Transcript

How integrated is Australia’s approach to statecraft across defence, diplomacy, development and industry – and how visible is that integration to the public?

What is the strategic logic behind Australia’s expanding network of Pacific partnerships and treaties?

What are the details of the reforms to defence acquisition and how will this impact the future of Australia’s defence industry?

In this episode, Pat Conroy joins Rory Medcalf to discuss Australia’s strategic outlook, defence reform, regional engagement and the future of defence acquisition.

(This transcript is AI-generated and may contain inaccuracies.)

Pat Conroy

So we are of the Pacific and that gives us greater obligations and greater opportunities. And we take that really seriously and people understand that. So yes, there's an element of great power competition in this. I'm not going to BS your listeners about that, but ultimately we're doing this because it's our future at stake here as well.

Rory Medcalf

Welcome to the National Security Podcast. It's a pleasure to welcome back to the program the Minister for Defence Industry and the Minister for Pacific Islands Affairs, Pat Conroy, the Honourable Pat Conroy MP. It's great to have you back on the National Security Podcast.

Pat Conroy

Thanks for having me Rory.

Rory Medcalf

So we're recording this conversation on the 12th of December 2025. We're recording, as we always do, from the traditional lands of the Ngunnawal and Ngambri people and pay respects to their elders past, present and emerging. And look, Minister, I thought that since you have joined us almost precisely a year ago on the National Security Podcast, that we could have a wide-ranging conversation today.

Beginning with really your own year in review, your own view on the challenges and changes in Australia's strategic and geopolitical environment over the last 12 months that you and your government obviously need to respond to, to anticipate, that shape the challenges to the interests and values of the Australian people. So I thought perhaps to begin with, how do you see the year that was?

Pat Conroy

I think the year that was, was one of delivery interrupted or sort of punctuated by a federal election in the middle of it. So for me, I think I was reflecting listening to your post-election podcast recently and I think obviously the analysis is sound as usual. I might disagree with parts of it, but I think it was a good summation of the election campaign. And I think for our focus, it's been on delivering what we committed to. We've got this regular drum beat of policy statements, whether it's on the defence side through the national defence strategy or what I and Penny Wong have articulated on the DFAT side. So first six months was delivering on that. Then we had the election. And then because we've had continuity of both the government, but also the key personnel and key positions. We've got on with deepening those already established policy directions, whether it's on our integration in the Pacific or our deep reforms to defence to speed up delivery, to drive increased capability for the ADF and all in a situation where the strategic circumstances are equally challenging, if not more challenging than when we came to power in 22. Certainly while Ukraine was, the conflict in Ukraine had started by 22. It's got worse. We've got sort the challenge there of being a good partner to Ukraine, as well as obviously the Middle East conflict, both the Gaza-Israel conflict, but also the broader sort of instability in that region. So it's an interesting time to be a minister, but I'm really excited about the opportunities to keep delivering with a focus on continuity.

Rory Medcalf

Look, thanks for that Minister. I know that in your role, I guess it's not your day job to be a of a commentator on every security or strategic issue and that it's much more about how do we as a nation respond to and anticipate to these challenges, but it really has been an extraordinary year. I guess reflecting myself on this, not only for Australia's  interests, there have been some pretty serious implications of change in great power relations. We've got the second Trump administration in the White House. We've seen China, particularly I think in our neighbourhood, showing presence, including with military force, the Chinese Navy, making its presence felt earlier this year and perhaps again very soon. We've seen the use of force in the Middle East by the United States against Iran and we've seen the way in which the tragedy in Gaza has unfolded but also moving to some sort of tenuous efforts at peace and as you say the Ukraine conflict has, you know, that tragedy has really ground on with devastating human consequences as in Gaza, but also in the case of Ukraine and Europe with serious consequences for the UN Charter and the, really rules-based order that we once sought to uphold or perhaps we still do. So look all in all, it strikes me that this is a deteriorating strategic environment. Has there been a change, I guess, in the way government approaches the scale of the challenge.

