Transcript

How has Indonesia’s foreign policy evolved under President Prabowo? 

Is Indonesia slowly moving from being ‘non-aligned’ to being ‘multi-aligned’? 

How have recent US foreign and domestic policies affected its relationship with Indonesia? 

How can Australia and Indonesia strengthen their relationship and enhance cooperation in the Indo-Pacific? 

In this episode, Natalie Sambhi and Yohanes Sulaiman join David Andrews to explore Indonesia's evolving role as a strategic actor in the Indo-Pacific and its relationship with major players in the region. 

(This transcript is AI-generated and may contain inaccuracies.)

Natalie Sambhi

As the US is pulling back, how can we then use that moment to then maybe advance some of the similar kinds of values and support governance in Southeast Asia through a coordinated think tank strategy?

Yohanes Sulaiman

The question for Indonesia is whether there is a commitment for Australia to actually be in Southeast Asia when push comes to shove.

National Security Podcast

You're listening to the National Security Podcast, the show that brings you expert analysis, insights and opinion on the national security challenges facing Australia and the Indo-Pacific produced by the ANU National Security College.

David Andrews

Welcome to the National Security Podcast. I'm David Andrews, Senior Manager for Policy and Engagement at the ANU National Security College. Today's podcast is being recorded on the lands of the Ngunnawal and Ngambri people, and I pay my respects to their elders past and present. This week I'm joined by Natalie Sambhi and Yohanes Sulaiman for an in-depth look at Indonesia, both as one of Australia's most significant international relationships, and as an evolving and consequential strategic actor in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

We've also recently celebrated the 80th anniversary of Indonesia's independence, which was declared on the 17th of August 1945, so what better time than now for this conversation? Dr Natalie Sambhi is the founder and executive director of Verve Research, an independent think tank focused on Southeast Asia, as well as a senior policy fellow with the Asia Society Australia and a non-resident fellow with the Brookings Institution's Foreign Policy Program. Associate Professor Yohanes Sulaiman is associate professor in international relations at Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani in Indonesia and a non-resident fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research in the United States. He is also the executive editor of the Journal of Global Strategic Studies. Natalie and Johannes, welcome to the podcast.

Natalie Sambhi

Thanks David.

Yohanes Sulaiman

Glad to be here.

David Andrews

Well, as I've just mentioned, we've just ticked over the 80th anniversary of Indonesia's independence, and in a couple of months' time it'll be a year since President Prabowo assumed office. So this seemed to me like a good time to look more closely at this relationship. So, Johannes, could you perhaps start off for us by sharing your impressions of President Prabowo's foreign and defence policies so far? How would you characterise his international outlook?

Yohanes Sulaiman

Well, his international outlook, in my opinion, is pretty much chaotic, if I can use the word. I already see Natalie is kind of like, cringing like, my God, here we go again. But, Prapowo, in beginning, seems to have a very high ambition. Like, he wants to be like the global peacemaker. He wants to be like the global statesman coming to Washington, Beijing, Moscow and get red carpet treatment all over the place. Well, that's fine. I mean, everybody has that kind of ambition. Especially if you look at what's happened today in international politics, and then of course Indonesia with its key strategic geopolitical position is actually in the right time and case to do so. But the problem is I just don't see any methods, like what's the strategic goal of all the visits? I mean, he went to Moscow and Beijing and was there for what? I mean, of course, like he said, yeah, I made a lot of deals. I made a deal with Washington; I made a deal with Putin and etc. But the problem is, again, talk is cheap. The problem is, where's the beef? What's the purpose of us going all over the place? What's the purpose of Prabowo going to the Middle East, going all over the place? Like, why? What's our strategic goal? Like, why should I care? I think that's what I call it chaotic because there is just no logic, except the fact that he wants to be seen as global peacemaker. That's it.

David Andrews

Would you concur with that judgment or would you like to provide a different perspective?

Natalie Sambhi

Yeah, no, I'm gonna side with Yohanes on this one. I mean, Yohanes says like talk is cheap. I reckon talk is really expensive in this case. Taxpayers’ money funding all of these, not only Prabowo, but his entire entourage, right? So I agree with you. The way I see it, he's got a seat at the table. And I would be expecting as an emerging middle power like Indonesia with these grand ambitions that he's got, like love the energy, like energy can't fault that. But where I would expect a leather-bound dossier of a nice, well-thought-out strategy, you get back of the napkin solutions. And that's the kind of thing, that's the other unfortunate energy that I can see, that there is this ambition there, as Johannes talked about. But I agree, it gets chaotic because there are just ideas thrown out. You know, a couple of years ago, Shangri-La, there was a peace plan between Ukraine and Russia, let's do it. Now there's going be another peace plan between Israel and the Palestinians, let's do it. But there's nothing behind it. There is an idea of having the seat at all these different tables.

