Transcript

Is Europe ready to defend itself without the United States? What roles do major countries like France, Germany, the UK, and partners like Australia play in this equation?

How is the European defence industry responding to the war in Ukraine and rising geopolitical uncertainty?  

Are the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres now fully integrated in an era of global strategic competition?

In this episode, Thorsten Benner and Bruno Tertrais join Rory Medcalf to explore the evolving landscape of European security in the context of global challenges., particularly the impact of the Trump administration, the China-Russia dynamic, and the potential responses of countries like France and Germany.

(This transcript is AI-generated and may contain inaccuracies.)

Thorsten Benner

China is the chief military enabler and technological enabler of Russia right now. China is also directly threatening our security.

Bruno Tertrais

A Europe which may have to take care of it by itself is a completely new scenario for us. That is not a we have seen for a century.

National Security Podcast

You're listening to the National Security Podcast, the show that brings you expert analysis, insights and opinion on the national security challenges facing Australia and the Indo-Pacific produced by the ANU National Security College.

Rory Medcalf

Welcome to the National Security Podcast, recording this episode from the traditional lands of the Ngunnawal and Ngambri people in Canberra, Australia, and I pay respects to their elders past and present. I'm Rory Medcalf, the Head of the National Security College at the Australian National University. And it's a real pleasure on this podcast to introduce our listeners to two of Europe's leading thinkers on geopolitics and security – Thorsten Benner and Bruno Tertrais.

Thorsten is the co-founder and director of the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin. Bruno is the Deputy Director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique in Paris. Both long-time observers not only of the European strategic situation but of Europe's engagement with the Indo-Pacific and the world, and both very familiar with Australia as well, great partners of the National Security College in our work over many years. So welcome both of you to the podcast.

Bruno Tertrais

Thank you

Thorsten Benner

Thanks for having us.

Rory

Today, it's the 9th of May, we're going to record a conversation about European security, but much more broadly than that, the connection between European security and global security. We'll look at the Trump shock, we'll look at the future of the conflict in Ukraine, confrontation with Russia, but also questions of the links of European security to the Indo-Pacific and the world.

 So much to cover and I guess it is an appropriate time to be having this conversation, not only because we're marking this week the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe, but also because there is so much, sadly, so much live conflict in the region and the world today and there may or may not be lessons from the past that we can draw on to manage these tensions going forward. But I thought I would begin with the question of the Trump shock, here in Australia we've just elected or re-elected the Labour government of Prime Minister Albanese and I think there's clarity emerging now about Australia's strategic settings in the years ahead. But a key issue here is how we're going to manage relations with Donald Trump's America in this second term. But of course, for Europe the contours are very, very clear.

And I might go first to you, Torsten. I'm interested in understanding how the shock of this Trump administration, the way that it seems to be turning its back on ⁓ patterns of partnership and alliance across the Atlantic, how is that playing out now in Germany and Europe and what does it mean for European security, Torsten?

Thorsten Benner

Thanks a lot for having me Rory on your podcast. Really appreciate it. I think it's a triple shock. And I think we've found answers or a way forward to varying degrees in Germany and Europe. I'll speak more for Germany maybe because Germany may be the country in Europe that is most affected by this because it's not just on the security posture. Or if you compare it to France. France, was much better adapted due to its more independent stance than Germany has been. On the security front, think rhetorically, at least Chancellor Merz is quite forward leaning. He said on the eve of his election that we need to strive for more independence from the US. That's of course a very, very bold statement on military grounds and he now needs to show or demonstrate that the German government can invest in the necessary capabilities.

The good news is that we've gotten rid of the fiscal constraints, at least domestically, on military spending so we can reinvest in our military in a way we should have done after the first election of Donald Trump. And finally, Trump is getting us to do what is necessary? The open question for me is whether we can get to an agreement with the US on a phasing, on a phased takeover of the critical enablers that the US is providing within NATO for European security. And we can make this a managed transition, so to speak.

More tricky is the economic part of the equation. There again, Germany is much more vulnerable due to its nature of a very, very export-dependent economy, we have a more than 60 billion Euro trade surplus with the US. Donald Trump doesn't like that fact and wants to change that. I don't think Germany has found a real answer to this and a change of its business model to deal with, and that's not just Trump, but also the looming China shock 2.0.