Pat Conroy

Well, I think I'd answer it in a couple of ways. One is we do recognise the challenges that are being thrown at us and that's why we're increasing the defence budget quite significantly, including recent announcements. around the Henderson Maritime Precinct, that's why we're really ramping up our focus on our role as a middle power diplomatically, that's why we're trying to be a good global player. And I think this is a period where we've got, circumstances are pretty unique in Australia, where we've got a sort of unified foreign and national defence policy or national security policy, from the top. Like I've said this previously, I struggle to think of a time when you've got a Prime Minister, a Foreign Minister and a Defence Minister so aligned in terms of their strategic intent and their approach to things. Secondly, I can't think of a time when we've got a Foreign Minister and a Defence Minister as senior as we have now. Now we've had periods where we've had one of them as senior, the example being Lance Barnard in the Whitlam Government or Alexander Downer as Foreign Minister in the Howard government, but to have the three most senior members of the government being all national security actors and all three of them being aligned partly symbolises our seriousness, but also symbolises how serious we are taking the challenges that we're facing.

Rory Medcalf

There's a lot to unpack there and I think that one thing I know our listeners are very interested in, Minister, is the question of the integration of policy across the portfolios. At the National Security Podcast we have an audience that includes security professionals and foreign policy professionals but also we like to think a broader audience of those if you like, intelligent general listeners who are concerned about Australian policy.  And I understand that you're on the National Security Committee of Cabinet, presumably very close to those discussions about integrated policy. There is a view that it would be good to see this articulated, I guess, in a one stop or sort of single unified way in the national agenda, such as through a strategic document and some would say that maybe the National Defence Strategy covers that. But I guess what do you see as the direction of travel for that growing integration of Australian statecraft? Is there integration below the surface that we don't always see in public or are you seeing this thread more clearly conveyed in the government's public statements?

Pat Conroy

Well, I think the answer is both. I think the National Defence Strategy makes a good first attempt at that integration and it's certainly one that is worked up while it's owned by the Department of Defence, it takes a much broader view of what a national defence strategy entails. And that might go to questions of resilience and national mobilisation later, but it also recognises the power of DFAT and the importance of DFAT. That certainly also was a key finding of the defence strategic review. But you're absolutely right that at the heart of this is the National Security Committee of Cabinet. And if I reflect on my role in it. I'm the first Pacific Minister to be a full member of the National Security Committee of Cabinet. I'm happy to be corrected, but I'm the second Defence Industry Minister to be a member of Cabinet after Christopher Pine. There might be another one there, but certainly Christopher's name comes to mind. And it's rare for... It's not always the case that a Defence Industry Minister is a full and permanent member of the NSC. I'm also the first Pacific Minister to be in cabinet as well. So for me, that integration of national security is at the top of that triangle with the Prime Minister, Penny and Richard, but it even flows through to someone like me who sits across both portfolios and is a full member of NSC and cabinet, which is certainly unprecedented on the Pacific side and quite rare on the defence industry side.

Rory Medcalf

So from one NSC to another, I guess, and incidentally this is the 15th anniversary of our NSC, the National Security College.

Pat Conroy

Congratulations.

Rory Medcalf

And I should note we had the opportunity to engage with Kevin Rudd recently who as PM, had the foresight to set up this organisation. But we've seen, I guess from our vantage point, a big year for Australian statecraft. We've seen, for example, further progress in the South Pacific in this sort of pattern or trail of agreements. You've mentioned already movement on defence strategy and I think we can perhaps get to some questions later on about whether the speed and the acceleration of defence spending actually is up to the scale of the challenge. But I know there's important reforms that you're pursuing as well as all of that. I'd love to dig deeper into a couple of those issues if I may Minister and I'd begin actually with the Pacific. So let's look outwards and then perhaps come back to Australia and defence a bit later. The pattern of treaties and partnerships across the region, including I think notably with Papua New Guinea, but also beyond the Pacific into Indonesia. I was noting, I think just before I went into this conversation that today Australia's received its first migrants under the Falepili Union with Tuvalu. So, there's a lot that's happened there in 12 months. Is there a method? Is there structure? What's the logic and the purpose to all of this diplomatic activity?