You know, I can see recently he's going to be at Shanghai Corporation Organization Summit at the end of this month. Yeah, fair - like other Southeast Asian leaders. He's now got a seat at BRICS. He's now hanging out with Russia. He's the guest of honour at India's National Day. He's guest of honour at the National Day in France. But to what end? Are these actually delivering material outcomes or is it just spending taxpayers' money and cutting into other elements of the national budget in order to be seen? And I think, you know, to defend that on another hand, like to be seen is a quality of its own. But I think it's much more powerful to be seen when you've got really well-developed ideas, when you've got an idea of what you want the new world order to look like or what Indonesia's place will be. Or if you're reaching out to show civil society that Indonesia has public goods to offer as well. But I haven't quite seen that yet.

David Andrews

I think the things that I suppose have probably resonated the most, maybe in Australia or sort of let's say the West more broadly have probably connected more to the Indonesia-Russia relationship as much as anything else in terms of whether that's their stance on the Russia-Ukraine war or maritime exercises with Russia, all sort of things that have happened relatively quickly in this first year that Prabowo has been president. Do you get the sense now that there's any sort of continuity from his time as defence Minister under Jokowi to now, or is there being quite a distinct break between those two periods of his approach to international affairs?

Natalie Sambhi

Yeah, I think I would say two things to that. I think there is a sense of continuity. I just want to pick up quickly on that Russia thing. I think that was blown out of disproportion in the Australian media. Yes, it's something to pay attention to, Indonesia's relationship with Russia. But I mean, Yohanes will probably confirm this, historically when we've looked at the relationship between Indonesia and the Soviet Union that has been long standing. There's been defence industrial flows towards Indonesia with Russian equipment. There's been other kinds of technical and scientific cooperation over the years, maybe not as much as other countries. But I think, you know, to see that blown up in Australian media was perhaps missing the broader context of Indonesia's strategic relationships with a whole manner of different partners. So I just want to flag that. In terms of the continuity with Defence Minister – yeah. I think Prabowo out in front, racking up frequent flyer points is the part of continuity I see. The new element to that is Prabowo taking personal charge of a whole number of other portfolios. And I'm not sure how sustainable that is. You can argue that him installing Sugiono as the Foreign Minister, someone who's not got a diplomacy background, has allowed Prabowo a lot more latitude. Prabowo reportedly took a lead in the trade negotiations in achieving a deal with the American president as well. These are not sustainable, but these arose through a mark of someone who wants very tight control over all of these portfolios, and not necessarily someone with the negotiation skills. Yes if he achieved a deal, but was that the best deal for Indonesia? And we can go more into the details of that later, but that's just kind of what I see. I see a president who is very, very hands-on, and I would argue almost too hands-on.

Yohanes Sulaiman

Natalie got it right, there is some sort of a strategic relation with Indonesia and Russia and it has been ongoing since 1950s although it has its ups and downs and of course if you talk to many people, I many politicians in Indonesia still have a very soft spot to Russia because apparently they are helping us against imperialism. And they look at them with rosy eyeglasses of like what happened during Sukarno where Indonesia was like this big power, you know, everybody was afraid of us, the Russians, the United States and Australia. Everybody was afraid of us. And Russia was one of our supporters back in the day. Remember when we tried to take back Papua from the Dutch, I mean, they supplied us with lot of bombers and submarines and whatever. And of course, nobody can mention that Russia didn't give it to us for free. It was very expensive. And but of course, I mean, nobody remember that. They keep saying that, oh yeah, Russia is our best friend, whatever. I you can look at what Megawati, the leader of one of the biggest parties in Indonesia said. So there is always a rush of fear making Indonesia some sort of like very soft. But at the same time, like Natalie said, we have to really be very careful in saying that is Indonesia is in Russia's orbit.

I mean, if you look at Indonesia-United States relation, it is actually, in my opinion, far stronger than Indonesia-Russia. And of course, Indonesia always considers, if we get too close to Russia, what will happen with our relations with the United States and whether there will be embargo or whatever. So that's always at the back. And then, of course, the training with Russia is already like a plan that you have to see to compare it to Indonesia-Australia and Indonesia-United States military exercises, which is far bigger, man. If you compare Indonesia-Russia military exercises with the United States-Indonesia-Australia exercises, I mean, it is like comparing a whale to a minnow. I mean, that's my opinion, of course, but you have to look at it from that perspective. Like there is always some sort of Russophile elements in Indonesian politics, but at the same time, really, I think we really need to be very careful in overestimating the ties. So it's more complementing what Natalie said rather than like always saying that, oh Natalie's wrong.

