Transcript

What is the ‘foreign policy reset’ undertaken by New Zealand’s National government, and how does it differ from the previous Labour government’s approach?  

How can New Zealand and Australia strengthen their alliance to face shared security challenges, amidst US uncertainty and strategic competition with China?  

How have recent Chinese activities in the Tasman Sea and the wider Pacific been viewed in New Zealand compared to Australia? What impact are these activities having on New Zealanders’ perceptions of China?  

In this episode, David Capie and Nicholas Khoo join David Andrews to unpack New Zealand’s shifting foreign and defence policy, its approach to China, AUKUS, and its relationship with Australia. 

(This transcript is AI-generated and may contain inaccuracies.)

Nicholas Khoo

There's a lot of damage that's been done by the Trump administration in respect to foreign policy, specifically in the Indo-Pacific and also more generally.

David Capie

And I think they're hoping that despite the disruption and the churn, that we might get to a point where something like a more orthodox Indo-Pacific strategy from the United States emerges and we'll just have to wait and see.

National Security Podcast

You're listening to the National Security Podcast, the show that brings you expert analysis, insights and opinion on the national security challenges facing Australia and the Indo-Pacific produced by the ANU National Security College.

David Andrews

Welcome to the National Security Podcast. I'm David Andrews, Senior Manager for Policy and Engagement at the ANU National Security College. Today's podcast is being recorded on the lands of the Ngunnawal and Ngambri people, and I pay my respects to their elders past and present.

This week I'm joined by Professor David Capie and Associate Professor Nicholas Khoo to take a look at the present state of Australia's oldest alliance and to better understand how the current state of world order is being seen from New Zealand.

David Capie is Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations at Victoria University of Wellington. He was regional co-chair of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific from 2020 until 2022 and was a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum Experts in Eminent Persons group from 2012 to 2019. And perhaps most importantly, he's an ANU alumnus.

Nicholas Khoo is an Associate Professor of International Politics at the University of Otago and a non-resident Principal Research Fellow at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Affairs based in Christchurch. David, Nick, welcome to the National Security Podcast.

David Capie

Pleasure.

Nicholas Khoo

Thank you.

David Andrews

Well, it's been a little while since we last talked specifically about New Zealand on the podcast. And so I thought it'd be a good chance while we're here to start our conversation with a bit of status update, a check on how things are in federal politics in New Zealand and how that sort of shapes the relationship. So there was a change of government in October 2023 from Labour to National in coalition with New Zealand First and ACT or ACT.

New Zealand. So we have a centre-right coalition party in government with Labour in opposition. David, if I could start with you, perhaps, could you give me a sense of what are the key foreign policy priorities of the government? How have things changed from where they were under Labour? And have there been any sort of advancements or indeed walkbacks on policies that were established in those previous years of government?

David Capie

Yeah, well, thanks, David. It's really nice to have the chance to chat. I mean, I think the 2023 election was definitely not fought on foreign policy. It was not a part of the election. was mostly fought on domestic pocketbook cost of living issues. But I think one of the changes that has become clear since the coalition government took office is a different approach to foreign policy in particular.

I mean, I think with a country like New Zealand, there's a strong degree of continuity, but there's been some important shifts. And in fact, the government likes to talk about what it calls having introduced a foreign policy reset.

So what's the foreign policy reset? I think it's got a couple of different dimensions. One is leaning into New Zealand's relationships with what are called its traditional partners. And here that's a kind of code language, essentially, not just for the formal alliance relationship with Australia, but also with those other Five Eyes partners. And so the government, I think, was somewhat critical of the previous government for being a bit cautious about talking about Five Eyes, talking about how it framed its relationship with the United States. And this government clearly wanting to lean in, particularly into the Australia relationship, but also those traditional partnerships.