And the third part, think equally far reaching, and we shouldn't forget about it, is the domestic part. And that has been maybe quite a shock that parts of the Republican establishment are now openly aligning themselves with the far-right alternative for Germany party. it looks like, least certainly Mr. Merz has interpreted that way that the parts of the US Republican establishment want regime change in Germany in the sense of a different government and a different attitude toward the alternative for Germany. JD Vance made it clear not only does he want the German establishment to give up its distance to the alternative for Germany, but he basically in his Munich speech outlined that he wants a different transatlantic relationship, not one of liberal-like-minded, liberal-democratic-like-minded powers, but more one of illiberal nationalist-like-minded players. So with the likes of Mr. Orban, the Hungarian prime minister, or the Slovakian prime minister, Fidzo, who is also today in Moscow at Putin's big victory parade.

That's of course a big challenge as Germany needs to manage this very, very severe challenge to its political centre from the fringes, especially from the far right. To have the US Republican establishment amplify this is of course quite something for the German political system to manage.

Rory Medcalf

So there's a lot there and I think those themes will draw out throughout the conversation. think the question of independent strategic policy in Europe and whether there is the will and the capacity for that, particularly in Germany, that confronting question of the domestic roots of policy and whether in fact the Trump factor is going to have a damaging and distorting effect on politics within Europe, although of course the result of the German election, some would say, was in fact a defeat for the Vance-Trump outlook, at least for now. you say, Torsten, perhaps this is the last best chance that Germany and Europe have these next few years to keep going.

Thorsten Benner

They call more than 20 % for the AFD defeat, but they didn't get the extreme right to power straight away, but it's more a longer-term project, I think, on that part.

Rory Medcalf

Perhaps they're one step away. later on the conversation, it would be great to come back, not only in the German context, but also for France and others in Europe, that question of the domestic factor. But turning to you, Bruna Tertrais, of course, on independent strategic policy, France does have a different record. I think this year in the last few months, my own students at the Australian National University have been taking quite a close look, I think, at French strategic policy and ⁓ the legacy of de Gaulle because there are many who would say that much of that is vindicated ⁓ when looking at the position that Trump is putting Europe in. But how's the Trump shock being received from where you sit?

Bruno Tertrais

It's true that the dominant feeling in France has been since November 2024, that our overall analysis of the European security problem has been vindicated. So the French government and Macron, President Macron in particular, have refrain most of the time to...to brag about the fact that the French were right, we told you so, et cetera, which I think was good. Nevertheless, there is a dominant feeling that what we have been saying collectively, what France has been saying since 1958 really, is that we are happy to have an alliance with the United States. It is a key important, this is key partner for European security, but we cannot bank on the fact that the US will always be there for us. And that is a widely shared analysis throughout France.

So I think that we were better equipped mentally, intellectually to face the Trump shock than some of our other key European partners. And this is where people matter. We have a President who has two years left but wants to leave a mark on the European agenda. And I think it's Macron's hour in a sense. Now, words matter. You mentioned independence. Well, it's true that independence, the sense that we don't rely on anyone for key factors of our security, nuclear weapons in particular, is important. But in general, we prefer talking about autonomy. And autonomy means that we're not seeking, nor could we siege,

Complete independence from outside partners, in particular from the United States. Again, this has never been about not having any defence relationship with the United States. We have to have one, by the way. Our defence is not completely independent. We think the US has a role to play and should continue to be an important player in European security.

All in all, the dominant French narrative we think has been more or less vindicated. We're not looking forward to the dissolution of the Atlantic Alliance. We want NATO to stay. NATO matters to us, to us French. A reminder, we rejoined the integrated military structure in 2009, but we French tend to think that we have to get ready for any possible contingency.

When push come to shows and the NATO in the late June will be a very important moment where we will have a better sense of where President Trump, not only the Trump administration, but President Trump wants to go. The body language, his speeches, everything will be analysed very carefully and that summit I think will be a very important moment to see where we're going in the next three years. Fortunately,  this is where it's interesting to have Thorsten and me speaking. I think this is a good moment for the French-German partnership. As we say in Europe, a French-German autart is never enough, but is always necessary to move things forward in Europe.

