get to the discussion, especially with Colin about the practicalities and implementation of that or in some instances even limitations of that. But the ASEAN culture, ASEAN way and ASEAN mechanisms are set to really enable that preventive diplomacy, setting norms, institutions, all the conditions that Bec earlier mentioned that are essential for conflict prevention and ideally by those frequent consultations, meetings that socialize even leaders with each other is also serving the purpose of building that political will among the participants to sign up for a common goal which is preventing any outbreak of major conflicts in the region because all countries in the region want peace and prosperity for their own development, for their own development’s sake.

We can get into the limitations in a second, but I just wanted to also stress that our paper highlights how ASEAN is essential and how Australia can partner with ASEAN and support the existing mechanisms and institutions with certain ideas to revitalize it, to inject more confidence in the existing mechanism and carry on not because they are long standing old or slow, but because they withstand the test of time and because it is a time where we see global conflicts and crisis on the rise and it is when we need those mechanisms more than less.

Rory Medcalf

What I might do, Huong, is take that analysis you've just given, which I think is a very useful scene setter, and just push you a little bit harder on that question of the role of ASEAN dialogue partners. As you've mentioned, Australia is effectively the oldest, but there are many other powers in the region that are ASEAN dialogue partners. And many of those powers, whether it's China or the United States or Japan, South Korea, India, the Europeans, others. Those powers would seem to be quite key to managing risks in the region because the region is so globally connected. So I'm just wondering if you can say something about how, from an ASEAN point of view, the role of the dialogue partners could be seen, given that a lot of the mechanisms we're talking about, such as the East Asia Summit or the ASEAN Regional Forum, they're not only populated by ASEAN countries, they include the dialogue partners.

Huong Le Thu

Yes, and that's where I think the role of ASEAN is so essential. Having that convening power where ASEAN is able to bring to the table all essential key dialogue partners in the broader Indo-Pacific. So dialogue partners include countries like you said, Australia, Japan, South Korea, our so-called middle or aspiring major powers, but also countries like China, like US, India, the big powers - some of them are parties to potential hotspots, flashpoints, potential actors in a potential crisis and conflicts. So the function of bringing them to the table is even more important. And we've seen that being exercised time and again, when there was a pause in communications between US and China for a long time, it was on the sidelines of ASEAN summits that they got to talk to each other. And similarly with us as well, Australia at some point had been in deep freeze with China and only at the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Jakarta that we got to have a direct contact with counterparts. So that is very essential role of ASEAN and it has proved that time and again, it is very protective of its perceived neutrality, not taking sides but providing a safe environment for everybody to come to the table and talk and mitigate this distrust or at least providing the channels of communication.

So not only dialogue partners can serve the role of supporting the regional multilateral efforts of conflict prevention, but actually in the way ASEAN operates, it's also providing any conflict mediation tools as well, serving that platform for enabling talks, even for countries that either are in some sort of disputes or don't have a direct communication mechanism. So we cannot discard that importance, especially in times of conflict and crisis, the avenues for mediation and communication is a very important de-escalation tool.

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Rory Medcalf

I might turn the conversation to the recommendations that the report outlines. And I will frame a few of those myself, just by noting that for all of the value of the ASEAN centric mechanisms over many years, in my view there has been often a lack of boldness or urgency in using those mechanisms. In fact, in some of the research we did, it was quite easy to find analyses, whether it's by some scholars within ASEAN or some outside observers, along the lines of if you use the mechanisms too assertively, you run the risk of actually damaging the diplomatic mechanisms themselves because particular countries may not be willing to talk or may not be willing to support the diplomatic processes - whether it could be ASEAN countries or major powers such as China. So I think one of the points of great caution and frustration that we encountered in preparing this report is that paradox that the institutions serve a purpose unto themselves, but that if you use the institutions too forcefully to actually address the problems that have been created for you, you could break the institutions. That's my analytical starting point. In terms of the recommendations, and then I want to throw to you Collin for a bit of cold water - or maybe whatever temperature the water is in the South China sea, maybe not such cold water - to throw a bit of water over our analysis.

We worked to craft some recommendations that are viable, that are practical, that are realistic, that a government such as Australia's as a dialogue partner could prosecute with ASEAN, without however, running the risk that we would simply be ignored, running the risk that some countries within ASEAN or a major ASEAN partner such as China which of course also is at the heart of many of the conflict risks, would simply say here is an external power trying to disturb the tranquility of the region, even though I think that would be a rather interesting piece of misinformation to argue. So where did we get to? I think firstly, we made a point that Australia and other dialogue partners of ASEAN need to be much more active in their advocacy of conflict prevention in these institutions. The strategic environment has deteriorated. We really have no more time to lose. But that in advocating the use of all of these great diplomatic meetings and summits and foreign ministers’ meetings and so forth for a very forthright conflict prevention agenda, we can't do this on our own. We need some ASEAN countries to actually step up as catalysing partners and take a lead with us.