I think there's also a very heavily Indo-Pacific flavour to the foreign policy reset. So what we've seen from Foreign Minister Peters, who's now in his third term in the job, and also the Prime Minister and other ministers as well, is a lot of attention to Indo-Pacific partners. So a lot of attention to ASEAN, for example, a lot of travel across Southeast Asia, importance on the Japan relationship, and also the Korea relationship, and also a really significant focus on India. There's a significant economic attention there, but also a recognition that there needs to be a broader strategic relationship with India as well. And then finally, I think that the other thing about the foreign policy reset that's a little bit different is I think there's a heavier sort of security weight to it, strategic weight in terms of how New Zealand has framed its relationships with the Indo-Pacific in particular. And so we've seen, for example, not only have we seen more attention to Southeast Asia, but we've seen a heavy focus in some of the joint statements that have come out to the importance of security and defence issues.

With the Philippines, for example, you've seen the conclusion of a logistics agreement and then just recently a status of forces agreement. With Japan, the conclusion stepping up there in terms of presence and working with Japan on things like North Korean sanctions enforcement, stepping up of the deployment on the Korean Peninsula.

And also, you're looking to do more in arrangements like NATO IP4. There is degree of continuity. It's not day and night. There's a lot of longstanding New Zealand interests that are still where there's continuity. But there is also some significant change as well.

David Andrews

Does that track with your assessment Nick? there things you'd agree with or disagree with or want to highlight?

Nicholas Khoo

Yeah, yeah, I would agree with David very much so, which then raises the very important question, which we will only have to see if a new government would come in to power and is from the Labour Party. So we can't really know. So it's important change that David has described and so important that one does have in one's mind this idea of, well, will it be continued as we move ahead in a possible Labour government? Now, obviously, this is something that is critical for our national security because the ability to maintain a consensus position will be watched by many countries, including China.

And because international relations is basically about strategic interaction, we can't assume, neither should we expect, that there won't be some sort of reaction from China. But obviously we can talk about that slightly later on. So I'd agree with David. It's in many respects a welcome development because as we know, the international environment is only getting more more competitive as seen by recent events in the Middle East. And of course, in respect to East Asia, there's plenty going on, on the ground, so to speak, perhaps not as high profile as what we're seeing in the Middle East, but certainly there are changes that are going on even as we speak.

David Andrews

So noting, as you say, Nick, that there's that question over whether there would be continuity between the two major parties of government if there were a change of government at the next election. Has there been a change of policy or assessment by Labour in opposition? The thing that comes to mind for me most is there was a lot of talk around AUKUS Pillar 2, sort of around the last election. And at the time, if I recall correctly, the Labour government was notionally supportive or at least not opposed to potential involvement in Pillar 2, but now in opposition has said that it wouldn't be. Is that correct or have there been other shifts in that kind of direction?

Nicholas Khoo

Yes, that would be correct. That's to my mind, the big change, the issue of AUKUS and Labour's position on it. Now, having said all of that, as we will all understand and know, AUKUS is a symptom of a larger security challenge that the region faces. Regardless of Australia's posture on AUKUS, New Zealand's posture on AUKUS, the larger question of the instability in the security arena is simply going to carry on. So, in many respects, while AUKUS is a very important aspect of the development of the security situation, the point is that fundamentally it's an unstable international environment. And that's where New Zealand has the...kind of deal with this situation together with Australia and its other partners. And this is where moving forward, you know, the whole issue of consensus in foreign policy, it's simply now an open question, at least for me, in terms of New Zealand being able to reach consensus. And in that respect, your question, AUKUS, highlights the fact that we're really beginning to see differences of opinion. So for example, Prime Minister Luxon will be visiting China this week. And just ahead of his visit, there's been a advocacy advertisement put out by none other than former Prime Minister Helen Clark, Geoffrey Palmer, Sir David Carter, Don Brash, Carl Worker, David Mahon. And they're basically disagreeing with the current policy that is adopted by the coalition. So we're already beginning to see...major changes in respect to foreign policy that previously would not have been as stark possibly.