Natalie Sambhi

Thanks, man.

David Andrews

And I think, thank you, I think in both cases that's a really useful point of clarification. And I think that's part of what I'm hoping to take out of our conversation. It is to maybe dispel some of these misperceptions and misunderstandings around Indonesia's foreign policy outlook but also the way that Australia and other states can view that relationship. As you say Natalie, I think we're all getting dozens of media requests to talk about bombers in Papua or naval exercises with Russia and things, but actually it needs to be viewed in this bigger and more long-standing context of a relationship that Indonesia's had. And so that's something that I thought would be useful for us to extrapolate on a little bit is I guess that sense of how Indonesia's foreign policy and security policies have evolved over the sort 80 years of independence and whether what we're seeing now is on that continuum or whether this is maybe a change of pace or change of circumstance from where we're looking at before. I mean, obviously the notion of non-alignment is a long-standing principle within Indonesian foreign policy. And we talk about the Bandung Conference, of course, that's in Indonesia - going back to the non-aligned movement in the 1950s. But are we still looking at Indonesia as truly non-aligned or is it perhaps more multi-aligned or something different altogether, do you think?

Yohanes Sulaiman

It is a continuum. I mean, if you look at Indonesia-Russia relations, it is actually more as a counterbalance against Indonesia-China, Indonesia-United States relations in the sense that we don't want to be seen as too close to United States. We also don't want to be seen as too close to China. And there's also question of us getting conflict. So Russia is basically a useful third country that if we got embargoed by United States, then we can buy our weaponry from Russia. And of course, nowadays there are lots of talk about China selling us weaponry, but there are also an opposition of us getting too close to China in terms of the military, because like it or not, China is a problem. I mean, if you look at what happened in South China Sea. I mean, maybe I need to go more out more, but nobody that I know in the Indonesian military is really saying that, yeah, we have to go gung-ho for China. No, most of them are actually very, very cautious of us having too close relations with China. I mean, because if honest, China is always a threat. So Russia is a kind of like a neutral third party that can be useful to balance our interests against China or United States. So it's still part of our independent active foreign policy that we just don't want to get too close to any country. I that's my take anyway.

 

Natalie Sambhi

Yeah, no, I'm going to back up my friend here again. I mean, the way I see it, within Indonesia, we kind of have to disaggregate that in a little bit. If we just look at the strategic side of things, even within Indonesia's strategic community, even between some of the players in foreign policy, in intelligence, in the military, within the military itself, different parts of the military are going to be more comfortable working with other actors than, say, for instance, with China. Some elements of Indonesia's intelligence community still have ties with Israel. There is just a deep pragmatism there for Indonesia, as is maybe driving other countries as well. And as Yohanes pointed out, one of those factors has been the arms embargo imposed by the United States after allegations of human rights violations in East Timor. And that has deeply scarred. I mean, we can say this comes back all the time, but it's not just the only factor. It's the idea that Indonesia wants to also develop its own domestic defence industry. And so it's looking for partners across the globe who can help invest in that. South Korea, Turkey, even nascent defence industry cooperation with Vietnam potentially as well, even though there might be competitors.

But I think this is really interesting. There's a pragmatism there that's driving all of this. But Indonesia at this point can have this veneer of ideology as well. Like you said, the non-alignment, the Bandung spirit. There's a continuity there that President Prabowo can say, yeah, know, it's deep within our DNA that we're friends with everybody. And I found this statement that he made at one of the recent forums in Turkey. And he said, I want to bring Indonesia to a position of good relations with all the big powers so that we can be some sort of bridge and mediator. This is our effort. I mean, that's lovely. That's so sweet. But how's that going to work in practice? But I think, as Yohanes said, how that works in practice is that there is a different level of cooperation with each different actor, different ratio on certain key issues. And what that looks like is a spectrum of relationships with all major players, Japan, France, Brazil and something else, United States definitely in security and so on and so forth, India and maritime exercises. And if that fails, if that veneer doesn't materialize into anything, they can just fall back on the pragmatism.

David Andrews

Do you think that that is likely to change, particularly thinking of the US relationship, for example? So now that we're seeing these different actions taken by the Trump administration that are sort of, I would say, destabilising the broader sense of global order, whether it's around tariffs or it's around withdrawal of funding for aid, those sort of considerations and seemingly more over-issued linkage between sort of trade measures and other foreign policy decisions and you mentioned Natalie that obviously there’s this history from 25, 27 years ago with trade embargos and..

 

Natalie Sambhi

Arm's embargo. Sorry. Yeah, specifically.

