A techno-diplomacy strategy for telecommunications in the Indo-Pacific

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This paper – authored by Lisa Curtis and Martijn Rasser from the Center for a New American Security – argues that the Quad has an opportunity to shape the telecommunications ecosystem in the Indo-Pacific so that key 5G and undersea cable infrastructure are more secure, resilient and open. The authors recommend that a concrete techno-diplomatic strategy – developed in partnership between Australia, the United States, India and Japan – will be key to ensuring that the future of the Indo-Pacific is free and open.

Key points

  • Public Diplomacy. The Quad members should have consistent messaging on the geopolitical risks of using technology from autocratic states.
  • Industry Collaboration. The Quad members should pool resources to provide financial incentives for private sector R&D, standard-setting, and digital infrastructure development. The four governments should also work with the private sector to craft an undersea cable strategy that addresses the risks associated with Chinese firms and cable landing sites in China.
  • Countering Coercion. The Quad members should provide financial or diplomatic support to any Indo-Pacific country that Beijing targets in response to forgoing Chinese technology purchases.
  • Government Financing. The Quad members should create new infrastructure financing mechanisms for telecommunications infrastructure development throughout the Indo-Pacific to provide a sustainable alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
  • Monitoring and Security. The Quad members should set up a joint monitoring system to safeguard the integrity of the region’s subsea cable network.
  • Strengthening Legal Frameworks. The Quad members should contribute to strengthening international laws to help prevent both physical damage and cyberattacks on telecommunications networks, particularly subsea cables.

Policy recommendations

  • Public Diplomacy. The Quad countries should pursue a clear and consistent effort to inform the publics of the Indo-Pacific countries about the risks of using technology from techno-autocracies, such as China. These efforts should also include helping governments in the region to build systemic mechanisms to factor geopolitical risks in policy decision making.
  • Industry Collaboration. The Quad members should provide incentives such as tax credits to encourage more and deeper collaboration, particularly for R&D, standardsetting, and infrastructure development in third countries. For undersea cables, the private sectors of each Quad nation must also discuss the implications for the market and overall connectivity and internet performance of segregating Chinese companies in subsea cable construction and in avoiding landing sites on or near mainland China.  Countering Coercion. The Quad members should provide financial or diplomatic support to any Indo-Pacific country that Beijing targets in response to forgoing Chinese technology purchases. Ensuring a united front on this matter will demonstrate to the region that Beijing cannot exert its will in the region unfettered. Numerous scholars have proposed ideas for countering Chinese economic coercion that could serve as the model for such an effort.
  • Government Financing. The US-Japan-Australia joint project to finance the subsea cable to Palau is a good example of multilateral cooperation to compete against Chinese efforts to dominate subsea cable construction in the Pacific Islands, where demand for bandwidth and connectivity is rapidly increasing. The US International Development Finance Corporation’s loan of $500 million to a consortium of companies to develop a mobile network in Ethiopia could serve as a template for 5G projects. Future efforts to pool financing for subsea cable projects in the Indo-Pacific region with strategic benefits for all four Quad members should also involve India. While India has not traditionally engaged in this type of multi-country project financing, its participation in such initiatives would send a strong signal about the strength and impact of the Quad as a part of the regional architecture.
  • Monitoring and Security. With an increased number of Chinese oceanographic research and survey vessels transiting the Indian Ocean Region, it is important for the Quad nations to set up a system to monitor the movements and activities of the Chinese vessels and guard against sabotage and espionage of the subsea cable network. Similarly, regular information exchanges between the Quad governments on Chinese digital infrastructure investments will streamline cooperative action by the Quad on efforts to counter and mitigate those developments.
  • Strengthening Legal Frameworks. The Quad members can contribute to strengthening international laws to help prevent both physical damage and cyberattacks on telecommunications networks, particularly subsea cables. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea recognises the freedom of states to lay and protect cables within their Exclusive Economic Zones and to lay cables on the continental shelf, yet there is no existing treaty to protect against cyber warfare on subsea cables. The International Cable Protection Committee, an international non-governmental organisation that promotes undersea cable protection, could serve as a valuable resource for the Quad governments as they consider developing and promoting specific international standards and regulations to maintain security of undersea cables.

About the series

This paper has been written for the Quad Tech Network Dialogue, as part of the Quad Tech Network (QTN) initiative. QTN is an initiative of the NSC, delivered with support from the Australian Government. It aims to establish and deepen academic and official networks linking the Quad nations – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – in relation to the most pressing technology issues affecting the future security and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific.

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