David Andrews

David, do you think, continuing this theme, that all that kind of that more security oriented foreign policy approach that you've outlined, and noting, as Nick said, that there's this broader instability in the international order, do you get the sense that there would be a level of continuity? Or do you think that these decisions are driven by politics rather than, maybe not rather than, but in addition to that sort of big international assessment?

David Capie

Yeah, I mean, look, as I said before, think that there are, there's no doubt that this government has introduced some changes of emphasis and approach to the previous government. But I think there is a huge amount of continuity there. And in fact, if you look back at a whole lot of the strategy reports and documents that have laid out in some ways, the kinds of things that this government has pushed for in its foreign policy approach they strangely enough actually came out towards the end of the Labour government. They came out in July and August 2023. And I think that government put them out. It was it was at a time in which that government was pretty very much preoccupied with its own re-election and domestic issues. And this government came in and I think has grabbed them and sort of embraced them with more enthusiasm. And I think in some ways that just speaks to the fact that there are these strong underlying common interests that sustain New Zealand foreign policy. I mean, think AUKUS is an interesting question. At the moment, any connection to Pillar 2 seems to be somewhat hypothetical. The previous government's position was to explore what it might mean. The current government's position seems to be we're interested in exploring what it might mean.

One, you get the feeling looked at it as if the glass was half empty, perhaps three quarters empty. One looks at it as if the glass is half full, perhaps three quarters full. What that actually means in the context of the upheaval and disruption coming out of the United States is the present government is also not anxious, it seems to me, to play up the rush to make any decisions. Prime Minister Luxon said the other day, well, we're looking into this, but it's moving very, very slowly.

So, I think we can, you know, there are these differences. There's no doubt about it, but I don't think we want to overstate them either.

David Andrews

Given we've just mentioned AUKUS and President Trump in the United States, I might stick with that theme of the third leg of our alliance sort of trilateral with Australia and New Zealand in the United States. There's been some new data coming out in recent days showing that sort of Australian trust in Trump is something like sort of negative 77 with sort of 22 % saying they do trust him. So it’s a pretty damning figure. I think it's the of the countries they surveyed in Asia, so Japan, Korea, Australia, perhaps India as well, we were by far the lowest. Now, New Zealand wasn't included in that list. But I assume that there would probably be a similar outlook. I mean, how are things perceived when it comes to the US relationship in New Zealand? I mean, yes, a more conservative party of government with a Republican administration, but I suspect that that doesn't necessarily carry through into perceptions of trust and confidence that relationship.

David Capie

Yeah, I mean, think President Trump is extremely unpopular in New Zealand, as he is in many of those places that you mentioned. And I think New Zealanders tend to think about the relationship with the United States sort of refracted through the lens of the presidency. So I think that has clearly, the tide has gone out in terms of public opinion for seeking that closer relationship with the United States. But in terms of the government's position, I mean, I think they're hoping, I mean, obviously, clearly the first four months of the administration, we've seen a whole lot of shifts that have been damaging for New Zealand's interests. Whether you think about New Zealand being tariffed and having steel tariffs on that were from the Biden and Trump one actually, a whole lot of shifts in terms of US engagement in the Pacific that are concerning, the shift on Ukraine. All those things are consequential in terms for New Zealand's national interests. But I think the government would probably say, I mean, this Foreign Minister Peters has used the line, let's wait for the dust to settle. And I think they're hoping that despite the disruption and the churn, that we might get to a point where something like a more orthodox Indo-Pacific strategy from the United States emerges and we'll just have to wait and see. And in the meantime, I think a whole lot of connections that sustain the US-New Zealand relationship have gone on just almost as normal. For example, the USS Blue Ridge was in Wellington just a few weeks ago. So some of those connections are here. I definitely don't want to underplay the level of disruption and unpredictably and uncertainty and the challenge that what we're seeing presents. But I think that public opinion on the one hand and what the government actually hopes to do might be not quite in the same place.