There was also a set of recommendations about strengthening the institutions themselves. know, it strikes me as unfortunate that institutions like the East Asia Summit that have a very clear mandate to help the region solve its strategic problems don't have much in the way of secretariat support or expert bodies to back them up. And so I think recognizing that there's all this latent talent in the region, including the expert persons group that we're a part of, that could provide much more advice to those institutions and could be drawn upon more actively by the institutions, I think is an important direction of travel. I’ll make two or three other very brief points and then throw the ball to you, Collin, and then back to our co-authors for an open conversation. The focus on information and transparency that's required from these institutions, I a lot of the potential conflict zones, in particular the South China Sea, are also an area where there's a lot of difference of opinion about what is actually happening - a lot of dispute about the information picture.

So somehow establishing, for example, an information fusion centre on risk, on risk reduction and conflict prevention that could effectively be a clearinghouse for information about conflict risks in the region. It could effectively be a repository for all of the agreements that exist already, some of which are honoured and some of which are not honoured by various countries, but also a place where information from the open source intelligence community or perhaps contributions by national governments and intelligence communities, information from the academic and think tank centre, could effectively be gathered and shared transparently to heighten that risk awareness. I think it’s another really important contribution that the institutions can make. And that would effectively be an information support for the diplomatic mechanisms we're talking about.

Final two points. One is to say that so much of the risk that we analysed in the region, the conflict risk, is not only going to affect the immediate parties to the conflict and whether that be a conflict across the Taiwan Strait, a Chinese attack on Taiwan - whether it be a conflict arising in the South China Sea or elsewhere - the repercussions are going to be vast and immediate, extending into economies and societies all over the region and all over the world. So using the regional institutions to promote a heightened and urgent dialogue process on geopolitical resilience, on an awareness of the potential impacts of regional conflict on economies and populations, we think would be a very useful contribution to make. And that's where we suggest that Australia and perhaps one or more of its friends in ASEAN and the region and perhaps other dialogue partners such as Japan, could be a kind of catalyst group to get that conversation going. And then last of all, of course we acknowledge that none of this can be useful if it does not engage the major powers - particularly China and the United States.  So look, that's where we got to. Collin, I'm very happy to hear your response at this point.

Collin Koh

First of all, Rory Bec and Huong, thanks so much for having me here. I have to apologize if my views are in some ways a little bit too narrowly being confined to maritime issues because that is where I mostly focus on. And it just so happens that in the region, we have a whole slew of maritime issues that we are actually very concerned about. The South China Sea is a recurring theme in our discussion. But let me just put forth a very strange juxtaposing of two contexts that happened almost around the same time. One, of course, the ASEAN summit that just concluded in KL. And of course, with all the talk about realizing what they call the ASEAN Community Vision 2045. And then on the other hand, you have the Cambodia-Thailand border, which somehow strangely and of course, for various very complicated reasons that we can talk about because I think all these are relevant when it comes to our discussion about conflict prevention, it sort of dragged on longer than we imagined. It ought to have been quite easily defused but this time around it appeared to have been a wake-up call for ASEAN when it comes to conflict prevention and mitigation.

Now I do see an opportunity here and I thought that is why the report is timely. The opportunity where the various stakeholders in the region recognize the growing importance of conflict prevention because of the conflicts that took place all around - in Ukraine and that have turned out in the Middle East. So therefore, with the growing uncertainties, there seems to right now be a tendency of regional countries to try to go back to basics. What I mean is to start to re-emphasize existing institutions. But to me, there has often been a questionable rhetoric coming up from that, because when they talk about growing or expanding regional integration, it tends to very much be narrowly focused on economic integration. It's not a bad thing because ultimately if we go by the liberalist view of international relations, then this growing interdependence economically could help to reduce or prevent conflict tendencies. But what I tend to see is there has been so far a trend towards growing economic integration and thereby not putting so much effort when it comes to political security integration. That pillar is somewhat lacking in that sense. And what I thought is a of a wakeup call for all of us is that at this point of time, when we talk about the deficit of strategic trust, we need to start to look at these issues as a bifurcation between the intra-ASEAN level and the ASEAN Plus level meanings - ASEAN and its relations and dynamics with extra-regional powers outside Southeast Asia.