David Andrews

Well corrected. Thank you. Arms embargo. And do you think that history and what we're going through now, do you think that is likely to shape the willingness for further cooperation with the United States at this moment? Or do you think that the bigger state of international security is going to override that from a pragmatic perspective, as you say?

Natalie Sambhi

Yeah, if you look holistically at the Indonesia-America relationship, I think there are lots of different factors there. I think the United States seeming double standard with wanting to find peace and supporting different actors in the Ukraine-Russia conflict and then not standing up for human rights violations in Gaza, have really impacted a particular generation of young people, not just in Indonesia, but in Malaysia and in Brunei as well, or in other parts of Southeast Asia. That's one thing to consider. What is the impact of the United States foreign policy globally on that generation? The second thing to consider is to what extent can the United States and Indonesia separate their economic and security relationships. I Yohanes said just now, you know, that a lot of Indonesian military, lots of different parts of Indonesia continue to want to work with the United States as a very strong security relationship. Many Indonesian military officers are trained at professional military institutions in the United States. So if that program is cut, then the United States will be shooting itself in the foot and then also cutting off a potential good source of that kind of PME to the Indonesian military. So if they can, they can cushion the effect of the trade deal, what's seen as coercion in some deals - because it's not really a trade deal. It's very, very lopsided if we look at what the terms of that deal have been between Prabowo and the American president. But the security relationship remains very important, very vibrant, very robust. so, yeah, if those two can be separated then they can continue to be a good relationship.

David Andrews

Yohanes, what are you seeing in the US-Indonesia dynamic at the moment?

Yohanes Sulaiman

Yeah, Natalie, got it right. And I think there's a huge negative feeling from Indonesia to the United States now. I first is, of course, the fact that the United States seems gung-ho in supporting Israel's humanitarian abuses in Gaza. if you look at ICS survey of elite opinion in Southeast Asia, you can see the proof in the pudding basically. The feeling towards the United States in Brunei, in Malaysia, in Indonesia, literally collapsed. The year before, like 60 % said, yeah, we are fine with the United States at the end. The number is always consistent. And then after November, after the Hamas-Israel, then it just collapsed. And then of course, And when Trump also said that, okay, we need put tariffs on Indonesia, there was a huge uproar on social media. And when Prabowo signed up to that 19 % agreement also, same thing. Everybody said, you know, he's now bowing down to United States, what kind of strong leader is he, the one that is kissing Trump's boots, basically, licking Trump's boots. So it was bad. And I'm really afraid that this will have, like I said, this will impact the entire generation that we need to start moving out from the United States orbit, that we need to start looking at United States not as a benign hegemon that is supporting this order, but literally like a bully. And that really scares me because I'm one on the field, who really pushes for more cooperation between the Indonesian and United States in terms of economy and security. And that's problematic.

Natalie Sambhi

I just want to add quickly on that. It's not just what the United States is doing globally. It's some of its domestic policies as well. Not long after there was the policy of randomly checking people and their visa status within the country, the Indonesian embassy in Washington issued social media posts saying that for all the Indonesian students studying at an American university, make sure you have your ID on you. If you feel like someone's approaching you, you don't have to open the front door. This is terrifying. You know, if you're university student, a master's student who's gone there on scholarship. You know, your parents would be back home wondering, are you going to get snatched and thrown into a van and then ending up in some sort of detention centre in the deep south? And that's a chilling effect that the United States doesn't need, particularly at a time when it's withdrawing a lot of its influence through think tanks, you know, with the issuance of guidance that people can't attend think tank forums like Shangri-La Dialogue and things like that. That's a whole cascading effect that I think we're going to see. so yeah, it's the United States foreign policy overseas, but also domestic policy that's impacting this relationship with Indonesia too.

Yohanes Sulaiman

Not to mention the fact that Trump puts down the voice of America, the USAID and what's the other one.. Fulbright. It was literally what Natalie said earlier. I mean, shooting itself in the foot because USAID and Fulbright is very popular in Indonesia. Lots of Indonesians are taking Fulbright to study in the United States. Now, no more Fulbright, then where are they going? They are going to China. They are going to Moscow.

 They're going to countries that's against United States. And that's basically destroying the entire generation. I got students who told me, I mean, like a couple years ago, they want to go United States to study at Ohio State, where I used to study or at whatever, Chicago, Harvard, all those great schools. Now, like Natalie said, the question is, who's going to knock the door in the middle of night and take me away? And of course that they don't have access to Fulbright and all those things. It's killing the United States soft power. I don't understand why they allow that. You also get Wilson Center was cutting out and whatever. It's crazy. I mean, okay, this is about Indonesian relations. So I'm getting off the page now.