This is where, once again, people matters, leaders matter. We seem to have two leaders, Frédéric Meuth and Emmanuel Macron, who have a good personal connection and who seem to see more or less eye to eye on the key problems of European security.

Just a final note on the fact that, yes, indeed, questions, domestic problems matter a lot. We have in France a... very important budgetary constraint, which will be NATO’s problem for increasing our defence effort. And obviously we'll also have an election in to use from now.

Rory Medcalf

I'm glad you've mentioned the NATO summit because I think looking ahead over the next few months that will be a framing event. It will be interesting on our part to see whether our Prime Minister attends this year. think Australia several times in recent years has attended as one of the Indo-Pacific four. And I think if anything I've seen in the last few months Australian governments, guess, or Australian government taking European security perhaps a bit more seriously.

Then we have in the past and it's high time for that. But on the broader challenge, and I think France is sort of a long way there apart from anything else with its own nuclear deterrent in that strategic autonomy policy, the broader challenge of capability, and I will come back to you on this, Thorsten, the question of effectively the rearmament of Europe that has been galvanised by the Trump shock and by, for example, the signal that Germany will substantially increase defence spending, that debt will no longer be a break or a limit on that. How's that going?

Thorsten Benner

I let's see how it goes. I think ⁓ it's a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for meeting our capability goals that we've liberated ourselves from this absurd debt break restraint that we've had. And by the way, it should also be a moment for German elites to say to our French colleagues that you by and large got it right. And thank God for France pursuing a more autonomous path because we as Europeans and as Germans would be in a much worse spot in this moment if it weren't for that.

I do think Mr. Merz was a very traditional trans Atlanticist by his background, but has pivoted or has really shown the ability to process reality in a way that he much more wants to invest in European and German capabilities. But as I said, getting rid of the fiscal constraint is the necessary, but not the sufficient condition because you can spend 100 billion euros in a smart way and you can spend it in a stupid way. You can make use of efficiency gains by really trying to integrate European spending on this, or you can spend it in a very parochial way. You can make sure that...by the spending, we lay the foundations for really strong, or like for strengthening European defence industry, or you can just buy abroad and so on. So these are all important considerations. And to my mind it’s way too early to tell whether we kind of pull off the spending in a way. Also reform our procurement bureaucracy in a way that they kind of are much more nimble, agile. Also give chances to some of the new technology, military companies that have players that have emerged in the European defence industry and not just to incumbent suppliers. Because what we see on the battlefield is course a rapidly evolving technological landscape where the 10, 20-year planning horizons of traditional military procurement are challenged by that.

Rory Medcalf

Bruno, how do you think the European defence industry, the whole sector really, is reacting to the opportunity and the challenge, whether it's in France but also across Europe, that question of agility and innovation and investment, how do you see the next few years playing out?

Bruno Tertrais

Overall, the European defence sector has absorbed the idea that one, will be increased defence procurement efforts and there are more money for national procurement. But even though it has shown some ability after two years, maybe three years now of Ukraine war to adjust to a world where faster and the more important production has been required, it is still expecting real money.

What I mean by that is that what I see from the defence industry is that they have done the mental shift, but they're waiting for proofs of love from the national governments. That is, yes, we...see that governments are thinking hard about and sometimes committing themselves to go beyond 2 % of GDP on defence, but we have yet to see a clear path. Although it varies from country to country. Poland is not France obviously, in many respects, but they are cautiously optimistic in the sense that they believe they will get more buying orders from the state, but they're still waiting to see whether this is the beginning of a serious long-term trend or not. I'm really not an expert in industry, by the way, so I can't say much more.

Rory Medcalf

Well, I will give you a question that I, two questions that I think you will have substantial or perhaps provocative answers on. I firstly, Bruno, the relationship with the United Kingdom, where does Britain fit into this European reinvigoration or rearmament? If I were Ukrainian, I'd probably be saying “Thank God for Britain.” among other things. How has that seen from Paris?

Bruno Tertrais

The UK factor is extremely important. And once again, people matter. We have a prime minister in the UK who not only has a good personal connection with most of his European counterparts, but who's also determined to go beyond Brexit and establish a working relationship with his key EU partners on defence which will ensure that the UK is firmly incurred to the rest of the continent in that respect. The French-British partnership on defence has always been strong and I think will get stronger in the coming months.  I'm reassured by the fact that in this moment where we have to absorb, like all of us, as you do in Australia, we all have to absorb the Trump shock.