Nicholas Khoo

Yeah, you know, I would underscore what David is saying. And I guess I would then zoom out and say that, you know what, Trump really is an exceptional president. mean, he's so exceptional that you almost need to bracket him and say, you know, this is a severe challenge to New Zealand, to Australia, to really the international system. In many respects, it's a case of just having to kind of wait out this presidency and see what happens. And I suspect, and obviously we'll never know, we'll only know when we get to the new presidency in four years time, because as you know, Trump can't run again. And then see how things develop from that point on. And this is where we really need to come back to what...American interests are. And those are long established, well established. It's basically about ensuring stability in the Indo-Pacific arena. And this is where Trump has actually done the opposite. And let's be absolutely clear, there's a lot of damage that's been done by the Trump administration in respect to foreign policy, specifically in the Indo-Pacific and also more generally. And I don't even believe the United States has done itself many favours.

So this is a systemic challenge to all allies and partners and friends of the United States ranging from Singapore through Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, et cetera, et cetera. And it's a great challenge. what else can we say other than, you know, this is a, it's not a great time for the Western Alliance, certainly.

David Andrews

I think that a lot of people in Australia probably also trying to keep their heads down a little bit. But we are presently in the sights of the White House and the Pentagon with regard to defence spending, particularly. ⁓ And I think that's an area where maybe the focus isn't as much on New Zealand. But nonetheless, there's been a big increase in defence spending in New Zealand in recent of announcements. The a new defence capability plan was announced only I think about a month or so ago, maybe less, which is forecasting an increase of up to more than 2 % of GDP over the next eight years, and an additional $9 billion of new spending, which I think is something that has been pretty warmly received in Australia.

It's nice to see that kind of focus. And of course, like we say, are different baselines, I guess, we're starting from in the domestic political scene, but that's been a positive change there. This is one thing maybe a little bit more speculative on my part, but I think there's a maybe an opportunity for countries like ours to work together in sort of multi-lateral fora to complement that work or to, you can't replace the United States, of course, you no matter if you had Australia and New Zealand and Japan and Korea and others together, you still can't replace them in aggregate, but it doesn't mean you do nothing. And I think there's a sense that maybe there's a chance for us to pursue forms of multilateral diplomacy or reform to try and underpin those structures of world order that are being undermined. And David spoke about a big focus on India and Southeast Asia from the government and things we can talk about things like the CPTPP as a trade forum as well, but it does seem like maybe whether it's the way we can keep our heads down on the bilateral sense, but still take collective action to try and address some of those challenges. I'm not sure that's just a speculative point on my part. I'm not sure that you've seen anything that might resonate with that kind of approach from New Zealand at this stage.

David Capie

Yeah, no, think that's right. The government's probably approach has been to invest. As I said, I mean, there's a lot of emphasis right now on the Australia relationship. It seems to me that this level of uncertainty and disorder globally that you want to get close to your closest friends and New Zealand's hugely fortunate that our closest neighbour is our best friend. But there's also a looking at how you can try and build ensure up some of the parts of that international order in ways that who you can work with to defend the principles that are really important. And on trade, for example, there's been some preliminary conversations. So the prime minister made a series of calls a month or so ago to a number of leaders about what are the possibilities for working together to look at how you can shore up some of these international trade rules. And there's been talk about, for example, a connection between European Union and CPTPP. Now, I think there's a lot of complications there. But essentially, states that even if you can't talk about joining, that there's some shared understanding of why having rules and predictability in international trade and openness is really valuable. I think one of the other things that's quite interesting is the way...New Zealand, I think, has been a little slow to the minilateral game, particularly on the security side. It's been innovative and creative on the economic side with Deeper and climate change and sustainability and digital trade and so on. But on the security side, it sort of found it's outside of some of this minilateral frameworks. And there, I think there's some hope that IP4, that connection with Australia, Japan and Korea could be creative. But also just, I'm seeing longstanding arrangements. Like for example in Southeast Asia, FPDA for example, that have been there, have been comfortable, a quiet achiever is sometimes cool, but suddenly those sets of relationships have an added value in a time of real disruption and turmoil.