David Andrews

What I was going to ask and sort of building on that idea, is where that leads Australia. Because I would like to think that Australian-Indonesian relations sort of exist in their own right, separate to what the United States is doing. But at the same time, clearly as an ally of the United States and as close as we are to them, it does have, I think to some extent, some sort of residual impact on the way that Australia is perceived internationally in the way that we relate to other states. And I think particularly when Southeast Asia has been hit so hard by Trump tariffs and things like that, it puts us in a delicate position. Of course, Foreign Minister Wong was over at the ASEAN Regional Foreign Ministers' Meeting and was speaking about this relatively recently, and the Prime Ministers made remarks as well. But do you think, Yohanes, does this shape or impinge on the way that Australia and Indonesia relate, or are they viewed as quite separate things?

Yohanes Sulaiman

Here’s the problem, I think. Indonesia has always seen Australia as United States younger brother or the United States sheriff in the Pacific. And that's one of the main reasons why the relation between Indonesia and Australia never really improved because many people think that if you want to get somebody listening to you in Canberra, you better go to Washington first. Although one good thing I guess about Trump is that it allows Australia to differentiate itself from the United States at this point, saying that look, we are different, the United States is pushing crazy policy, but Australia is still having a very good relationship with Indonesia. I think that's a huge opportunity for Australia. But the problem is again, the trade relation with Indonesia-Australia is very low. I always find it weird, flabbergasting the fact that when we had surveys to Indonesian's elite or policy makers, and then they were asking in the ICS survey about who do you think is the best partner aside from the United States and China. Most of them choose either the European Union or Japan. I literally keep screaming like, there's Australia next door. Like, why? Like, why do you think of the European Union, which is like half a world away, not somebody next door? But again, they keep telling me like, because Australia is United States little brother, which I know it's kind of stupid, but it is. So I think that's kind of the perception that Australia really needs to dispel. And this is, I guess, kind of giving the opportunity.

Natalie Sambhi

Yeah, after all that US bashing, actually, we should probably look at the silver lining, which I agree with Yohanes. There is an opportunity. And I can tell you two quick ways I think Australia could really capitalize on what is, I hope, a temporary US withdrawal from a number of different initiatives. And the first is on gender, peace, and security. So through some of the research that I've done about women's leadership in Southeast Asian militaries, I know that the United States had been responsible for funding several programs for supporting training and exercises for women personnel in the region. Now, particularly English language courses, which are instrumental in helping them advance in their careers by enabling them to do things like taking up positions in peacekeeping operations, which gives them invaluable field experience, which then helps them further their careers. So there's a there's a virtuous cycle there with just something as simple as English language training. I also know Australia provided that from many of my interviews on research projects.

So as the US has now pulled the plug completely on GPS WPS, Australia together with other partners, because Australia can never, you know, have the sheer scale and size of resources that the Pentagon has, but we can together with our partners, try and fill that gap. And that's a really important part of supporting what we see as women's participation in the workforce, particularly in the security sector. And I think people will remember that. And the second thing in a related way is, again, we're not going to be able to compete or replace what the United States has in terms of scale and size in its think tank ecosystem. But we can look at coordinating between our think tank ecosystems in Australia when it comes to our messaging about Southeast Asia. If what Yohanes says, and I agree what he diagnoses, is maybe an image problem that we have. then how are we coordinating that message through our think tank networks that are plugged into think tank networks in Southeast Asia as well? Could we look at that as the US is pulling back, how can we then use that moment to then maybe advance some of the similar kinds of values and support governance in Southeast Asia through a coordinated think tank strategy?

David Andrews

I think those sound like very intriguing prospects to me. And I think it probably highlights and respects the need for that kind of creative policymaking in the Australian space. Yohanes, as you said, there's not necessarily a lot of, say, economic complementarity and maybe the sort of perceptions in Indonesia are more focused on bigger trading partners like the EU or Japan. So Australia has to do things differently. We can't just rely on the way in which our economic complementarity with China has fuelled that relationship or our long-term alliance with the United States has underpinned that relationship as well. We have to things slightly differently. I think that's one of the things I want to take away from our conversation. It is hopefully helping people in Australia to understand a bit better some of the complexity and dynamism and detailing in that relationship because – and this is hardly an original thought on my part - but a lot of the conversation in Australia boils down to things like boat people and Bali and then when things like the Russia relationship flares up, that becomes the front page for weeks at a time. And actually there's so much more going on underneath the surface there in a much more complex way.