Now when we talk about intra-ASEAN relations that's where I thought having conflict prevention ideas, new solutions, or innovative measures in place could be very timely. If we look at what happened recently, putting aside the Cambodia Thailand border issues, but what I tend to see is in the recent times where we see ASEAN member states trying to resolve their own disputes. We have seen some progress in that, for example, the Indonesia-Vietnam EEZ delimitation which came about after so many years of negotiation. And of course, the most recent one was between Indonesia and Malaysia when it comes to joint development in the disputed offshore bloc in Ambalat which is in the Sulawesi or Celebesi. So these efforts appear to point to some optimistic context here, whereby if we look at conflict prevention we probably could see that prosper more at the intra-ASEAN level. I think we have seen these efforts manifesting itself. There is a growing appetite for that. However, when it comes to involving extra-regional partners, I think the prospect becomes much more uncertain which is why I do sense the caution in the report.

 You could use certain ASEAN mechanisms but unfortunately some of the mechanisms that could apply to ASEAN might not necessarily apply when it comes to the involvement of some other players outside the region, in this case China. I don't think China will necessarily want to abide by the ASEAN mechanisms. This has been a bug back where we talk about enforcement, who is going to be enforcing it? I don't think Beijing will want to let ASEAN mechanisms do the enforcement to begin with. So therefore, I think one important example that we can draw upon, which if I could bring you back in memory back to 2018, if you recall the adoption of the guidelines on air military encounters on game. I remember that because Singapore was the ASEAN chair during then. And what was interesting was even though it was an ASEAN document that was aimed at conflict prevention, the other dialogue partners agree in principle to that document. Of course, it's one other thing about whether any of the parties involved do apply those principles or those norms that were enshrined in this document. But I thought that is a very good reference point to look at when it comes to involving extra-regional parties in ASEAN-centric mechanisms.

One interesting point that I picked up in the report was the proposal on an information fusion centre on conflict prevention which I thought was very interesting, but my immediate thinking was that very likely it couldn't be hosted in any of the ASEAN member states for one reason - because of the likely sensitivity of these issues. Of course there is a sort of a pre-emptive or preventive mentality amongst some of the ASEAN member states that any such initiative that could potentially be misconstrued as having a certain agenda should be avoided as best as possible. So what I thought is maybe this IFC, if you want to call it that, could be hosted in Australia in partnership with a like-minded ASEAN member states. Which I believe, it will be more constructive if we started off from a coalition of like-minded ASEAN member states instead.

And so far we have seen tell-tale signs coming out from at least some of the ASEAN member states who are keen to explore things that are outside the usual state of things that ASEAN lab mechanisms have been talking about. So this is probably one bold step that could be taken. But suffice to say is that when we look at conflict prevention, we focus a lot on strategic level mechanisms. I think we also need to remind ourselves that the operational mechanisms that largely apply to the practitioners - by that I mean the military practitioners, the uniform practitioners, Coast Guards, militaries for example - these are still very relevant and in fact if I could argue, they serve as an interim measure - if not just a complementary measure - until we manage to reach the point where we have a more embodied framework on conflict prevention mechanisms altogether.

Rory Medcalf

Collin, thank you. And I did have to laugh because the suggestion of Australia playing host to an institution like that, while it appeals to me, I think is an interesting example of how some of our friends in ASEAN sometimes see Australia as useful to take a lead on these issues, as long as we're not too assertive about it. So I think we should stock that thought away and see where it goes in policy. But Huong and Bec, I'm interested in your responses first to what we've heard from Collin or from one another for that matter. Bec, what are your initial responses?

Bec Strating

Well first, I mean Collin, it's so wonderful to hear your analysis of the report and I have to say I don't disagree with some of the limitations that you pointed out there. And you mentioned this idea of going back to basics - and that's one of the things that I found in conversations that I had in the region about the ideas that Rory, Huang and I were playing around with - is that there is actually still foundational work that needs to occur about what conflict prevention is, what kinds of conflict we are seeking to prevent, and what is actually possible in the existing ASEAN-centred mechanisms. I mean, one question that came up was, what can these ASEAN-centred mechanisms do if crises emerge? What channels actually do exist for leaders or policymakers to use. And even I think people who are very familiar with these mechanisms and institutions might not have a clear answer around those channels or mechanisms throughout crisis. So some of this I think is really going back to some of the fundamentals. But part of the advocacy component here is, as Rory was saying, there's a real urgency around these issues, particularly when we're talking about preventing conflict, interstate conflicts, and particularly between great powers. And so part of that is about reinforcing the importance of conflict prevention on the agenda and working collaboratively with countries in and beyond ASEAN.