Pat Conroy

Well the logic and purpose is to be the partner of choice in the Pacific. Our security since 1945 has been based on three pillars as far as I'm concerned. One is the alliance with the United States, formalised in 1951 but well in existence in 45. Second is a tenure warning horizon for a regional conflict with a peer level adversary. And third is being a partner of choice in the Southwest Pacific. The second one disappeared and we no longer have that tenure warning horizon. And the third one is under assault, every day. Both Penny and I are being very clear that we're in a permanent state of contest for influence in the Pacific. And it's my job to lead in that area, to make sure we are the partner of choice as much as possible. So that's the overarching policy agenda. Then

the two things that I'm really proud of is one is that our commitment to this area is to use every tool of statecraft to be the partner of choice. And you talked about integration across various government departments. It doesn't stop at DFAT and Defence. In every country we're mobilising, whether it's our defence relationship, our policing relationship, DFAT, ODA, permanent migration, temporary migration, sports, cultural links, whether it's First Nations or religion, we are using all those avenues to be the best partner of choice. So that's the sort of method to the madness. And then the other, other key thing I'm particularly proud of is while the Falepili Union Treaty is different from the Nauru-Australia Treaty, which is different from the Pukpuk Treaty, but the common theme is that we act on the priorities of our partners like, we turn up and listen and act on their priorities. So I was privileged to help lead the negotiations with Tuvalu and I actually received their proposal when I visited Tuvalu in August 23. And it was their request that we were acting on rather than us dictating to them what they wanted the treaty to focus on. that's the thing that I think has been a breakthrough is a genuine partnership where we listen to their priorities and then act on them. And PNG has been a long-running process, whether it's the Pukpuk Treaty, the bilateral security agreement, the rugby league deal, which was instrumental in that, as well as the budget support. And we've signalled our intention to pursue other agreements. Nakamal with Vanuatu is obviously still bubbling away and we've initiated discussions with Fiji on elevating our relationship there as well

Rory Medcalf

So my next question was going to be what can we expect next, but it sounds like that, you know, as well as those agreements that are already bedded down, there are others that are in the works. Is there anything else you can say today about what to expect in 2026 in this space?

Pat Conroy

Well, think a key thing or two things is one, delivery. We have to implement what we've agreed to, otherwise we lose credibility with our partners. So the Falepili Treaty has a number of historic parts of it and we need to implement all of them. And then there's our broader Pacific agenda, which is sort of not limited to one country. So we've also had our first cohort of migrants under the Pacific engagement visa, the first time we've allocated a section of our permanent migration intake to a specific region to build the diaspora there. Or whether there's our ongoing work to continue to have the Pacific Islands Forum as the central architecture for the whole region. And we're looking forward to the PIF in Palau in 2016 to really advance things, whether it's the Pacific Policing Initiative or the Pacific Response Force, a multinational security force designed principally around disaster relief. So we'll have our bilateral advances, but we'll also have a multinational approach to the Pacific reflecting our concerted enthusiastic participation in the PIF.

Rory Medcalf

So you say delivery is an absolute, big priority for 2026. And I think looking at the scale of what Australia is taking on here with these agreements, and I would focus particularly on PNG, again, because of what a substantial nation that is, surely there's risk in not getting the delivery right. I mean, whether it's in areas like recruitment into the ADF, whether it's in the question of ensuring that with the mobility and migration and so forth arrangements that we're not, if you like, inadvertently taking too much talent from the region. How do you see those challenges?

Pat Conroy

Well they're there and and we need to be cognisant of it and we have to mobilise the whole government to deliver this and there's huge buy in on that. In terms of the dangers of brain drain in the Pacific, that's why we're very deliberate in how we design things. So for example, the Pacific engagement visa, we deliberately designed to have a random ballot feature in it so that a heart surgeon has as much chance of winning the migration pathway as a year 12 school leaver. And that's really important to avoid brain drain. And that was controversial at the time. The opposition opposed that even though we put it in to directly address one of the key concerns of our Pacific partners. So, deliberate design features to avoid risk and then making sure we deliver on it is the of the key thing. It's one of my jobs as a sort of one of the coordinating minister for this entire area is to be the early warning siren for across multiple departments. When I'm speaking to a minister from another country, it's my job to relay that to the bureaucracy, hold on, we've got problems in this area. How do we focus on that?

Rory Medcalf

So eagle-eyed focus, but there is a big strategic vision and I think you've been quite upfront about the permanent contest for influence and the Foreign Minister has articulated that previously very explicitly as a contest for influence with China in the neighbourhood, in the region. One criticism that has been expressed not only about the engagement or the partnerships with the South Pacific but also with Indonesia and efforts to build partnerships in Southeast Asia is that this is really Australia putting its diplomacy at the service of so-called US primacy in the region rather than some sort of independent Australian position. What's your view on that?