 

The fact that we have the three key countries plus Poland, that is the UK, France, Germany, and Poland,  more or less on the same tune. is one, we want the US to say, but if the US leaves or drastically reduces its presence, we'll to make up for it, at least partially. And two, we are committed together – not only nationally, but together to ensure that Europe will be able to deter Russia and defend against Russia if needed in the coming years. The problem is a question of timing. There are endless debates on can Europe defend itself without the United States? I think it's a more complex debate than it looks. People sometimes they take the US commitments, the units, the material contribution, they say, well, how could Europe replace that in timely fashion? Well, maybe we'll do things differently. Again, the big question, which is new for us Europeans, is how do we deter Russia without the United States? Nobody, I think, has a clear answer to that. How do we defend against a possible limited Russian aggression if the United States is not present? Again, the good news is that most of the key leaders in Europe, not all of them, but most of the key leaders see eye to eye on the challenge, at least on the broad principles that we should adopt in the coming years to face with that challenge. Now, once again, the big problem is that we don't know exactly what the challenge is. There's still several different scenarios for the future of the Atlantic Alliance. We could have Trump deciding to withdraw everything. It would be irresponsible not to plan for this scenario, but we could also have a much more favourable or positive scenario with Trump saying, okay, you've agreed to increase your defence efforts. You have to understand that I have to transfer some of my assets to the Indo-Pacific, but I will remain committed to European security. And we have to plan for all these scenarios.

National Security Podcast

We'll be right back.

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Rory Medcalf

The other theme where I am confident Bruno, you'll have some valuable things to say for our listeners is the nuclear dimension, nuclear deterrence of Russia and beyond. But I might actually throw that ball to Torsten first, because you've written a piece quite recently, Torsten, in think Foreign Policy, where you talked about a German position on nuclear deterrence, somewhat at odds with where Germany's been in recent decades. If you could maybe share some of your thinking first, and we'll go back to Bruno after that.

Thorsten Benner

My own thinking is very much in the spirit of hoping for the best and preparing for the worst, what Bruno has outlined. There may be positive scenarios. Mr. Trump may moderate after the bruising experience with the markets and so on. mean, his first months in the presidency haven't been a roaring success on all fronts. That's the scenario. There might be a sane American president taking over in less than four years. That's all possible.

But I do think we need to start preparing for the worst, for worse outcomes, including the US pulling back its nuclear extended deterrence umbrella to Europe. And for the longest time, the majority of Germans have thought that if you only contemplate this even privately and if it gets then public, it would incentivize Mr. Trump to have crazy thoughts and say, can pull it back. I think he doesn't need any external stimulus for crazy thoughts. He's well able to generate them himself. So we better get going and imagine a future where we cannot rely on a US extended nuclear deterrence.

And we're in the luxurious situation, unlike you know, your regional neighbours, Japan and South Korea, that at least we have nuclear powers in Europe, that we can nuclear-armed powers like France. And Bruno has written very elaborately on this. France is already contributing to European nuclear deterrence, but what kind of arrangements would be possible with France that could possibly be a functional, not equivalent, but something akin to nuclear sharing that Germany has US, for example, nuclear warheads stationed in Germany and similar arrangements could be of a different kind of precise kind be imagined with France. And that's probably fairly controversial in a very anti-nuclear country like Germany. We've spent the past decade trying to rid us of anything nuclear also on the civil side that I do think It's irresponsible to not invest in civilian nuclear research now that we have at least possible future scenarios that the increased global energy hunger from artificial intelligence and so on could be met by new nuclear technologies and not just the small and modular reactors that are not quite cost effective now, but also thorium and fusion. And so that we need to recommit to civilian nuclear research.

And I do think...Germany also ultimately needs to create, maintain, without talking, I of course our government shouldn't be talking about this, some sort of nuclear latency because the strategic environment may shift, you know, not in our favour in the future. it's also unclear whether in the long run we can rely on our neighbours and what the posture, for example, of a possible far left or far right government in France would be on cooperation with Germany. So, we need to plan, as I said, hope for the best, work constructively with anybody. can work constructively with anyone, but at least in our background thinking, prepare for the worst scenarios because time and again, Germans have been surprised that their hope-ism that things will somehow work out, that we can continue with our existing business model on both security and political economy, that we can just with minimal adjustments continue that that hope-ism has been challenged or had a rude awakening in a clash with reality.

