Transcript

How aligned are China and Russia's strategic interests? 

How is this relationship playing out in relation to competing spheres of influence in Central Asia? 

What are the key points of friction in the China-Russia partnership? 

In this episode, Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva and Graham Meehan join Sally Bulkeley to delve into the complex dynamics of the China-Russia relationship, exploring the alignment and divergence of their strategic interests.

(This transcript is AI-generated and may contain inaccuracies)

Graeme Meehan

We talk about Russia's interests as if it was uniform, but I think there's a distinction between what's in Russia's interests and what's in the Putin's interests.

Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva

So Central Asia is the only region that Russia kind of still continues to have some sort of hope for, and with Chinese stronger influence that goes beyond economic presence that could be the potential area these two great powers may clash.

National Security Podcast

You're listening to the National Security Podcast, the show that brings you expert analysis, insights and opinion on the national security challenges facing Australia and the Indo-Pacific, produced by the ANU National Security College.

Sally Bulkeley

Welcome to the National Security Podcast. I'm Sally Bulkeley, Deputy Head of the ANU National Security College. And today's podcast is being recorded on the lands of the Ngunnawal and Ngambri people. And I pay my respects to their elders past and present. This week, I'm joined by Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva and Graham Meehan to reflect on Eurasia and the China-Russia relationship.

And to briefly introduce our guests, Dilnoza is a lecturer at the National Security College here at the ANU with research interests including Securitisation Theory, the geopolitics of Central Eurasia, radicalisation, Russian foreign policy in Central Asia and the nexus of security and policy making in higher education. Dilnoza has completed her PhD at the Australian National University with doctoral research focused on securitisation theory in the context of higher education policies in post-Soviet Central Asia. Graeme Meehan is a highly respected esteemed diplomat, having served overseas as the Australian Ambassador to Russia, Head of Post Consulate General Shanghai, Deputy Head of Mission in Beijing, and Deputy Head of Post Australian Representative Office Taipei in Taiwan, amongst many other highly esteemed roles.

Dilnoza, Graham, welcome to the National Security Podcast.

Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva

Thank you

Graeme Meehan

Thank you

Sally Bulkeley

Before we start our discussion around Eurasian relations with the China-Russia relationship, I'd like to firstly focus on the China-Russia relationship itself and would like to also offer a few headlines to our listeners on the pacts that have emerged over the last several years. In June 2020, Extended Military Cooperation Agreement took place for an agreement over five more years focused on joint exercises, military education and technology. Fast track to 2021 and the No Limits Strategic Partnership emerges. And then in 2022, on the eve of the Beijing Winter Olympics, the No Limits Partnership Declaration is announced. A few weeks later, Russia invades Ukraine. And then in March 2023, Xi Jinping undergoes a state visit to Moscow. Today, in July 2025, a joint statement on global governance reform has taken place where China and Russia have released a statement advocating reform of the UN Security Council and global financial institutions, calling for non-Western voices to be prioritised. Graeme, how aligned are China and Russia's strategic interests in the current global order?

Graeme Meehan

Thanks Sal. I would say under the current regimes, they're quite closely aligned in two respects. One is that they're aligned in agreeing what they're against. They're against Western and particularly US preponderance and values, what we often call the rules based order. But what they say is a system designed by the West for the West's interests. They're also quite aligned in more transactional terms in the sense that both of them are getting something from each other. China is getting, particularly since the full scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, is getting cheaper oil and gas. It buys 20 % of its oil from Russia. And it is the largest buyer of Russian coal, for example. It also gets a useful market for its manufactured goods, cars, mobile phones, IT equipment - sectors where Western companies pulled out of Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

And China, especially since Ukraine gets a more compliant international partner. Russia gets semi-direct with support for its war. It gets dual use equipment, things like fibre optics, things that can use in the war. And it's got this market for its oil despite the sanctions that the West has imposed on Russia. But these are transactions, they're not an alliance. And it's not like the way the West has been giving arms to Ukraine. These are not being given away. Nothing has been given away. Both sides, particularly the Chinese, are driving very hard bargains because they know they have Russia in an awkward spot. Another area where they're less aligned, I would say is that while they agree what they're against, they're not so aligned and what they're for. China is making a much more determined effort to build its own world order, institutions, habits, international norms.