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David Andrews

The China relationship for New Zealand. It's one that Australia has put a lot of attention into ⁓ itself over many years now. Over the best part of decade, that's been a more security-oriented perspective, you might say, on China from Australia. There's been a lot of focus on not just the military build-up, but concerns around political interference or espionage, foreign interference, things of that nature.

Nick, you obviously have a great deal of China expertise, that's where all of your research is focused. How are perceptions of that relationship in New Zealand? Are there key concerns that have emerged? Is it similar to Australia? Are there different examples of what's happening on the ground?

Nicholas Khoo

No, I think it's different. mean, in having said that it's different, there are clearly some similarities, right? I mean, at the kind of broad international level, both New Zealand and Australia want to actually engage with China. They would like China to be a contributor to security in the region, at least in the way they define it. So in that sense, there are similarities in the broad sense. But at the end of the day, New Zealand is not a formal alliance partner of the United States, and that does mean that there are differences.

So I would point out to the fact that there is a sharp difference of opinion emerging in New Zealand in respect to China. And so this would be represented by some in the Labour Party as opposed to those in the coalition. And we're seeing this to begin...to emerge now. And who really knows how this will evolve? But the fact of the matter is there are differences of opinion that are rather sharp. And certainly, as I indicated before, there was an advertisement taken out by a number of former New Zealand government officials, including Helen Clark, that to me at least suggests that there is a difference of opinion. And very, very interestingly enough, is that last year, the Chinese ambassador to New Zealand basically intervened in our discussion and internal debate on AUKUS. And to me, that's quite an interesting development, to put it mildly. And so it suggests that moving forward, used to be this sense that politics stops at the water's edge. And I'm getting a little concerned that that may not hold in the future moving forward.

Let's certainly track this situation, but it does suggest that the China issue is emerging as a potential issue in New Zealand politics and therefore something that should be of interest and concern for the bilateral alliance between Australia and New Zealand. And certainly should be the subject of close discussion moving forward.

David Capie

Can I just jump in on that, David? I think that if you look at the issues that worry Australia in the China context, almost all of those issues are concerning to New Zealand too. Cybersecurity, foreign interference. We our security agencies call out China, express concerns about their foreign interference problem. South China Sea, for New Zealand, huge EZ maritime domain. Respect for those rules is really important. The Pacific, that's a really...you know, crucial issue, economic coercion. list goes, you know, if you went down that list for Australia, you could take every single concern would be for New Zealand as well. I mean, I think there is, there's clearly a different sense. New Zealand's a, you know, a smaller country and a different set of resources and different strategic geography. And how it responds is different. But I think, but that's more of a tone perhaps. But I think this is government again has made it quite clear that it wants to feel able and willing to speak up and express those differences and not just say things but do more. So for example, multilateral exercises in the South China Sea and so on. And I think the domestic differences, it's hard to know just how deep those are. I think there's a lot of commonality and common interests there. Again, those strategic documents that came out that expressed a lot of these concerns came out at the end of the Labour government in 2023 and have been picked up by the current government in power. And I think sometimes when you're in opposition, you take positions that when you find yourself back in office, you are not the ones that you're when you're confronted with the official advice and so on. I mean, for example, before the 2023 election, there was a lot of speculation that this government, centre-right Luxon government was actually going to pivot towards, you know, there was an article in Foreign Policy that said New Zealand votes right and pivots towards China, that it would be driven by business interests and want to get, you know, a sort of a warmer China post hasn't been the case at all. I think again, those underlying interests are pretty strong and they're complicated. mean, it's New Zealand's largest trading partner. It's an important player, but there are those other challenging interests at play and that's going to be a challenge, a balancing act for whichever party I think is in power.

Nicholas Khoo

Yeah, you I would agree with David. It's kind of like an emphasis of tone, really. And just to kind of even further complicate the situation, obviously China is New Zealand's number one trade partner. But if you actually add up the percentage of trade that is contributed by our quote unquote traditional allies and important partners, including South Korea, Japan, United States, UK, Australia, the amount of trade constituted by these countries is actually slightly larger than in terms of our trade with China. So this is a really interesting development. moving forward, this is a situation we've actually never faced before as a country. And it will be very interesting how we develop. I'm all for consensus. I hope it actually solidifies over time. There's no reason this can't be the case.