Pat Conroy

look, I reject that utterly. This is about our relationship with these countries and it's about our partnerships with the region and we're uniquely placed. Unlike whether it's China or the United States or other nations, we're a member of the PIF. We're a member of the Pacific family. Four kilometres separates us from PNG. We've got 100,000 Australians of Samoan heritage living in Australia. So we are of the Pacific and that gives us greater obligations and greater opportunities. And we take that really seriously and people understand that. So yes, there's an element of great power competition in this. I'm not going to BS your listeners about that, but ultimately we're doing this because it's our future at stake here as well. Our prosperity and our security is dependent upon prosperity and security of the Pacific, regardless of what other countries are doing. And that guides my actions and it guides our government's actions.

Rory Medcalf

And it's about the communities in the region, right? mean, to what extent is this about ensuring that our partners, our neighbours are prepared and resilient against a range of shocks, not only the question of great power relations?

Pat Conroy

Oh, absolutely, I've made this case. One of the reasons I was given the international development portfolio as well in opposition in 2019 and then in 2022 is I have one of the electorates where there's probably a higher level of scepticism about foreign aid, for example. And when I'm making the case for foreign aid, and particularly in our region, I say even if you're not, even if you don't regard us as having a moral obligation to lift people out of poverty, which I do actually think it was always dangerous having politicians talk about morality, but I actually do think we have a moral obligation to do it.

Rory Medcalf

It's tough in this day and age.

Pat Conroy

It is, is. But even if you put aside altruism, we want to see the end of TB, sorry, drug resistance, tuberculosis in PNG. We don't want to see polio coming back to our region. That impacts us as well. Having instability and insecurity on our doorstep can only, will affect us, will impact on us. And so even if you don't care about the rest of the Pacific as fellow human beings or acknowledge our colonial past and the legacy of things like Blackbirding, which means we have an obligation to the people of Vanuatu, for example, and other Pacific nations. But even if you ignore all that, we don't want an unstable region, a region which is incredibly young in terms of the average age, we don't want them with health issues with pandemics, with mass unemployment driving civil war. We just don't want that in our region.

 

 

Rory Medcalf

We talked about preparedness and resilience, whether it's in our region or domestically, so let's bring the conversation back to that. And I guess at this point I want to put in a shameless plug for some work that the College is doing in that space. So we're conducting consultations around the Australian community on really the way a broad cross-section of Australians thinks about security, but the bigger preparedness and resilience picture as well. And when we’ll be launching our findings at a conference. in March next year. Perhaps we can hope to see you there, Minister.

Pat Conroy

Sure. Sure.

Rory Medcalf

But what's your view on how prepared Australia is, or I might put it in different way, what's your view on how the agenda of preparedness and resilience against the whole range of security shocks is evolving in Australia as a priority or as an agenda item for your government?

Pat Conroy

Well, it's evolving, I think, if I can start at the sort top level. It's one where everyone recognises we have a challenge and everyone is trying to think about what are the entry points to attack it. The National Defence Strategy was intentionally called National Defence, because we're saying it has to go beyond the Department of Defence. You have to talk about things like fuel security, have to talk about industrial mobilization, you have to talk about critical minerals and the strategic supply chains. And it's a work in progress. I think it's a challenge for a bureaucracy, quite frankly, that sort of, from my point of view, from the mid-90s onwards, early 90s onwards, embraced neoliberal economic thinking too much, both from a sort of economic rationalist approach, but secondly, a post-Cold War sort of laziness about the interconnected nature of the world. And we can't rely on those tired old clichés. We have to invest in our sovereignty and our resilience. You just have to look at sort of the challenges of the munitions industry during the Ukraine conflict to everyone's day-to-day experiences of trying to get toilet paper during COVID to understand that global supply chains are fragile. They're easily interrupted and we need to make a really strong effort to understand and invest in our own supply chain resilience. And in my area of defence industry, you're talking about shameless plugs, I'll do a shameless plug. We're tackling that right now through the Guided Weapons Explosive Ordnance Enterprise. I opened our first missile factory only last week in Port Wakefield. We started production of missiles right this week and we've got two more factories to build.