It wants to extend its global influence, use its economic clout to create an alternative or to twist the world order in its direction. I think Russia, especially since the invasion of Ukraine, is less of a builder than a wrecker. It really doesn't have the economic clout or the policy bandwidth to create new institutions and norms. It's really stuck going along with China's efforts and not necessarily all that enthusiastically, but pretending to be enthusiastic. For example, when China pushed hard for the expansion of the BRICS, widen its membership, the sense one gets is that Russia wasn't quite as keen, but what could they do? They have to go along. So they're aligned, but there are plenty of areas where there's much less alignment, I would say.

Sally Bulkeley

Graeme, thank you. I think the sentiment conveyed there on Russia, China, not an alliance, and the questioning of the genuineness of that particular relationship - Dilnoza, I'm very keen to hear your views too. In particular, do China and Russia genuinely share a vision for the future?

Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva

That's a really good question. They do seem to share a sort of a degree of partnership, but again, against the Western or particularly the US hegemony as they call it. What they seem to call particularly very popular in the global South is the call for multipolarity. There is no clarity on either side what that multipolarity would look like. Multipolarity would mean from international relations and international security theories, that there would be multiple poles, multiple different spheres of influence. But it doesn't seem to be an agreement between the two. Who would be the one deciding what multipolarity would look like? I believe what we call their partnership or the alliance is basically pragmatic and interest-based. So their interests are one, yes, countering the US influence and calling for multi-polarity. And if you look at the Russian discourse, their foreign minister multiple times calls for change in the international system and calls for a change from the rules-based order to the law-based order. But there's no clarity what that law-based order would look like.

Unfortunately, these statements are very popular in the global South. In some countries, they seem to think, yes indeed, there is a point in what these countries are calling for. Other divergence I would see is that Russian discourse calls for Eurasianism. Russian discourse says that Russia is not just a state, but it's a civilization. And they should be the ones uniting Eurasia within that the so-called the Russian world that would include Eurasia. Eurasia is a huge continent, right? But that includes China as well. And it's interesting how there wouldn't be a case where there would not be a tension between the two when Chinese are part of Eurasia. And once, in fact, I remember when Putin visited China, a journalist asked him how Chinese presence, businesses, investments in the overall post-Soviet space, particularly in Central Asia, would align with Russia's Eurasian policies, particularly the Eurasian Economic Union. And somehow the answer was that, you know, it aligns really well, but there's no clarity, there's no practical essence in that answer because it seems to be, there is no way these two powers can get along with their separate interests in the region - in the global South as well, if the so-called multipolar world was there, for example.

So I believe that it's very much interest-based and Russia relies on Chinese support. China relies on Russian support, diplomatic support. And there are several institutions, they work under, for example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the China-led SEO. Russia is a part of it, along with many other countries, including Central Asian countries, India, Pakistan, Iran. They are also under BRICS and they call that basically we should have less reliance on US dollars. So there should be interaction more and the global south should have more voice. But there's no clarity what it would look like in reality in practical terms.

Sally Bulkeley

Yeah, thanks, Dilnoza. And I think we all witnessed in 2023 during Xi Jinping's state visit to Moscow, a promotion of multipolar world order narrative, which is where we are alluding to. We've also seen in the past where China didn't support the invasion, but blamed the West and called for negotiations. We've also seen where diplomats from both China and Russia have met and criticized the US's hegemony, paving the way for deeper alignment. It appears China and Russia are sending signals on changing the current international order, but the narrative somewhat lacks substance. However, it's still having a resounding impact on our Eurasian nations. It'd be great to hear your perspectives on how that narrative is impacting on Eurasian nations and how the effect of that narrative is taking its way forward.

Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva

Yeah, that's a really good question. The call for multipolarity in general is very popular in the Global South. It is very popular. It's a part of, you know, working back and revisiting the history where they all had colonization and there's time for them now to prosper. There should be equality. There should be a change in the current international system. However, what these narratives lack is in practical terms, what that order would look like. If I give an example of central Asian states, for example, Central Asia is a really significant post-Soviet space that is made of five central Asian states of roughly about 80 million people. So right now, this is the only strategic region that Russia still tries to dominate. But unfortunately to the Russian side, I would say China has almost replaced its presence.