But in general terms, Natalie, what do you think of the present state of the bilateral relationship. Obviously there are these areas we can do more in, there's more we can grow in. But I think there's been a lot of positivity around the upgraded defence cooperation agreement in 2024. The Prime Minister's made it very clear that he views going to Indonesia as sort of his first international visit for both his terms as prime minister now. There's lots of those sort of positive signals being sent at the national leadership level. Do you think that does that sort of bear up to scrutiny? Is that an accurate reflection of that relationship or is that at least accurate to the Australian perspective?

Natalie Sambhi

Yeah, look, I think you hit the nail on the head. I mean, from a very Canberra perspective, the relationship is in a relatively good state. We've got these upgrades in terms of defence cooperation, and then we now have invested our Southeast Asian economic strategy. So things are looking good insofar as returning towards Southeast Asia as well. But if you go beyond that into the human to human, people to people, community to community ties, we have some stuff going on, but it's not at scale. And I think there are a couple of recommendations I would make there other than on my wish list of having greater awareness of Southeast Asia within our schools and then hopefully having that reciprocated with Indonesia. But that's not always the case. Indonesia has so many other greater immediate issues on its plate. But we ourselves, our new Colombo plan has been fantastic. I saw some of the figures this morning. In the five years between 2014 and 2019, we've boosted almost double the number of students studying in Southeast Asia. But the problem with that is that they're all short term courses.

A large percentage of the funding has gone to students studying either for two-week programs or one-month programs, and about 1 % of the people funded are doing a year-long program, and there's about 10 % doing semester-long. So encouraging Australians, particularly young Australians, to stay longer in the region, I think would actually get us better bang for buck for the investment that we're trying to make in increasing this curiosity and interest in places like Indonesia. That's one. And then on a very, very grass-level grassroots way. The Australian government can look at the cost of visas for Indonesians visiting Australia. At the moment, it's $190 per person. If I want to go to Bali, it's $55. So if somebody wants to bring a family of four, that's almost $800, which is a lot of money. So if you want to really increase people-to-people flows and have a good impression of people staying in Australia, you want people to come to their children's graduation at their Australian university. Make it easier for them. And these are very, very simple things that government can do.

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David Andrews

There's something that struck me only in the last week, I think, and this is maybe not national security, but it's still, I think, a good point of bilateral relations is in sport. And Robbie Gaspar, who used to play football in Indonesia and Malaysia and elsewhere, recently played a large part in getting a game together between one of the largest teams in Indonesia and the Western Sydney Wanderers from the A-League. Persib Bandung, I believe, is the Indonesian team. And I don't see why we shouldn't, whether that's with government help or not, but pursue things like why doesn't every Australian team have a relationship with a team in Indonesia? And why don't we have these sort of games at beginning of every season, for example. But there are these, these almost society level aspects of the partnership that I think are ripe for boosting and for promotion. We might have a great government to government relationship.

We have a really - at least judging from the video that he released - Prabowo seems very chummy and personable towards Prime Minister Albanese and towards Australia, which is great. And we want to see those partnerships, but that only goes so far. And so we need to, I think, hopefully make that more holistic and all these big international dimensions will obviously shape what's possible, but there's so much more that happens at the local level as well. Yohanes I'll spin back to you at this stage, beyond those concerns that you mentioned before that some people have in Indonesia around Australia's relationship with the United States and how we might be perceived, in the expert community, hopefully understanding all these different details and nuances, is there a good perception or feeling towards what Australia's been doing with Indonesia over the last little while? Is there a positive spin on that relationship, or is there still a lot more could be done?

Yohanes Sulaiman

Honestly, there are a lot of things, good things that have been done by Australia in Indonesia. I think there is a lot more people to people engagement also. And many things that Australia did are highly popular, such as Bluey. I mean, my God, that dog is your best friend all over the world. Everybody I know, I mean, I got kids and all other parents are talking about Bluey. mean, that's your best export and you know it's crazy. Bluey is crazy, I mean everybody I know is watching bluey over there. So there are a lot of things that Australia can do to promote itself in Indonesia but again the problem is it is just not that much. That's the problem and I agree with that Natalie there's a problem with the scope with the intensity with like how widespread it is compared to like China’s engagement. I mean China is basically throwing lots and lots of money. I mean they invited a lot of religious leaders in West, in Central East Java or they went to China and went to Xinjiang and say look Xinjiang is nice There's no problem in Xinjiang. Come on. I give you guided tour all over the place. And everybody coming back and say, yeah, Xinjiang is nice. Nobody gets persecuted.