We're doing rapid work around both building drones and autonomous platforms as well as counter drone defences and all of those are moving at speed to recognize the sovereignty implications of global conflicts. But we need to do more and we need to mobilize bureaucracy that sometimes has grappled with this. And we also have to understand that we need to invest upfront to build the sovereignty, even if it appears on paper more expensive, because the payoff is in the back end. That's why we committed to continuous naval shipbuilding in WA and South Australia, even though a lot of commentators say it's cheaper to build, buy these ships off the shelf somewhere else. A, there isn't really a shelf overseas. There's not a showroom where can buy 11 frigates. But we're recognising that to build that sovereignty does involve a bigger upfront investment, but the payoff is that independence, that regularity of demand that allows a workforce to be built and those skills assembled.

Rory Medcalf

Well I do note we've got this very good partnership evolving with the Japanese and that will involve, if you like, Japan providing the Mogami frigates at pace at an early stage before the build in Australia. I mean, how do you see the balance of the international and the domestic there?

Pat Conroy

Well, it's being pragmatic. We're the first government to have committed to continuous naval shipbuilding in WA, to complement continuous naval shipbuilding in Adelaide, and it's about getting a steady stream of work to build up the workforce. So the workforce there starts with landing craft medium, then building landing craft heavy before the onshore of the Megami class frigates. And we made a controversial decision to source those first three frigates in that 11 ship class from Japan. And we did that because we needed them yesterday because of sort of 10 years of inaction by the last government around ANZAC class replacement. And so we are getting the first three vessels from the extant production line. And Japan has been very generous to give production slots that were owned by the Japanese maritime Self Defence Force . Now, without getting into detailed negotiations, we haven't asked them, but I have a strong suspicion. It was a.. they were comfortable giving us three, I don't think they're going to give us 11, even if we weren't committed to building continuous naval shipbuilding in our country. So it's about a pragmatic approach where we build up the workforce through the landing craft projects, get the first three vessels as quickly as possible to replace the ANZAC class frigates, and then shift production to here as the centrepiece for continuous naval shipbuilding.

Rory Medcalf

Now that we're fully in defence industry mode, we've moved away from the Pacific Islands side of your role, Minister. Let's talk about what you're seeking to achieve through defence capability acquisition reform. I mean, to put it in plain English, the establishment of effectively a defence delivery agency, a big announcement that you made just recently. Look, It would be great for our listeners to give a clear sense of the what and the why and the why now and then perhaps we can just go to a few of the questions or critiques that have been made about how effective this is going to be.

Pat Conroy

Sure, so there's two really significant announcements we made last weekend. I'd love to explain to your listeners later when we get into the detail about why they are the most significant reforms to defence in 50 years, because there's a bit of scepticism out there, but I'd like to get into that. There's two interrelated problems. One's around capability development and one's capability delivery. If I go to the latter one first, capability delivery, there's been a couple of challenges. First, the one defence reforms that the last government put in place, I think, in this area have been a disaster. The Abbott Commission of Audit recommended that defence no longer be a project management organisation but simply be a contract management organisation. That led to stripping out of thousands of positions in the sort of project delivery side of defence, a loss of any vague independence for that part of defence that used to reside in what's called the Defence Material Organization and a reintegration into defence. So that meant that we didn't have defence as skilled and educated customer as it could be for defence industry, which meant that it outsourced project management to the private sector.

And that has led to some of the schedule delays and problems that we faced where 28 major projects running 97 years late was what we inherited in 22. So very significant. So we had a defence organisation that didn't have the size, didn't have all the skills it needed and didn't have the autonomy as a project management organisation. And there's some great people in defence doing this work, but there weren't enough of them. They weren't independent enough and they had short rotation cycles, for example, ADF officers being there for only a couple of years rather than having longer term careers. So the Defence Delivery Agency is revolutionary because we're going to be moving out the three key delivery arms, the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group, the Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Group and the Guided Weapons Group into the Defence Delivery Agency. It will be independent of defence.