Rory Medcalf

So Bruno, so much there on the precursors of a new nuclear debate in Germany, even questions of nuclear sharing or perhaps even nuclear latency. I'm assuming, well, I know that there are similar conversations happening in Poland, perhaps more overtly. So, your perspective as a nuclear strategy specialist in France looking at this, how is France looking at the future of its own role in nuclear deterrence across Europe?

Bruno Tertrais

Well, first of all, the good news is that there are conversations happening between Germany and France, between France and Poland. And these conversations are much more intense and easygoing than they were 10 years ago. This is an old debate, you know, can there be, should there be a bigger European contribution to nuclear deterrence on the continent? But I'm struck by the fact that these conversations are much easier than they were 10 years ago and that's good news. That is our neighbours have understood that it's time to break that taboo.

 So I think overall there are three scenarios. I like to break things down into three scenarios. First scenario, there is increased worry about the solidity of the US nuclear shield, but it still exists on paper, but our neighbours want to be reassured, mean, was additional reassurance. And I think France and the UK, I'm a big fan of always saying France and the UK, because the UK is committed to European nuclear security, should provide additional reassurance more by words and exercises and by anything else. We can do it, but it depends on what they request and how far our British friends are ready to go at this point. I suspect there is some reluctance in the UK political establishment to more openly commit themselves outside the NATO framework to the nuclear protection of allies because they are extremely worried about the future of their own technical cooperation with the US at this point in time. So that's for now, in a sense.

What if there was complete breakdown of the...nuclear security guarantee offered to Europe. I we have to plan for. Then I think again, the UK and France completely outside the EU framework, by the way, it says they shouldn't have anything to do with the EU, including because some of our EU partners are viscerally anti-nuclear, like the Austrians and the Irish for instance. Can we imagine that we reproduce more or less the systems that the system that exists in NATO? Yes, partly, at least for the idea that you can plan for a common nuclear operation with nuclear and non-nuclear countries. That's entirely feasible on paper. What we could not do easily because it would take time and cost a lot of money is to reproduce the nuclear sharing arrangements that exists in NATO. I  think the French are intellectual and politically ready to consider it now, but I always caution about those making, I'm not talking about you Thorsten, but some are saying, yeah, we could have French missiles carried by F-35. Wait a minute, it's not as easy as it looks. If you want to deploy permanently nuclear weapons on another country's territory, it's costly are plenty of legal, technical problems to consider. All in all, this can be imagined and should be imagined, but that will not happen, that would not happen before a long time.

Then there's a third scenario, which is kind of the one that Thorsten mentioned when he talked about nuclear latency, is can, should non-nuclear country, and I'm not from one, prepare for a complete breakdown of existing security arrangements, including the non-proliferation treaty. When I say complete breakdown, let me clarify. It's very hard for me to imagine a realistic and probable scenario where an existing non-nuclear European country believes it has to go nuclear in the coming 15 years. It's very difficult for me to imagine such circumstances. Never say never – again 30 years from now, things may be different. And there are countries which already have some nuclear related experience like Germany, along with Netherlands, they have uranium enrichment capabilities, etc. They are technically advanced, et cetera.

 But once again, it's a third and highly improbable scenario from where I stand. The fact that you have a country like Poland who openly says, look, if we don't have a nuclear security guarantee, we may have to consider national option is one thing, but it doesn't mean that they are politically ready to seriously consider a national nuclear option.

Rory Medcalf

This is a very dynamic conversation, and I think it's sharing with our listeners some pretty confronting thoughts about the future of security. But let's bring it back to the immediate circumstances of conflict. We're recording in May 2025, the conflict in Ukraine arising from Russia's invasion, Putin's illegal and brutal invasion of Ukraine continues despite the efforts for peace on whoever's terms. It would be interesting to hear some thoughts from each of you as to how you see the Ukraine situation and Europe's security protection against Russia playing out in at least the months ahead. Torsten?