In the case of Central Eurasia, we see that countries are very much aware of these great powers’ narratives. They do really understand that they have their own national interests. And what they try to do is try to have the so-called multi-vector foreign policy where they deal with each great power and try not to upset anyone basically. But they do understand that there's nothing for them in these political or geopolitical games, that China is there for its own interests. Particularly China has become really dominant in the economic investment with its Belt and Road Initiative, with its presence, with its companies. I guess viewers or listeners would know that China announced, Chinese leader announced its Belt and Road Initiative in Kazakhstan in 2003. That shows the significance of the region. But Russia still dominates the region with its international institutions following the collapse of Soviet Union. For example, it has the Commonwealth of Independent States, it has its own type of NATO, which is the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The three of the Central Asian states are members of this institution and do rely on Russia on their security. So basically, the countries in the Eurasian context, particularly in Central Eurasia, they try to navigate these geopolitical games and try to make the most of the great games that are happening still in the region.

But what they see is that they see quite a significant potential threat, both from Russia and China. For example, with Russia's invasion of Ukraine, there were many concerns in the post-Soviet space that what if Kazakhstan could be next or other Central Asian countries could be the next in the move. So Kazakhstan is the central Asian country that has the longest land border in the world with Russia, it borders with Northern Kazakhstan. So yeah, these are the really legitimate concerns for many in the post-Soviet space. And after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the region has become the only region with the largest population that Russia still seems to have some presence, given the situation in Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus where Russia has to an extent lost its influence. So central Asian countries seem to be trying to make the most use of these great power games basically, but they do not believe that one or other is in their best interest with whatever narrative they would have with the multi-power world order.

Sally Bulkeley

Thank you, Dilnoza. Those are some really interesting dynamics there. And Graeme, really interested to hear your perspectives, given firsthand you have been there to see the political shifts and dynamics through your experiences as ambassador and a highly esteemed diplomat through China over the last few years.

Graeme Meehan

To focus first on central Asia, would agree with Dilnoza's points that the Central Asians were rather taken aback by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and they have had to balance their interests quite carefully, but it's hard to avoid the impression when visiting those countries that China's influence is growing and Russian influence is receding. The investment from China is just so enormous and China is starting now to invest more in security and political relationships. It's established this China-Central Asia summit to which Russia was not invited. And I think people in the region are conscious that Russia, as long as it's embroiled in Ukraine just has less bandwidth, less time, less resources to focus on anything except Ukraine, and that creates a weakness and gives an opening to China. I think more broadly that as I said earlier, and again, I agree with Dilnoza about the message of multipolarity and the messages that are quite well received in the global South. But I cannot help but see those as being driven more by China with Russia as a junior partner, tagging along. Russia's influence, for example, in Africa is very limited so those small number of countries who've been relying on Russian mercenaries - originally Wagner and now what's oddly called the Africa Corps. And interestingly, the invasion of Ukraine has accentuated that.

To the extent that I was very struck in in Moscow in the months after the full scale invasion in 2022, talking to African and Asian ambassadors who basically said, look, this is just a fight between Europeans. They've been fighting for hundreds of years, nothing to do with us, what do we care? Basically, we're annoyed that it's impacting us - it might affect oil prices, it might affect the purchase of things like fertilizers - but we're not interested. And Russia also tried to say that this is a battle against the West, but China has a stronger argument. China can say it's these Europeans messing up the world order with their internal struggles. Hint, hint - Russia is also a European involved in a European war that we, the real global South, shouldn't be taking any notice of, or it should be a wake-up call to us that we need a more multipolar world order. So when you face those kinds of messages, it makes Russia look either unimportant or catching up or even one of the guilty partners. So I think China gains from this and is a real counterpart to the West in the way that Russia isn't and can never be really in its current state.

Sally Bulkeley

Graeme, you make some great points there on the differences of power associated with where Russia's influence lies versus China. And Dilnoza, I'd be very interested to hear from you, whether you believe it's a relationship one of equals, or is China clearly the dominant partner in this relationship and in the context of Eurasian relations and its influence.

Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva

So China is indeed dominant in this relationship, but it's never clearly stated, but it's quite obvious. So Russia has no choice but to accept the junior role in this interest-based relationship. Even if it says no limits partnership and the Chinese leader visits Russia the most of all the nation states he pays visit to. But there are many areas where it's obvious that China dominates. If we look at their military economic capacity, it's very obvious, right, that China dominates. But the point I'm trying to use here to illustrate why China is dominant is with their spheres of influence. If we look at their spheres of influence, China with its economic investment, with its presence, has already in the last few years started talking beyond the economic presence. In the context of Central Eurasia, for example, China has recently launched the Central Asia plus China format summits. So I think the first was held in 2023 or 2022, I'm not sure. But in that summit, interestingly, China for the first time and since then made several statements that China would ensure the security of Central Asian states. And that was an interesting observation given in the past, it was always Russia making those statements saying that we will look after the security of central Asian states. We do have common past in the Soviet Union. We have special relations with these countries, but that narrative, that discourse is changing. And Russia seems to have nothing to respond to that because it has become obvious.