You're basically fighting like a huge fire inferno with a garden hose. I mean, I think that's one of the big problem here. think the intensity of the engagement, I think It pales compared to what China has been doing or even Russia. Russia is now, I mean, I'm in the WhatsApp group of IR scholars in Indonesia and they basically are getting lots of offers for Indonesian scholars to just go to St. Petersburg, go to Moscow and we are welcoming you there. I mean, you don't have to pay those $180 Australian visa, just come. We are paying you. I mean, that's crazy about the outrage. I and I think that's what you are really up against. You have to understand that. And then, course, following what Natalie just said about the Australian teenagers, you are coming to Indonesia, maybe first thing they should do is understand that Indonesia is not just Bali. Indonesia was just Changgu and Seminyak. It is big, there are lots of things outside Denpasar. So I mean, so I think there are again, there are a lot of things Australia has been doing in Indonesia, a lot of great things, but it just pales in terms of intensity and that really worries me.

David Andrews

Are there any areas where you think there are major divergences between Australia and Indonesia, Yohanes, that would potentially undermine that effectiveness? I take your point, and I think it's the same as Natalie's raise that - or at least I interpreted it that way - that there are lots of areas that we can focus on that are quite tailored and quite specific and get to core points of the relationship. But of course, we can't deliver the sort of the scale of a China or even a Russia to some extent with those approaches and the large scale economic ties and cultural diplomacy in that sense. We have to find different ways of doing things from Australia's perspective. Are there any blockages that you see that we need to overcome or work around?

Yohanes Sulaiman

I think the big problem, I see there are two problems in the blockages if I want to use your term. Of course, there are many more but I think there are two big problems here. Firstly, economic relations I guess is not as robust as you want to make part of it because we basically produce the same thing. We produce coal and raw materials, something that Australia’s also producing which makes economic relations between Indonesia and Australia is not as strong as we want it. I think if there are more economic relations, more intensity, then good other relations will follow. One of the main reasons why China's relations with Indonesia is very strong is because there are just a lot of businesses working with China. They keep getting lots of money from China. So it is in their interest to support good relations with Indonesia and China. And that's something that is not emulated in Indonesia-Australia relations because of the lack in terms of economy. I think that's one big problem. And second, already mentioned this before, but there is always the feeling that Australia is the United States’ sheriff in South Asia. There's also trauma of what happened in East Timor. So it is an image problem, basically. If you ask me how to solve this - short answer - I don't know. Like Natalie, we have been thinking a lot about how to solve this, but it takes time. And, you know, it's just very difficult.

Natalie Sambhi

I think I would agree with that. think definitely the second point Johannes made about this image challenge that we've got. I think it even goes beyond that. We have to be rather careful that someone with Prabowo, setting aside any potential hypocrisies and double standard exercise by the Indonesian president and his government, setting that aside. If there are any instances where Australia can look like it's behaving in any kind of proxy way of the United States or in any kind of colonial way towards the Pacific, or if the fact that it's very extractive relationship with Africa becomes more publicised, then we open ourselves up to being a punching bag. This convenient rhetoric that countries like Indonesia have and other countries like leaders of Burkina Faso, for instance, that have this Western bashing as a very helpful rallying point for them, which has a bit of domestic cachet.

We have to be careful that that doesn't become weaponised. I'm not saying that it's likely to happen, but it could happen. And that's where Australia, I think, has this good opportunity, looking at whatever's happening in United States now, to really forge our own identity. Going ahead and recognizing Palestinian statehood, going ahead and acting in responsible ways and promoting that within our region. Those are really important things that I think that we could do, like I said earlier about the coordinated messaging. But what's the message that we want to send, and making sure that we don't allow any kind of us being wrapped up into this anti-Western, anti-colonial type of sentiment within the global South-South/ Global majority has any legs to it. And that's what I think we should look out for.

David Andrews

One thing that struck me both, Yohanes, from your comments and now from Natalie's as well is how this connects with, I suppose, the specific approaches that the Australian government has taken over the last few years, and particularly the Albanese government in the last, I guess, since it's been re-elected. I think it seems to me that there's been more of an effort to create a level of shall we say rhetorical distance between the Australian government and the US government on a few topics. And as you just mentioned, Palestinian statehood is one very clear example of that. I think the language used by the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister to me seems to be setting a bit of a - by no means a split - but just sort of pushing some of that rhetoric a little bit further apart and trying to set out a more uniquely, independently Australian outlook on the world and on the region. And of course, Southeast Asia has been a long held interest for the Labor Party particularly, but it just feels a little bit more pointed to me at the moment than perhaps in the past. And I wasn't sure if either of you felt like that was, if intentional, making any headway or likely to be effective if the image still remains of the deputy sheriff mould and some of their language is maybe trying to separate Australia from that a little bit and stand a bit more on our own two feet in the region. Is that something that you've noticed as well or is, am I just seeing things out?