Thorsten Benner

It's hard to predict. you know, I've become quite humble. Bruno, I think you very eloquently put it, you know, within, you know, from extrapolating from today, 15 years from now, I hope no European country has to consider, like additional country has to consider and decide to become, try to become a nuclear armed power itself, be it Poland or Germany. But had you asked me in 2010, my sense of imagination wouldn't have been enough to actually imagine what happened in the past 15 years. That was during the heydays of the Obama administration and so on. I was fairly naive back then. I'm doubting my own imagination now. Maybe I'm over-imagining things, but I think at least I've... Bruno, you've been in this Cheechic space for all your career, I'm more in international relations and international institutions. I believed in the gospel of liberal internationalism and global governance and so on. And that was a nice future we imagined for a while. And I wish that future had become true, but it hasn't. So I've become quite sceptical of my own sense of imagination. But I hope to be proven wrong by reality.

In terms of the coming months on Ukraine, it's to be seen. I think Germany for sure needs to be able and willing to lead on supporting Ukraine militarily, either in the very unlikely case that there be some sort of pause to the fighting agreed among the parties. don't see that this is where it's going right now. JD Vance said as much recently that the US government doesn't seem to have much hope that its so-called mediation efforts prove successful.

And so we need to support Ukraine in the short term with what it needs, but I don't think we have longer term answers on what Ukraine desires, security guarantees and so on. don't think the German government, mean, Mr. Maez has been quite forward-leaning on a lot of things, including actually contemplating, discussing with France on nuclear sharing scenarios and so on. He, for example, drew what sounded like a pretty strict red line, for example, on German troops being deployed in the case of some sort of ceasefire and so on. I don't think we have a plan, like at least I haven't seen a plan for this from the German side for the contribution.

I think in the very, very, very unlikely case that there be some sort of, imagine there's some sort of US-Russian agreement that Ukraine agrees to and that sanctions are being rolled back. These will be quite brutal discussions also within Germany, within Europe, then how we should react to that, pull back our own sanctions to a degree with a snapback mechanism and so on.

That's not the most likely, the most likely scenario is that we need to find a way to support Europe. Dahmer and Macron have done that in the so-called Rammstein support process already to kind of, you know, to have this European led and try to get the U.S. maybe with European funding to provide as much military assistance to Ukraine as possible. But Bruno will maybe know what the likely scenario is and maybe tell me that we're all prepared and that just the Germans have been out of that debate for the past six months as we kind of chose a new government.

Rory Medcalf

Bruno.

Bruno Tertrais

Well, actually, I'm fairly confident in my forecast for the coming months. Let me put it this way. One, there won't be a peace agreement or a long-term stabilization agreement between Russia and Ukraine. Two, there could be a temporary complete ceasefire given that it may be in the interest of both parties after more than three years of war. Three, there will be increased European assistance, but not enough for Ukraine. But given that it's unlikely that the US stops all support Ukraine, I think that it will not completely change the military situation on the battlefield.

But let me put it this way. I rarely use the expression, it's a historical moment, it's a turning point. But I do think that 2025, for the Europeans because of the combination of a Russia which is now structurally almost permanently at war and a US, the United States of America, which is increasingly less likely to be considered the prime guarantor of European security, while facing convergence which I think is truly historical.

My take regarding the long-term question of Russia-Ukraine is that it's a historical separation between Russia and Europe. It's the end of a historical cycle that began in 17th century. Even though I'm certainly not a doctor doom regarding the risk of possible Russian military attack on Europe I don't think we're facing anything like the Soviet Warsaw Pact threat, but the risk of a limited attack on Europe for huge political gains for Russia, potentially, at least seen from Russia's and a Europe which may have to take care of it by itself is a completely new scenario for us. That is not a scenario we have seen for a century.

By the way, this does not necessarily mean, and I don't know whether you want to talk about that Rory, but that we are now a hundred percent focused on the Northeast of Europe. I think it's important for a country like France, for a country like Germany to realize that it's a big world out there that we cannot close our eyes on what happens in the Indo-Pacific.

I expect actually the French new strategic review to include a reminder that the Russian problem and the fact that we may have to take care of it pretty much on our own doesn't mean and shouldn't mean that we're entirely refocused on strategic outlook on Europe. I think it's a big debate. It's an emerging debate. I suspect that Germany and France would agree that doesn't mean that we should close our eyes to what's happening on your side.