I think that was a really central part of the paper was that this can't just be about Australia going ahead and being like, here's what we need to do, but working collaboratively and in step, particularly with ASEAN countries. But the other point that Collin makes around the successful dispute resolution, I mean, I think this is something that doesn't get the attention that it deserves. We think a lot about the South China Sea and we think a lot about grey zone tactics and we think a lot about how intractable these disputes are and seem. We don't often spend a lot of time thinking about how ASEAN countries have come together to resolve maritime disputes. And that is a kind of optimistic story there. But the point is made that these disputes are not involving China for example. And, you know, from a realist perspective, we might say that conflict prevention depends on the great powers. But I think I'm not a realist, so I can say that I believe in the agency of middle and smaller powers and regional powers and that part of this is about trying to be creative. I think it's hard to be creative in this space when we know that there are limitations to what can be achieved, but that the work is more important now than ever.

Rory Medcalf

I'm going to challenge you, Bec. You are a realist, just not with a capital R. Anyway, Huong, what's your response? And I'm curious particularly on that question of potential conflicts within ASEAN, as opposed to potential conflicts between ASEAN countries and other parts of the region, because there are some good stories to tell.

Huong Le Thu

Yeah, so a few thoughts that came to my mind while listening to all of you. I think I could subscribe to most of the things that you've said, Collin, and of course all of that you said Rory given our agreed co-authored negotiation and multilateral mechanism that respect all members. Joke aside. I think some of that does reiterate what you've already hinted as well, is that while we support existing mechanisms and we highlight their value, we also caution against being too rigid or too precious about existing mechanisms. Something that you mentioned Rory, that pushing too hard might break it. But at the same time, the mechanism needs to serve the goal rather than the other way around. And of course there are limitations that are associated with the ASEAN way or countries in the association or even a broader ASEAN architecture, but they should not be the core, right?  So we advise for some flexibility of ASEAN adopting to the new environment and the need, the urgency that, perhaps speaks against that slow pace consultation or having everyone agree on everything together based on rigid consensus. We know that all member states have their own national interests and they have their own foreign policy. But when it comes to ASEAN, there are certain shared goals and they should inform the decision rather than the habit of how they are conducted.

And so we advise in our paper for ASEAN to work with not only individual dialogue partners, but also other multilateral institutions that share the same values and norms and also subscribe to the international law, for example, the UN, the OECD. But in fact, you know, we should be open-minded to the Quad or BRICS for that matter as well. ASEAN recognizes that it can't do conflict prevention on its own as well. And we recognize that global and regional conflicts are not separated from each other. We are living in the interconnected world where crises from one region do affect other regions as well. And in fact, the global order is under challenge and therefore I think all institutions need to be working with each other. So that caution against that preciousness and like Collin mentioned, there are ASEAN values, but who is socializing whom is the permanent question that Professor Alice Ba first posed, whether it is ASEAN that socialized China into its norms or it's actually China socializing ASEAN into its norms. But nevertheless, as long, I think, as this dialogue continues, the adaptation process is on both sides.

The challenge is when the countries stop coming. I think that's where no socializing can happen. And that also is a risk if, let's say, The US under Trump administration pays no more attention to ASEAN mechanisms. And it is challenging for ASEAN as well, because as I mentioned earlier, the convening power would be weakened if the major powers stop coming to the same table. Another point I wanted to make is that it is a continuous process - the norms, the circle of life of norms as well. And as Bec mentioned, those definitions, what is conflict, what is crisis, are not necessarily understood the same by everyone. And I would even throw it in that the nature of conflicts is changing and evolving, right?

It is evolving as we speak. Before, when let's say when even the code of conduct negotiations started two decades ago, declaration of conduct, the factors of cyber elements and technology in conflict, or even what is the threshold of open conflict was different. So we are negotiating perhaps with an outdated set of assumptions. And we are stuck in still negotiations while the threshold of war has changed. - the grey zone activities, what is considered an open conflict, what is not. And the tools applied into this active operations have also evolved. So I think we are in the catch up game all the time, even if we want to get on the same page. Some time ago, The US Indo-Pacific Command’s Admiral Davidson said that short from war, China already is controlling the South China Sea, paraphrasing. And I remember writing something about that. Yes, maybe we are short of war in the South China Sea. We see relentless and continuous provocations, but they are sort of lateral, horizontal, rather than vertical escalation, not to the threshold of war, but we are far from peace. So short of war, but far from peace. And also what do we define by peace? Whether it is a negative peace where, you know, maybe there's a lack of physical violence and active acts of war, but there's maybe no justice or no adherence or respect for the international law. Of course there are other forms of violence as well.