Natalie Sambhi

No, I think we've kind of skirted around the idea of the role of China with the Indo-Pacific. But I don't think we've grappled with the idea of how we're going to look as if we are by default part of an anti-Chinese American coalition, particularly if it comes down to joining any kind of treaty-bound response to, say for instance, the takeover of Taiwan or an attack on the Philippines. And having a very frank and open conversation with our nearest neighbours about what does deterrence actually mean to them, how do they actually feel about US-China armed conflict and where would we sit within that? Noting that, unlike the United States, we are much closer to this region. We would be a site, given a ramping up of our installations in Henderson and other places, for assets that would be shared with the United States. There were great risks there, but I think our neighbours are also looking at these developments saying, yes, it's all well and good that our prime minister's gone to Beijing, but if it comes down to the crunch, Australia, you're going to be just on the side of the United States. And maybe that's not where we're prepared to be yet. So having these kinds of conversations now, I think, would help at the government to government level.

David Andrews

What do you think? Has any of this cut through, do you think, within the Indonesian system?

Yohanes Sulaiman

I hate to say this, but no, unfortunately. Like Natalie said, the proof will be when the conflict happen, like what will you guys do? That's the biggest question. And you know, again, talk is cheap. Natalie, you say it's expensive. But there's a problem. I mean, I think Albanese got lots of boxes check. I think he got it right. I mean, actually even Morrison, regardless how much you hate him, he actually did pretty well from an Indonesian perspective. Basically, he's saying the right things, nut again, the problem is where are we when push comes to shove? Will Australia go back to United States as becoming their little brother again, later, when Trump leaves the scene or what will happen? I think that's one comment, I guess. I might be wrong here, but I think the biggest question for Indonesia is whether there is a commitment for Australia to actually be in Southeast Asia when push comes to shove. Whether Australia is an independent Southeast Asian country, rather than a satellite of United States in Pacific. I think that's one thing that I honestly don't have any answer to. Because it just take forever to change the image, but I don't know am I making sense? I'm not sure I'm making sense but you know, that's my that's my feeling.

David Andrews

I mean, for what it's worth, I remain confident that we are a sovereign and independent actor with our own interests to pursue the region. I think, Natalie you said, we are resident here in a way the United States isn't. And so that's been the case since day one. I mean, if we go back through the sweep of Australian strategic history and thought, it's always been focused on Southeast Asia from the 1940s and ongoing. We have a long history of presence there, which I think spells that out, but...

Yohanes Sulaiman

Can I jump in a second? The funny thing is, actually Australia is one of the supporters of Indonesia. During the independence war between Indonesia and the Dutch, Australia has been very consistent in supporting Indonesian independence. When we have this so-called free countries commission, Indonesia basically voted for Australia to be its representative as a part of the negotiating team against the Dutch. So there was this very close relation actually between 1945 to 1949 because Australia was one of the countries that actually supported independence. And honestly, I'm very surprised that it was not that much emphasized in the relationship between Indonesia and Australia. Of course, in the 50s, everything went belly up because Australia was supporting the Dutch in West Papua. And that's what I guess one of the main reasons for the split, of disappointment. But honestly, this is one part of the relations between Australia and Indonesia that really needs to be focused on. They really need to be emphasized. I think very few people really know this, that Australia was boycotting the Dutch ships that were coming to Indonesia, Australia was supporting Indonesia and United Nations. This is part of a little bit of history that very few people really think about.

Natalie Sambhi

If only we taught more history in Australian schools. But yes, I completely agree with Yohanes.

David Andrews

In some ways it feels a little bit like when we're looking at our relationship with Indonesia and looking at Indonesia's place in the world, I think to some extent it’s almost like we're holding up a mirror of some sorts to ourselves. Because of those, as we've just said, these decades of interconnectedness, both in terms of our mutual diplomatic ties, relationships, and economic models and, we have a continent but Indonesia has the world's largest archipelago. We're all dealing with large maritime zones and complexities and different parts of our history I think are shared and complex. And so I think that there's not really a nice, neat answer that we can sort of finish with that says, you know, we've now ticked, we've solved Australia-Indonesia ties and we've solved all the issues, we've found the right policy problems to address. I think almost all the questions that we're asking apply equally to both parties, which I think is what makes such a fascinating relationship and such a fascinating topic to discuss and to study. And so I've really valued your time with us on the podcast today, Yohanes and Natalie, for sharing so many of your thoughts and insights and contestations and provocations. So hopefully our listeners have taken that away as well and a lot more for us to build on and work on in the years ahead. So thank you for being with us on the National Security Podcast.

Natalie Sambhi

That's my pleasure. Thanks, David. Thanks, Yohanes.

Yohanes Sulaiman

My pleasure.

National Security Podcast

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