Rory Medcalf

Well, look, what I might do with we've got so much ground to cover and it's already been, think, a very substantial conversation. There are three themes that I did want us to at least touch on before we wrapped up the conversation. And one of those was very much the question of the connection of the theatres, China and the Indo-Pacific. How does that connect with the Euro-Atlantic? You know, it's quite obvious to say now that with China effectively enabling the Russian war economy with North Korean troops in the conflict in Europe. Extraordinary things that I think certainly my imagination would have had difficulty contemplating not long ago that the theatres are connected, but at the same time, it's quite understandable how Europe needs to look to its own security first. So I would be interested in any parting observation from either or both of you on the China and the Indo-Pacific factor. Secondly, the fact that we do have sadly other theatres of conflict in the world. The ongoing crisis in the Middle East sparked proximately by the October 7 attack on Israel, but now unfolding in so many awful ways. The fact that India and Pakistan are exchanging fire right now across the line of control and indeed over the border. And then finally, thirdly, that point of the domestic origins of strategic policy and whether we can actually count on any of our countries having effective and stable strategic policies in the years to come. So there's three, I think, rather confronting dishes on the a la carte menu here. And I know we can't cover them all in the next few minutes, but I might just offer each of you a chance to offer some substantial closing thoughts. Torsten?

Thorsten Benner

Thank you, Rory. Indeed, hard to do justice to in just a couple of minutes. I won't say much on the domestic challenge, save to say that I think none of the big European countries can guarantee a stable political outlook to underwrite a strategic posture that at least I've outlined for my country. it's part of, you know...one of the biggest challenges for our political elites is to stabilize the centre and to find popular support for that.

But let's just imagine we're successful with that. where should we be going on the questions that you've outlined? By the way, Bruno, on the Russia question, I'm totally in alignment that we need to be able to deter and deal with Russia by ourselves and prepare ourselves for that. On the historical break of that cycle that Russia is turning away from Europe for good, and you said like during the Cold War that was still part of that cycle and now it's turning away, at least I would allow, and maybe I'm naive, know, Mr. Putin and his, you know, and his ilk are there now they may not be there in, know, at least we should strive for a future and also be able to deal with a somewhat different Russia because indeed these theatres are connected.

And we're confronted right now with a dual Russia-China charge. Mr. Xi chose to not go to Brussels to celebrate the anniversary of relations between China and Europe, but he chose to go to Moscow to deepen the strategic partnership with Russia. China is the chief military enabler and technological enabler of Russia right now. China is also directly threatening our security. You don't even need to connect the theatres, but of course the theatres are connected in the sense that the strategic or the fight between China, the US, and the countries that want to maintain their autonomy in the region, of course, also very much affects our economic interests. it was right for the German coalition agreement to say that we need to continue to focus on a free and open Indo-Pacific, deepen relations with countries like Australia, India, Japan, and so on. We're not a military power there, but politically, we very much need to do this and also increase military cooperation without us, unlike France, being a resident military power there. So, I think we need to be doing that. And all the while, Bruno may say something about the other theatres of conflict.

Given, I'm from an institute that calls itself Global Public Policy Institute. I come from a tradition of global governance and international institutions. think in all these strategic debates, we shouldn't forget the destabilizing effects of the assault of the Trump administration on global institutions that may have just started them withholding. It's in the cards that we withhold funding, for example, the whole of UN peacekeeping operations and many of the UN agencies, the 40 % of what they provide for humanitarian assistance. So, these are all in these theatres also possible destabilizing factors. So I think as Europeans or at least as Germany, a country that is committed to much lateral institutions, we need to start the process of reimagining international corporation and international institutions without the US supporting that system or the US actively trying to destroy parts of the system. That's a discussion also on global health for that matter, because it's intricately linked to security as we've seen during the pandemic. That's a discussion also in this strategic thinking context we shouldn't have.

Rory Medcalf

Thank you. Bruno, noting that your president actually I think is going to be speaking at the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore a few weeks from now, it would be interesting to hear your closing thoughts on the Indo-Pacific dimension as well as any of those other factors.