China has not only with its economic presence, but it is there with several attractive packages, whether it's investing in different infrastructure projects in the region. And these loans are very attractive. This is something that Russia cannot offer. It cannot compete with China in this regard. So obviously Russia would still have its sphere of influence in that region because of the past, because of the language, history to some extent. There are some people who still may be nostalgic about the Soviet past, particularly the older generation who experienced that life. But given the current state of the economy, young people are interested wherever there is money, wherever there is a better life, where there is more source of income coming from. So I believe that this is definitely the relationship where Russia has to accept, even if it accepts or not, it is definitely junior. And another example to that, I do remember in one of the Valdai conferences, a journalist asked the Russian president that question. We do see increased Chinese presence in central Eurasia. So how don't you think that we might be threatened by the Chinese presence in the region? And the answer was very philosophical, that China doesn't have the philosophy of dominance, which was very interesting.

Of course, we know from international relations theories, from particularly from realism that any nation state, particularly if you are going to be a great power and if you know it you would be interested in maximizing your national interests, whether it would include invading another country or having a stronger presence. Another aspect that China tries to popularize is the non-interference in domestic affairs. That's the very thing that China is very popular for in most non-democracies and in the countries in the global South. But I'm not sure to what extent the statement is valid. But China says that we do not intervene in human rights issues in your countries. We do not tell you do this, do that, have a democracy or have elections and so on. For the reasons China itself doesn't have it, obviously, in its country. But yeah, that's the thing that China seems to be having stronger presence and sphere of influence in the case of Eurasia. And this is changing. And that potentially could be an area where these two great powers might potentially have conflict over.

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Sally Bulkeley

I'm hearing from both you Dilnoza and Graham the diverse and different objectives coming from China and Russia, despite the partnership pact and agreement. China in its presence and its building of global power through a different approach to say Russia, who have been more aggressive around Eurasian nations and their influence. Dilnoza, we'll start with you first. Are there any clear limits or fault lines that you can see in the China-Russia relationship? And I think based on that, how resilient is their cooperation, particularly with the multipolarity we've been discussing, the international shocks, the introduction of the Trump administration earlier this year, sending shockwaves for economic tariffs and interchanging priorities. Really interested to hear in the face of all the things happening globally and the uncertainty, will there be a point where the China and Russia relationship will fail?

Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva

I believe that potential clash could be over their presence and the sphere of influence in Central Asia, for example. So Central Asia has always been a strategic region for all great powers. goes back to the times of the great game or to the popular grand chessboard, the book by Zbigniew Brzezinski, where he outlined why Central Asia was important for the United States and why the US foreign policy should not let any great power dominate the region. So it's a little bit of kind of geopolitics here. But coming back to real practical life right now, what we see is that as China continues its stronger sphere of influence that will potentially upset Russia at some point. It's already happening, but it may not be acknowledged in official discourse, in the narratives. There seems to be a kind of a way we can get along with each other. We do have the common goal of multipolarity, the multipolar world order.

But I think the current main point here is basically the standing up against the Western hegemony in these two powers. So I don't know in the lack of that goal or if that goal changes, for example, if for some reason these nation states start getting along with the West, either China or Russia. If that government, if that regime changes, that kind of pragmatic relationship might be weakened, obviously, because there's that countering factor is no longer there or might have been weakened. So I believe that potentially Chinese stronger influence in Central Asia and Central Asia being the dominant region for Russian foreign policy, that could be the potential area. Another point to support this point would be that for Russia, its near abroad foreign policy is really important. Its near abroad includes the former Soviet countries, basically. And what we know today, as I was mentioning earlier, so the South Caucasus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, are no longer kind of trying to be careful with Russia or trying to kind of still acknowledge that Russia is still dominant.

For example, the Armenian prime minister doesn't really go to the Collective Security Treaty Organisation in person. He goes online intentionally. There's a point in that as well. Azerbaijan in the past few years has become more kind of neutral, although it relies on a strong partnership with Türkiye today. And the same, we do see a lot of protests in Georgia. So Central Asia is the only region that Russia kind of still continues to have some sort of hope for. And with Chinese stronger influence that goes beyond economic presence, that could be the potential area these two great powers may clash. And one last point to mention is that over the last few years, China has replaced Russia in terms of trade partners for the region for all five central Asian states. I'm sure it's the case for other Global South countries as well, but since the point we're talking is about central Eurasia, that is the case. So that could be the region where they would potentially have a clash over the spheres of influence.

