Frankcom was a tragic victim of a brutal and complex war

The death of aid worker Zomi Frankcom was a terrible tragedy. There is no doubt she was working in Gaza out of the best of motivations and it was brave of her to serve in a dangerous war zone. The world can ill-afford to lose such people.

There is a shared responsibility for her death; there are the operational mistakes and failed targeting process of the Israel Defence Forces, freely admitted by the IDF and for which it has apologised. Frankcom was also let down by the poor operational standards of the World Central Kitchen, particularly when compared with the experienced and proven standards adhered to by organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. 

The person assigned to investigate and report on the WCK incident on behalf of the Australian government, with the full co-operation of the IDF, was former defence force chief Mark Binskin. Binskin has a wealth of high level operational and targeting experience in Iraq, during the initial large-scale conventional manoeuvre operations, then later in the highly relevant siege of Mosul from October 2016 to July 2017.

His report disclosed that the WCK hired armed guards, a move was not cleared with the IDF. The WCK vehicles were using a route that was different to the one communicated to the IDF. The movement was conducted at night rather than in daylight, which was also contrary to what had been advised to the IDF. One of the WCK guards was observed by the IDF firing into the air. These factors led to the IDF conclusion that the convoy had been hijacked by Hamas.

The WCK vehicles did not carry transponders and radios, and were inadequately marked. This is in contrast to the ICRC, an organisation well -practised in working in war zones. The lack of radios was particularly problematic in this instance: the IDF had no way of tactically communicating with WCK. That is inexcusable

Mike Kelly, co-author, was seconded from the Australian Army to support the work of the ICRC in Bosnia and became very familiar with what a sound intergovernmental organisation/non-governmental organisation war zone operation should look like. 

Across multiple deployments he observed laxity and incompetence in high-threat environments from a variety of NGOs. In general, they are motivated by good intentions. But as the saying goes, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. The WCK was operating in an ongoing conflict zone unrivalled for its complexity. Its operating capability and procedures didn’t adequately provide for that environment.

The other party bearing responsibility for Frankcom’s death is Hamas itself. This terrorist organisation routinely hijacks food convoys to support its own operational model, including prioritising feeding its own combatants, denying food to Gazans who opposed them and using the looted supplies to underpin the black-market economy that funds its operations. 

In July, the UN co-ordinator responsible for Gaza, Ramiz Alakbarov, was forced to issue a public condemnation of Hamas for obstructing aid operations entering a World Food Program warehouse, assaulting truck drivers and forcing shutdown of a food distribution point. He cited a “dangerous pattern of intimidation, violence and obstruction, including smuggling attempts, targeting and abusing humanitarian operations”. He said these Hamas actions were “placing humanitarian workers at risk”.

Apart from its role in starting and prolonging the war, this constant looting and compromising of aid activity by Hamas created the circumstances in which the WCK incident was at risk of occurring, particularly when compounded by the poor operational standards of the WCK. For Zomi Frankcom, this toxic mix proved fatal.

Notwithstanding the mistakes made by the IDF, Binskin found “the IDF strike on the WCK aid workers was not knowingly or deliberately directed against the WCK”. He also highlighted that IDF targeting regimes, battlefield management and investigation procedures were substantially the same as those employed by the Australian Defence Force. What needs to be understood here is that military personnel are subject to two disciplinary systems: administrative and criminal. 

In this case several IDF officers were subjected to administrative discipline. Binskin highlights that this is the appropriate course of action when it is determined criminal proceedings aren’t warranted.

He further cites the example of the Kunduz MSF Hospital incident in Afghanistan in October 2015 in which a US airstrike resulted in 42 deaths. An Australian doctor, present during the airstrike, was fortunate to survive. This was also found to be a mistake and administrative discipline action was taken against those responsible. Australia did not demand a criminal prosecution. 

As brutal as it sounds, the laws of armed conflict are situated in the context of violent war zones where lawful killing is permitted. To establish a war crime in such circumstances is difficult. In an announcement that also included reference to the WCK incident, the Israeli Military Advocate General authorised two other cases from the war to be further pursued on a criminal basis, proving the system in Israel is working effectively. 

This reality should be respected. Imagine, for a moment, if the Afghan Foreign Minister publicly reprimanded the Australian government by saying the ADF members accused of the 39 alleged murders in Afghanistan should all have been convicted by now, and the 13-year delay in bringing those matters to trial amounted to a cover-up. What would we have said to that?

Binskin should be called on again for his expert advice on the findings regarding Frankcom’s death. It appears Israel is open to co-operating again with such a further consultation and if confirmed that offer should be accepted.

Mike Kelly is co-convener of Labor Friends of Israel and former minister for defence materiel. Anthony Bergin is an expert associate at ANU’s National Security College.This article first appeared in The Australian 24 August 2026.