So even the nature of peace and war are not shared commonly in the first place. So that's where actually the role of continuous ASEAN processes and dialogue and their being tedious and multiple of them are necessary for adopting to those changes, right? And even shaping agency is where ASEAN has to adopt and shape this international environment. And perhaps I should stress that ASEAN's character is very different depending on the chair of the year. And perhaps we see that, you know, the openness to adaptation more among some members and they may be even leading. Collin mentioned, for example, Singapore’s very forward leaning chairmanship in some aspects, others as well. But even this year Malaysia's chair, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, actually said that a degree of deterrence keeps all actors honest. Which I think is a great sign, that deterrence is even adopted in the ASEAN language, right?

Something that we also argue in our paper for a responsible and transparent level of deterrence, while being of course mindful that increased military activities, military buildup, military joint activities may also lead to other risks like unplanned conflict. We are not only warning against planned crisis and conflict, but what we are actually very scared of - and the risk of them are increasingly high - is the probability of unplanned conflict that may escalate to further crisis. And without constant regular dialogues and consultations where actors can reassure each other about their goodwill or their lack of aggressive motives is an even more risky environment. This is again where platforms, multilateral platforms like ASEAN, are essential to constantly reassure and actually add a degree of transparency in terms of actors' motivations and intentions.

Rory Medcalf

This has been a very rich discussion and there's so much more to explore. And I think all of our speakers have touched on the urgency of these issues. We're going to have to wrap up in a moment, but Collin, I might just give you one last word to suggest what's missing in the work we've done so far. If you were asked to offer your recommendations on conflict prevention in the Indo-Pacific, particularly with the focus on South East Asia, what would be your top recommendation?

Collin Koh

First of all is that, as I highlighted briefly earlier, is that we have been focusing a lot on the strategic level mechanisms. So one way to try to bring everything together is to consider those operational mechanisms in place. For example, the code on unplanned encounters at sea. How do we emphasize international conventions like COLREGS that govern the same interactions between maritime entities, not necessarily forces, entities out there at sea. COLREGS is the 1970s international convention that looks at regulating ship actions to prevent collisions. So it's what you call the collisions regulation, COLREGS. So all these mechanisms, I believe, were part of the back to basics that we could look at in trying to reach a more holistic get together in terms of both the strategic as well as the operational aspect. So that is one.

The second thing which I think within the ambit of any research is sometimes very hard to accomplish is to look at media itself. Because if we look at what happened in the recent Cambodia-Thailand border dispute, which is strange coming from me because I looked at maritime issues and now I'm talking about land border issues. It's interesting because the tensions continue to evolve in large part because of media itself, right? The use of live stream to put forth so-called personal opinion and then that was picked up as official and then thereby it sort of keeps the tensions going. How do we incorporate media management? How do we incorporate the role of media in terms of conflict prevention? Which is already talked about earlier by all of you regarding working with other parties other than the state itself. So how do we work with the media in trying to promote conflict prevention? I think this is one aspect that is a very much worth looking at.

Rory Medcalf

Thank you for adding that element. And I think that the narrative or information dimension is somewhere where we could work a lot more effectively and profoundly and try to limit conflict risks in the Indo-Pacific. I'm going to pause it there. Again, my thanks to co-authors of this report. We strongly encourage listeners to read the report in full and there'll be a link of it available with the program notes. There's a lot more work to be done in this area of conflict prevention in the region. I don't think that any of us have any illusions about how diplomatic mechanisms can achieve this alone, but it was heartening to have a conversation about how we need to make better use of the mechanisms that exist, invest more effort in them, and in particular pursue that political will that our colleagues have identified. The launch of our report was in fact alongside major events in Kuala Lumpur earlier this month, the Foreign Ministers' Meeting of the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum Foreign Ministers' Meeting, and of course, the ASEAN Summit. Those are precisely the kind of mechanisms that in our view need to be taking our recommendations and putting them into action for regional peace and stability. Thank you again to Huong Le Thu, to Bec Strating, and to Collin Koh for joining us today on the National Security Podcast.

Huong Le Thu

Thanks for having me, thanks Rory.

Collin Koh

Thank you, Rory.

National Security Podcast

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