And certainly what this does highlight is that, as David mentioned in 2023, there wasn't much discussion on foreign policy in our general election. For next year, let's hope that there is a serious discussion on foreign policy because it deserves our attention.

David Capie

Can I just also just jump in, David? You also asked about the defence dimension. And I think one of the other things that's interesting here is how the defence conversation has shifted in the last five or six years. You know, the government, as you mentioned, released a defence capability plan. It was the sort of final piece of a defence review that actually began under the previous government. But as you say, for New Zealand, talked about a pretty significant uptick in investment in defence.

But what was pretty striking is that for the two main parties, Labour and National, and then the two other parties on the right and centre right, there's no real disagreement about the need to increase defence expenditure. There are differences, there's no doubt. The AUKUS Pillar 2 connection is one where there's a clear difference has emerged. But that shift in defence around defence is just another example, I think, of where there is actually quite a lot of bipartisanship.

David Andrews

One area that I wanted to maybe narrow in on just to draw the Australian eyes away from our domestic scene and to see how things are perceived internationally in relation to China is the recent circumnavigation of Australia by this Chinese task group. Now, as no doubt you're aware, it caused quite a lot of consternation in Australia. But of course, there were New Zealand ships involved in shadowing those vessels as well.

The Tasman is a our shared waterway rather than it just being a sort of an Australian interest. So I don't know if I guess the short answer, short question rather is like, how was that perceived in New Zealand? Was it viewed as aggressively or as confrontationally as it was in Australia? Because that seemed to be the key analytical takeaway for a lot of people was that this was an attempt by China to coerce or threaten or signal to Australia its vulnerability or least its sort of its interest within China's sort of regional deployments. Was that part of the conversation in New Zealand or was it just a little bit of a interesting sideshow in Australian politics.

Nicholas Khoo

Yeah, so this is a major concern. So we had politicians, ex-politicians on all ends of the spectrum really, that commented on this and certainly raised concerns about this, and rightly so.  The interesting thing about this is that it came in terms of a succession of issues. So you had...not just the Tasman, soon after that had the islands issue. also had, prior to that, the year before you had the missile testing or the ICBM test in the South Pacific. So it seems like it's one issue after another where, you know, whether China is acting out of pure security defensive motives or something different, the fact of the matter is that as they grow as a state with interests, it's beginning to rub up against regional stability to some degree. And, in that respect, New Zealand has to be interested and concerned about this. And it's obviously will be an issue with the Australians too. So moving forward, my sense was that there was a concern in particular about Cook Islands. And I know that Winston Peters was very, very firm about this, that this is an issue of concern to New Zealand.

He was quite concerned that Cook Islands was… I hesitate to characterize it in great detail, but I would say that this is something that really does cut into New Zealand's fundamental national interests. We have a special relationship with the Cook Islands, and it can't be the case that we're not being consulted closely by Cook Islands before they take actions in respect to China.

David Andrews

David, any thoughts from you on that?

David Capie

Yeah, I mean, on the task force, I mean, I agree with Nick. think I was at home on a Friday night and I got a call from a journalist. It was the, I think the key thing that really propelled it onto headlines here was the live firing exercises that caused the diversion of commercial airliners. And that, was a front page story basically for a week. So, it really, mean, in terms of public opinion, it really did have an effect.

And I think New Zealanders, perhaps less so than Australians, aren't really familiar with workings of hard power close to home. So it had an effect. I mean, the government's position here was similar to the one in Australia in that it wanted to walk that line between saying that these are, know, China is completely welcome to exercise freedom of navigation under UNCLOS and those rights, but it would have been nice if there'd been appropriate notice for, in terms of these live firing exercises.