It will be led by the National Armaments Director who will report directly to the two ministers, the Defence Minister and myself, and it will have direct financial control. It will be responsible for its own budget. And when government approves projects, what is normally called second pass, the budget transfers to this organisation to control. That means they can get on with being efficient project managers and delivering these projects at pace. And effectively, Defence becomes the customer, where the National Armaments Director signs a contract with Defence saying, yes, I'll deliver these 11 frigates for this price at this schedule. And Defence is the customer and the DDA's job is to deliver the capability there. So they have the autonomy and the ability to do that. Linked to that by delinking it from Defence, we reduce the chances of changes being made to projects. Changes are death to large Defence procurements.

You just have to look at the challenges of the Hunter Class project in Australia or projects overseas. So by having this separation, it makes it harder for well meaning people within the defence bureaucracy to change projects. Anyone who's built a house knows if you change something post signing the contract with a builder, you add schedule and you add cost. So that's the first really important reform. The second one is capability development where again, the first principal reforms in 2014-15, were really problematic. They devolved capability development to each of the services rather than having it united under the centre of defence. We're centralising it, we're even more professionalising it and we're adding more discipline in a group under most likely the vice chief of the defence force. So that's about imposing greater professionalisation in how we set the requirements so that that can then flow through to decision making.

Rory Medcalf

It sounds good, but one of the critiques of course is that this harks back to the old Defence Material Organisation with its strengths and its weaknesses but also there's the question of how quickly can this change be enacted? What does early success look like? Where will we be in six months, 12 months, a year or two in this fast-changing strategic environment?

Pat Conroy

Yeah, well on the first question, this is very unlike the DMO and anyone who says that it's DMO 2.0 is either being mischievous or doesn't understand defence procurement because the two key differences is that the head of this won’t report to the secretary and the CDF of Defence, they will be independent of Defence and report to me and the Defence Minister. So that autonomy is critical. And the second thing is they will have control over the budget. Anyone who understands the bureaucracy or any large organization, whoever controls the budget is the king. So they need to control the budget. Having been an advisor when we're last in government watching the DMO up close, it didn't have the autonomy and it didn't control the budget. And therefore it didn't have the power to be a good project manager. And that's the critical differences from the DMO. And it's why quite frankly, both the Canard review under Howard and the Mortimer review under Rudd recommended this model, but in the end, neither government could come quite at it. So they're two critical differences that I think increase the chances of success.

 In terms of what early success looked like, we've been very deliberate in how we've designed this in that at the moment, these three delivery agencies are tasked with delivering $35 billion worth of projects per annum. So They've got to keep their focus on delivering those projects as we roll them out into the new defence delivery agencies. So first off, we're designing the detailed implementation plan right now. We've announced the principles. We've got a task force working on the details right now consulting with industry consulting stakeholders. The three groups will be combined within Defence on the 1st July 26 and then rolled out as their own autonomous organization on the 1st of July, 27. Some people say that's too slow. I think those people misunderstand or don't understand the scale of what we're asking. We're moving six and a half thousand people as well as recruiting senior leadership potentially from outside the organization, as well as moving all those projects. We've got to do this deliberately and with attention to detail. And that is a key focus here.

Rory Medcalf

Are there lessons from the experience of the Australian Submarine Agency.

Pat Conroy

Well, I think one of the lessons there is that there was a scale of challenge there of standing up a completely new agency from the ground up, getting the IT systems, getting the reporting systems done at the same time as delivering the very significant AUKUS projects. So there are certainly lessons there that have educated us, informed us on how we're designing this, which is a gradual process, but this is the most significant reforms to defence in 50 years. We're taking 6,500 positions out of defence and we're taking  40 % up around just under 40 % of the defence budget and putting it into an autonomous organisation. That is huge.

Rory Medcalf

In terms of the leadership, National Armaments Director, I mean that will be one of the more important jobs in the country, be an absolutely critical role. What's the profile there that you're looking for?

Pat Conroy

Without getting into the weeds of the recruitment, what I want is someone who has a demonstrated record of leading large organizations and a demonstrated record of delivering large-scale procurements. So it could be someone within the Defence industry, could be someone within the existing Defence apparatus, or it could be someone from a completely separate sector that deals with complex projects. So the resources sector is another area that will be scouring closely or the large engineering sector. We're talking about someone who day in, day out manages multi-billion dollar projects because one of the challenges in this area is that 15 years ago, these three delivery groups, 27 % of their projects were complex in nature using the sort of ACAT characterization. now it's close to 60 % of their projects are complex in nature. So the level of complexity has gone up, the number of staff doing it has gone down, and that's led to many of challenges we're facing now.