Bruno Tertrais

Yes, by the way, I'm slightly more optimistic or at least not as pessimistic as Thorsten regarding the US commitment to global institutions in the sense that I don't think the US has yet passed the points of no return. It may happen, but we're not there yet. So on your three questions very quickly, one, the connections between the Pacific and the European security. I'm delighted very seriously that Macron goes to Shangri-La because it would be a great opportunity to remind our friends and allies in the region that exactly what I was saying earlier, the fact that we're going to focus more on the Northeast of Europe does not and should not and will not mean that we are, that it's a zero-sum game and that we will be less interested in the Pacific.

I guess the key question is that we're We all know that the connections are strong and getting stronger between the two theatres, so to say. I think the question is, what do we make of those connections? Let me give you an example. Assuming there is less U.S. interest in its alliances, even though he wants to focus in the Indo-Pacific, does it make sense for Australia and Japan to get closer in terms of defence and security relations with key European partners, because if a common protector is no longer there, it is a common interest to deepen our security relationship. It's a question mark.  I think, but once again, I think the connections are obvious. It's what we make of the increased connection.

Second point on China. This could be the subject of a much broader and longer conversation, and one which Thorsten knows more than I do. Here's my question. Will the changes in the trade flows and value chains and the possible, although not necessarily likely, increase commercial ties in some segments at least between China and Europe, mean that we as Europeans will be less committed to protecting common interests in the Indo-Pacific, supporting at least verbally Taiwan, et cetera. It's a question mark for me.

On domestic issues, I think for my country, for France, the big problem is as follows. We are in an extremely difficult budgetary situation in the sense that our public debt is literally ballooning and we are going to be extremely vulnerable to an increase in the interest rates in coming 10 years.

My question is, will France be able to continue to be one of the key leaders in European defence with a defence budget which I think cannot go much beyond 2.5 % maybe of GDP in five to 10 years from now? It's a question mark. I think it's a classic ambitions versus capabilities question. I will end on one rather optimistic point.

If the National Rally, the so-called radical right came to power in 2027, which is a real possibility, I'm utterly convinced that they would seek to reassure allies and partners more than break with our traditional defence policy. They weren't bound to be seen as a normal governing party. So I'm not too worried for our line of work. I'm not worried about that scenario, which at this point in time has a 50-50 chance of happening.

Rory Medcalf

Bruno, before we close, just one quick observation from you on the, whether it's the Middle East or South Asia or both of those zones of conflict and crisis and how that relates to European security perceptions.

 

Bruno Tertrais

Very briefly, geography matters. there is continued deep interest in Europe about the Middle East for many different reasons. But there is particular interest in France because we host both the biggest Jewish community in Europe and the biggest Muslim community in Europe. There's always the fear that the conflict is imported, so to say, in France.

So overall, think that Ukraine is still looked upon by European public opinion, at least in France, with a lot of interest and support for Ukraine. I'm really, really sure by the fact we're not really suffering from Ukraine fatigue. If you had told me three years ago that three years from now, we would still be supporting Ukraine and that French public opinion and overall European public opinion, not talking about specific country like Hungary or Slovakia would still be supporting Ukraine. I would have been extremely reassured. That was not a given.

Thorsten Benner

Maybe as a final point, geography matters, but sometimes we need to also transcend geography. What we're doing now, having this joint podcast, France has very much invested in its Indo-Pacific IQ. I think Germany needs to do that much more. So I'm glad we're doing this program together, Rory, bringing German parliamentarians to Australia and having joint exchanges. Last year we went to India, I think these kinds of initiatives like we did with the Robert Bosch foundations, we need to be as Germans doing in the future because Australia is far away, but we have a lot of common interests to pursue and it's important to invest in the relationship.

Rory Medcalf

Thank you for mentioning that, Thorsten. I think the work that we've done together in parliamentary education will, I hope at the moment, help parliamentarians in both of our countries understand a bit better what's happening, for example, in India and its crisis with Pakistan. But we are going to have to leave it there. We're up against the clock. It's been a very frank and rich discussion. I think you've been very generous, both of you, in sharing your insights with our listeners.

So Bruno Tertrais and Thorsten Benner, thank you for joining the National Security Podcast.

Thorsten Benner

Thanks for having us. Thank you.

Bruno Tertrais

Thanks Roy. Pleasure.

National Security Podcast

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