That was a line that Winston Peters repeated to Wang Yi when he was in Beijing not long afterwards. But I think in terms of public opinion, was another one of these examples, just another one of these data points, along with the ballistic missile tests that Nick mentioned, Cook Islands agreement, the Solomon's Island agreement that just are making New Zealanders aware that China is a global actor with global interests that are increasingly present in our neighbourhood and not always in a way that are consistent with New Zealand interests.

David Andrews

Nick, can I just jump back to you for a second to expand on that Cook Island scenario? I, obviously the Pacific is hugely important to both New Zealand and Australia, and it's a key area of focus. But I'm not sure if, if everyone in Australia will know the sort of the particulars of what had been occurring in Cook Islands. Can you maybe expand on that just a little bit for us?

Nicholas Khoo

Also, basically we had Prime Minister Brown basically reach an agreement with, at least informal, an informal agreement with the PRC on a series of agreements that basically allow for an expansion of Chinese economic interests in respect to the Cook Islands. And these were not conveyed to New Zealand, certainly in the level of detail that we would appreciate. In fact, it was such a out of the blue development that Winston Peters, as was referenced just now, saw fit to actually take exception to this agreement that was signed in Beijing subsequent to the meeting that occurred. So this is something that is really an expression of kind of the larger turmoil in the region that in respect to New Zealand's interests is actually basically making a dent. So this is something that is not something we're actually used to. But as we've seen in 2024, the missile tests, and then 2025 with these Tasman exercises by the PRC, and then coming on top of that, the Cook Islands issue, it's all beginning to add up and become very clear that the strategic environment is something that is deteriorating. And obviously, know, full credit to the New Zealand government producing the reports in 2023. They're making very clear their point and it seems to be reflected in actual developments, both in our region and also more broadly in respect to Europe and now in the Middle East. So a picture is beginning to form that would be by now very clear to the New Zealand public entering into an election next year that investments in defence are actually worth it and are wise investments. And this is a major change in New Zealand's foreign policy context.

David Andrews

Speaking of investment and of, I guess, the structures of New Zealand foreign policy, we've talked a little bit about some of these different publications, strategies and documents that have been put out. And one that I actually really commend our listeners to look at, in addition to this recent defence capability plan, which I thought was very, very clear and easy to read, is the national security strategy that came out a few years ago. And as I understand it was framed in part by quite sort of bottom-up approach of public consultation and engagement And feeding in truly national perspectives on what security looks like for New Zealand and for New Zealanders. Now, we don't have a national security strategy in Australia. We've only ever had one back in 2013. But it's something that I think that there's a lot of interest, at least from the National Security College, funnily enough. I think there's a lot of people here that think that would be a worthwhile endeavour. And it's something that we're pursuing in our own way through some community consultations.

I would say that for Obviously for a small country, as New Zealand is, in terms of population, it permits in some ways a more sort of hands-on and engaged form of security consultation. And I think that's something that I've taken away as a real positive that Australia should learn from is to look at the way that New Zealand's conducted some of these reviews and strategies and implement that into our own strategy making. But for that preamble, I just thought as we draw our time to a close.

If you had to of, I suppose, reflect on the broader state of our bilateral relationship, and hopefully you'll excuse us for knocking out the Wi-Fi in Wellington when the Navy came to visit recently, and you won't hold that against us, but David, how would you characterize or view the bilateral Australian-New Zealand relationship? Are there any sort of rough edges that still need to be knocked off? Are things in a good place? What's your sense?

David Capie

Yeah, David. Look, I think the relationship's in a really strong space at the moment. I think that the frictions that were there were primarily around treatment in New Zealanders, rights of New Zealanders in Australia, and some of the questions around deportations. Particularly, I think those came to a head at the end of the Scott Morrison government, and the Albanese government worked pretty quickly, I think, to try and find a solution to those with the Ardern government.