Rory Medcalf

What’s to watch closely in the agenda in 2026, whether it's on the Pacific or defence industry. We'll need to wrap up. It's been, I think, a really illuminating conversation, Minister. I wanted to just close by going back to some of the things we talked about actually a year ago, a little bit more, maybe not philosophically, but sort of conceptually thinking about what does a national security agenda look like for a very explicitly progressive government? You know, there is a view that national security is more of the home territory of the conservative side of politics. Of course, if you look at Australian history, that hasn't always been the case. So I'd be interested just to, perhaps before we close, unpack a little bit more of your thinking about how you think about national security from your political orientation.

Pat Conroy

Now, I appreciate that. And I gave a speech recently reflecting on the history of Australian security policy at a political level, and I couldn't help but note, for example, Menzies history of Nazi appeasement even after World War II started.

Rory Medcalf

I wasn't that well, that's bit pointier than I was expecting but go ahead. There'll be pushback on that from others.

Pat Conroy

Yeah, yeah. I'm pointy by nature. the fact I do, well,

Rory Medcalf

There will be pushback on that from others

Pat Conroy

I do remind colleagues that he wrote a letter to Stanley Bruce 10 days after Poland was invaded, arguing that a peace deal should be done with Hitler. So this view that his appeasement stopped in 1938 is just factually wrong. Now, why do I raise this other than a bit of gratuitous political partisanship, is that it infuriates me that there's a that there's a view that conservatives or reactionaries own the national security space. They do not. And you weren't suggesting that you're actually asking me for my views, but it gives me the ear aches big time because it doesn't, isn't reflected in the history of our country and it's not reflected in our approach. And one of the things I loved about the federal election was the Prime Minister introducing this concept of progressive patriotism. Which hopefully gets a bit more attention over the next three years as people see practical manifestations of it. So for me, progressive patriotism is about being proudly a country that supports UN, supports our position as a middle power who's proudly engaged in international diplomacy, is a proud alliance member and we've entered into our third alliance ever with the PUKPUK Treaty, but also proudly stands on our own two feet. By investing in our own supply chain sovereignty and our reliance and our self reliance. So whether it's investing in Australian made missiles or strategic minerals, sometimes in partnership with others or by ourselves, it's saying proudly, we're not going to hide or run away from the national security debates. We're going to own them.

And we're going to own them through concepts like progressive patriotism or the PM's conscious rejection of this obsession with measuring how serious you are about national security as a measurement of percentage of GDP budget expenditure, being very focused on make the case for capabilities and then you win the budget support rather than the other way around. And I think you can see more of that over the next year. And it's something that I'm really enthusiastic about, which is that we've got an opportunity that is rare for federal governments to really embark on change in this area. For example, by the end of this term, subject to the PMs being satisfied with our performance, Richard Marrs will be the longest running Defence Minister since Jim Killen in the late 70s. I'll be the longest running Defence Industry or Defence Supply Minister since 1950. That gives you huge authority to make change and reform the organisation because you're the constant rather than the people that you're dealing with being the constant. And you can expect us to then start imprinting that progressive patriotic approach into our national security approach.

Rory Medcalf

That's a really useful way to wrap up the conversation. think certainly others have commented on the stability of this government, that sense of continuity. It also carries a burden of expectation, of course, but you're all deeply aware of that. Two just closing thoughts from me, if I may. One is, I think you mentioned earlier about the journey the bureaucracy has been on, and certainly my sense is there is a national security bureaucracy that's really ready for an agenda of national preparedness and to enact that agenda in a way that's consistent with this progressive patriotism, this agenda of the government. The second is the issue of resourcing and the point of course is well taken that the case needs to be made for capability and the structures to accelerate capability, development and delivery and so on need to be in place. But I suspect we're in a strategic environment where the demand for Australia to commit more resources to security is only going to grow. So look, that's a final comment from me, Minister. I want to thank you very much for being with us on the National Security Podcast. Hope you do get a little time to breathe and reflect and perhaps even a bit of downtime over the summer holidays. But thanks for joining us on the podcast.

Pat Conroy

My pleasure and Merry Christmas to all your listeners as well.

Rory Medcalf

Thank you.