Sally Bulkeley

Thanks Dilnoza, there's quite a few complex power dynamics at play there that you've mentioned that have emerged over the last few years. Graeme, being on the ground in Russia and China, very keen to hear your view as well.

Graeme Meehan

I think it's very easy to see potential fault lines. And in fact, I have to confess that I've been continually wrong over the years. I keep thinking that the Russia-China relationship has reached its plateau, that it can't go any further. And again, it does. I think as long as Putin is in power and as long as he is stuck in Ukraine and consumed by the war there and his battle with the West. He will do whatever it takes to win in Ukraine. And if that means, mortgaging Russia's future to China, losing influence, even in central Asia, then he'll, he'll do it. He's in his seventies. What happens in 20 years is not his concern. What will be more interesting is a post Putin world, or a world if the Ukraine conflict was resolved, but I think that's a long way off. There's a lot of people in Russia among the elites and ordinary people who have reservations about how close Russia is becoming to China. Even before the war when we had a lot more contact with Russian officials I would talk to Russian people who worked on China are in the system. They were always very careful what they said to me, a little bit oblique, but I got the strong impression that they were uncomfortable even then in 2020, 2021 with how close Russia was moving to China and they had suspicions about China that they were, they would hint at. And that must be even more so now inside the system.

And let's not forget, there was a period in the 1990s and even into the early 2000s where in the more open political environment of the day, there was a lot of concern about China and about buying up Russia or this huge population next door to the depopulated Russian Far East or Eastern Siberia, and that suddenly hordes of Chinese would come across the border and take over the country. That sort of stuff has faded partly because it didn't happen, partly because it's a much more closed political environment in Russia where you can't really debate those things as openly. But in a post-Putin world, we don't know quite what will happen, but you could imagine a resurgence of that kind of nationalism, xenophobia, and a popular sentiment shifting quite radically against China. And let's not forget that within China there are, it's carefully controlled, but there are people you will hear talking about the bits of what's now the Russian Far East that used to belong to China and hey, that should be ours again. It's not current, but it sort of floats around there in the background and in some future somewhat different Chinese regime could come to the surface again.

So I think in the medium to long term, particularly post-Putin, there's going to be problems and issues. And as Dilnoza said, Central Asia was a prime place where that competition for power could become more acute and start pushing apart those fault lines all across the system in a whole lot of areas and stoking some resentments and suspicions that are at the moment quite latent, but they could come out after Putin. We'll see, but there's certainly plenty of potential there to rock it on its head.

Sally Bulkeley

Graeme, you make a really good point there that there are quite a few fault lines and there are quite a few what we would consider dependencies across each of them at the moment as they continue with these very different ambitions. Graham, extending on from that, how might China's Taiwan ambitions then influence the partnership with Russia? You mentioned earlier very close focus in relation to Russia-Ukraine war, but also aggression to Eurasian nations, will the Taiwan ambitions of China further exacerbate that fault line?

Graeme Meehan

I don't personally think that China is propelling imminently to bait Taiwan. It is certainly preparing the ground militarily to give the party, the communist party, the capacity to do so should it wish to in the future. But then I should say as a caveat, I didn't think that Russia would launch its full scale invasion of Ukraine until the last minute so my predictions may not be so, so reliable. China still has plenty of levers to use, to try to use against Taiwan, including influence operations, its economic influence. But supposing it did come to a conflict, it may not be a full scale invasion, it be a blockade, could be some action against those two tiny islands that belong to Taiwan that are couched, Mazu and Tiananmen that are couched up against the Chinese mainland, Fujian Province. I can't imagine Russia wanting to be involved in that at all, except to offer rhetorical support in votes in the UN or something like that. The idea that Russia would assist militarily or I've heard it argued that Russia would assist by launching an attack on NATO to distract the West. I just find that extremely far-fetched. I thank Putin may be to some extent delusional in the beliefs he holds about the West and about Ukraine, but he's not suicidal. The idea of doing something like that would be quite, I just cannot see that happening. the risk for Russia would be too great.