I think the relationship's an excellent heart. It's such an important relationship to New Zealand across all the different dimensions. I'm sure Australia was pleased to see the foreign policy reset, the attention to Australia and the new government's foreign policy priorities, and the attention to defence and security issues. I think those have been welcomed. I think it was already on a good track probably before January 20, but the inauguration of this administration in Washington that's just...and the sort of turmoil we've seen, as it seems to me, if anything, just underscored how important that the relationship is with your closest friends. And so I think it's in a really good space. I think, you know, there are always differences of approach, of tone, scale, resources, but I think right now the relationship's in a really strong, strong place.

David Andrews

How about you, Nick? What are your thoughts or assessments overall?

Nicholas Khoo

I suppose what I would say is that we're in a long run situation. Perhaps this is an obvious point, but it's easy to kind of get caught up in the kind of weekly, monthly, even yearly changes that have been going on in recent years. But to just emphasize, underline the fact that this is a long run thing, a long-haul development where we're going to have to actually rethink a lot of our kind foreign policy basics. I think New Zealand and Australia are showing a lot of promising signs that we're basically on the same page, which is what we would want, Facing a kind more harsh external environment. And, you know, that could very much be silver lining in what's emerging in respect to New Zealand and Australia.

David Andrews

Something we've started doing in recent weeks, is asking our guests as a sort of a final question, if you're sitting down with, let's say, relevant foreign and defence ministers or the prime minister for New Zealand and for Australia, perhaps, if you had the chance to give them a piece of advice or a policy recommendation on how to advance that relationship, what would that be? So, David, I'll start with you if you don't mind. Do you have a key takeaway that you'd like to...share to our political leaders.

David Capie

For all saying that it's in really good shape. I think New Zealanders don't spend nearly enough time thinking about the Australia relationship and don't really actually understand generally how important Australia is to us. And I suspect actually, I were to be honest and go to the other side of the Tasman, that Australia, because it's got other relationships as well, that probably to some extent takes the New Zealand relationship a little bit for granted as well. So I think there are things to do.

You know, we've spent a lot of resources over the last few decades in trying to increase our understanding of China, of the United States. I sometimes think that we need to make those similar investments in broadening public understandings of the value of each partner to the other. Particularly speaking to this side of the Tasman, there's more we could do just to increase our knowledge of just how important Australia is to us.

David Andrews

And Nick, the final word from you.

Nicholas Khoo

You know, I think we're really in very uncharted territory and, you know, the alliance relationship that Australia has with New Zealand is critical to New Zealand and it's something that will be severely tested moving forward. And all the more so that calls for increased investment, not just in the things we'll be talking about in terms of military or leadership to leadership level but basically in engagement at the kind of ground level with the New Zealand population and also vice versa. And so in many respects, we're calling for kind of like traditional people to people diplomacy to really underscore that we're facing headwinds together and we have a long history of cooperation stretching back decades. It's last and it's been very robust. And so there's a lot to build on, but just to kind of underscore this sense that, We are in uncharted territory and the relationship will go through challenges and that there's every reason to be confident, but also to expect that even if there will be some sort of ⁓ development that causes us to kind look hard at ⁓ existing cooperation agreements, that actually we can come out on the other side in a better place. But it will be a challenge moving forward.

David Andrews

A very final last question that's somewhat off topic, I don't want to infer that New Zealand is a cultural monolith. But this episode's coming out before the Super Rugby final on Saturday. We have the Crusaders and the Sheafs, two very strong New Zealand teams in the final. Do we have any tips from the panel for who we think is going to take home the prize this weekend?

David Capie

I'm a Hurricanes fan, the only tragedy is they can't both lose.

David Andrews

As a Warriors fan who also is a Brumby's member, I concur, but I think personally I'm just sick of the Crusaders winning, so I'd be happy to see the Chiefs get up.

David Capie

I think I'm with you on that one, David.

Nicholas Khoo

I'm a neutral on that one.

David Andrews

Well, David Capie, Nick Khoo, thanks so much for being on the National Security Podcast and thanks for sharing your insights.

Nicholas Khoo

Thank you.

David Capie

Pleasure, nice to talk to you David.

National Security Podcast

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