So that could put us, again, it's all very hypothetical, but that could put a stress on the relationship if something like that was to come to pass and China sought more active support from Russia and Russia refused, then you could imagine a bit of disappointment. But I don't think the Chinese would be foolish enough to think that they would get military assistance in that kind of action. And again, it would depend when this happened in a post-Putin world, Russia might run a mile and find that as a useful excuse to align itself more with the West if China did something as extreme as trying to invade Taiwan.

Sally Bulkeley

Thanks, Graeme. That's a very thoughtful answer. I think in considering China's Taiwan ambition, I appreciate that we're not only looking at the aspects of military escalation here, but economic resilience, societal resilience. There's a whole host of factors there that interplay with Taiwan's ambitions and how that partners with Russia. Dilnoza, I'm very keen to hear your views as well.

Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva

Yeah, I think I would totally agree with Graham's points. The support, if there is in the event of that invasion, I think the support Russia could offer would be limited to rhetorical support. Reason for this, number one, is Russia is already very much committed in its invasion of Ukraine. Russian discourse is framed that the war, although it's called it as special military operation, but the narrative is that it is a threat to the very existence of the Russian state. And I don't see Russia having capacity, militarily or economic capacity, to be able to offer support to China, doing anything in practical terms. In fact, when the crisis happened in the Middle East, I'm referring to the case of Syria, political analysts were contemplating whether Putin will be able to send support will be able to help Assad somehow before the current regime, the al-Sharaa government, came to power. And there were similar discussions when with regards to Iran as well. So, but none of them happened. Obviously there were careful diplomatic statements in relation to these two cases, but there was nothing practical other than that. Recently, Iran and Russia signed an agreement, defence agreement, right? Prior to that conflict, I mean. So I think that the support that Russia could offer would be very much limited to the rhetorical support.

Sally Bulkeley

Thank you, Dilnoza. We're running out of time at this point. It's been such a wonderful, insightful conversation. But before we leave, I was hoping that both of you wouldn't mind offering some final reflections. Graeme, is there anything that you would like to offer our listeners before we leave this podcast today?

Graeme Meehan

Thanks. So I'll just make one point that has been implicit in some of the things both of us have been saying, but that is that we talk about Russia's interests as if it was uniform. But I think there's a distinction between what's in Russia's interests and what's Putin's interests. And his interests now having got himself stuck in Ukraine are all about that. I said earlier, he'll do anything, sell anything, buy anything, he’ll do anything because he's got to win as it's vital for his political fate, his possible personal survival and his place in history as he sees it. I think we make a very strong argument that this whole invasion has not been in Russia’s interests one little bit, and becoming so beholden to China is not really in Russia’s long term interests. And we may see in a post-Putin world, a revaluation, a move of the pendulum back in the other direction. Or we may not, it's all dependent on what comes after Putin, which is itself a huge question we can hardly start going into now. But let's not assume that what's happening now will continue and let's not assume that what's in Putin's interests are in Russia's interests.

Sally Bulkeley

Thank you Graeme. Dilnoza?

Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva

Yeah, so I think that given both states are authoritarian states - although it's never written officially - in these states, the great power, the one person having all the ultimate power will remain as it is. And that's the future of all authoritarian regimes. So unless there is a change in the system, in the governance, whether it comes through the civil society or some other ways, I think that kind of approach in the foreign policy of these two states will remain as it is. Now, I might be criticized for this point that people might say that what we see in the West today is the rise of authoritarianism as well, looking at the US foreign policy to some extent. But I would like to make it clear, my point is in reference to the authoritarianism where there is no clear and open and free contested elections. That's the point I'm coming from. And I would like to also emphasize that something we probably haven't mentioned is that in traditional security studies, we always look at the hard security threats, whether it's military, economic, and other ways. But I think in the past few years, what we see is more the rise of grey zone tactics by these two powers.

And that's something I think as those who are interested in international security, national security, I think our viewers should also be aware of that, that today the threat comes mostly from grey zone tactics, whether it's information warfare, it's impacting ordinary people, particularly in the global south. That explains the popularity of some of these authoritarian leaders in the region. Obviously definitely include cyber security threats as well, but I guess my point here is more sort of impacting the minds of people through information warfare. And that impacts ordinary people, young people particularly, who are formulating their ideas and who may at some point work in the government in their own countries. So I think that's another really important point for us to be aware of the potential threats that might come from these two great powers.

Sally Bulkeley

Graeme, Dilnoza, it's been a pleasure discussing Eurasia and the China relationship with you today. Thank you very much for being part of the podcast.

Graeme Meehan

Thank you, Sal. I've enjoyed it.

Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva

Thank you for having us.

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